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The Politics of Black Squatter Movements on the Rand,
1944-1952

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Studies of black urbanization in South Africa have tended to focus on the larger forces impelling African families off the land, on the evolution of state policies of regulation and control, and on the politics and culture of more permanent black communities. Much less well-known and researched are the politics of migrant workers in the cities, and of those communities in the process of becoming urban, particularly squatter societies on the fringes of towns. Even where the importance of the latter has been recognized, there has still been a tendency to equate black urban squatting with organized squatter movements and communities like the Orlando squatters outside Johannesburg in 1944 and 1946, the Cato Manor settlement outside Durban in the mid 1940s, and the Crossroads squatter camp outside Cape Town in the 1970s and early 1980s, so that once these have been removed or suppressed, the issue of squatting is deemed to have disappeared. Yet such organized squatter camps have merely been the high points, the most visible concerted expressions of what has been an almost continuous phenomenon of massive proportions from the beginning of the century to the present.

Between the 1890s and the 1910s, unregulated squatter shanties sprang up on mining land all along the Rand. Toward the end of the first decade of the 1900s these were broken up and re-constituted into urban locations. The so-called problem seemed briefly to have been brought under control but it soon re-emerged. In 1919, the post-World War II government instituted a new form of land tenure, in the shape of small-holdings around the main towns of the Rand, to provide a kind of pension for ex-miners and other members of the white working class and to help defuse white working-class militancy. Instead of breeding a contented white citizenry, and providing dairy products for the towns, this land quickly be-
came one of the major sites of black urban residence. Tens of thousands of black workers, and eventually hundreds of thousands, found homes in these areas, living in small clusters of shacks on innumerable plots.

In the 1950s, government efforts succeeded in clearing most of these peri-urban squatting communities. But, contrary to the image of the apartheid state as brutally efficient, its success in keeping these areas clear was short-lived. In the 1960s, the freeze on the provision of black housing and the surge of industrial production meant that squatter shanties again made their appearance by the end of the decade. Over the past twenty years they have grown in solidity and size, so that the latest estimate of the combined populations is in excess of four million.

These peri-urban squatter communities, which have been such a substantial and enduring feature of black urban life, have left their own lasting imprint on black urban society. The politics of certain areas of Soweto—Naledi, Phiri, Mapetla—for example, still display their own distinct characteristics in response to this bequest. Likewise, even now, the peri-urban settlements around Cape Town, Pietermaritzburg, and Durban seem to reproduce much of the characteristic cluster of political practices and core components of political culture that other squatter communities have generated in the past. A close examination of the past may thus serve at least partially to illuminate the present. The slice selected for this study is the squatter movement that sprang up on the Rand in the mid and late 1940s and foreshadowed the birth of today’s massive African townships on the Rand.

The Second Great Trek

The squatter movements on the Rand trace their origins to the structural changes taking place during the 1920s in the white farming areas of the Orange Free State and Transvaal. The black labor tenantry which lived in these areas was exploited more harshly and ruthlessly by capitalizing and increasingly sub-divided struggling white farmers. The brief explosion of resistance from rural farm workers led by the Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union (ICU) was one expression of this pressure. Emigration to the towns and the city fringes was another. As early as 1927, G. Ballenden, the Non-European Affairs Manager for Johannesburg, complained of six hundred black families streaming into Johannesburg each year, and it is highly probable that the great bulk of these were fleeing
from the farms. Certainly, the greater proportion of immigrants arriving in Brakpan at the time were coming from Transvaal farms. Under the impact of a devastating drought which gripped the whole of South Africa in 1932-23, this exodus gathered force, augmented by increasing numbers from the African reserves whose economies were also cracking in this period of stress.\(^5\)

Every town in South Africa recorded a massive increase in its black population in this period, a growing proportion of which comprised women and juveniles. Between 1926 and 1936 Johannesburg’s black population increased by 40 percent. The percentage increase of black women on the Witwatersrand towns in the 1920s ranged from 58.6 percent in Brakpan to 158.6 percent in Germiston. This sudden influx into the towns placed a great strain on available resources, particularly housing, and stretched the assimilative capacities of urban culture to its limits.

The stagnant employment market in the towns acted as a limited disincentive to emigration in the 1920s and early 1930s, and helped put a brake on the flow. However, as Martin Legassick and Harold Wolpe have suggested, an increasingly large latent surplus population was being dammed up in the rural areas of South Africa awaiting the opportunity to break out. Its chance came with the sustained expansion of the South African economy following South Africa’s departure from the gold standard in 1933. The new revenues accruing to the gold mining industry and government promoted a dramatic surge forward in manufacturing and the crea-
tion of countless new jobs. The outbreak of the Second World War accelerated the trend. The numbers of factories in South Africa grew from 6,543 in 1933 to 9,999 in 1946. The black urban population of Johannesburg rose from 229,122 in 1936 to 384,628 in 1948.7

The flood of immigrants to the towns changed the face of black urban life. The municipalities initially reacted by attempting to impose a tighter system of permits on women and lodgers. In response, new types of black political organizations began to be formed in the shape of Vigilance Associations and Tenants' Leagues, often loosely linked to the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA). Little is known about their activities or the political culture to which they gave expression. All that is clear is that under their aegis the mass meeting became an increasingly popular form of political expression.8 The surge of immigration to the towns also brought new frictions to black urban society. Since virtually no new housing was built for blacks in this period a large proportion of new arrivals found accommodation as sub-tenants in the houses or back yards of the established black urban dwellers. With so many people crammed into such a small space, inter-personal and familial tensions became acute, and with space at such a premium, rack-renting and cavalier treatment of tenants by landlords also became common. The earlier communal spirit consequently began to break down and to be replaced by class animosities between the long established city folk and the new arrivals in the towns.

The alternative to seeking sub-tenancies in the towns was to squat on white small-holdings in the peri-urban areas. This took place on a vast scale until the land surrounding the main urban areas, both on the Reef and around South Africa's other main towns, became like one huge residential sponge. In Brakpan alone, on the far east end of the Rand, a population of between 9,000 and 12,000 Africans lived on the small-holdings, a figure which swelled to 23,000 by the late 1950s. Even greater numbers lived on the fringes of Johannesburg and Benoni and it is probable that a population of close to 100,000 people, who had only a limited exposure to black urban culture, lived on the urban outskirts by the latter stages of the war.9

In these congested and increasingly unhygienic black dwelling areas, frustrations and tensions progressively built up. They finally erupted toward the end of the war in a succession of squatter movements that spread across the length and breadth of the Rand. They were organized by grassroots community leaders who, having mobilized a following, organized invasions of what was usually
municipally-owned land. Here they established rudimentary administrations for the newly formed squatter settlements, which in most cases were subsequently taken over or removed to municipally-controlled "emergency" or squatter camps. The most important of these were set up around Johannesburg and Benoni, beginning with the squatter movements of James "Sofasonke" Mpanza in Johannesburg and Harry Mabuya in Benoni, in April 1944 and December 1945 respectively. These were followed by further squatter movements led by Edward Khumalo and Abel Ntoi near Johannesburg's black township of Orlando in 1946, and then a spate of lesser movements in Johannesburg and Alexandra led by Oriel Monongoaha, Samuel Kgoma, and Schreiner Baduza, until by the end of the year, 63,000 people were living in Johannesburg's squatter camps alone. At this point the squatter movement paused for a while until it gave its last convulsive shudder in the huge squatter movement to Apex near Benoni in July 1950.10

These squatter movements are important for a number of reasons. They signal both the birth of South Africa's modern urban townships and the industrial proletariat they house. They also spawned a distinctive political culture and set of political practices—for the first time since the very beginnings of the Rand, people characterized by a very transitional migrant culture were concentrated together and not immediately assimilable to the urban culture which the older townships had helped form. The political culture of squatter movements persisted in one form or another to the 1970s and even beyond. It also lives on, in grotesquely parodied form, in many of the squatter shanties which have developed in various parts of South Africa in recent years. For this reason alone its origins seem worthy of attention.

The squatter communities which sprang up in the mid to late 1940s varied widely depending on the place and time in which they were established, their occupational and ethnic composition, and the origins of their leadership groups. The politics of these settlements did, nevertheless, share a number of common features which developed from the common problems they all faced. The most obvious of these was the creation and protection of pockets of illegal space on which shack communities could be built. However, the squatter communities were also beset by a number of other deep-seated social problems which the squatter leaders could only ignore at their political cost. Foremost among these were crime, uncontrolled youth, family instability, and social disorder, which the squatter leaderships all addressed in comparatively similar
ways. The common denominator of each of these social malaises was material deprivation, and this again the squatter leaders made various efforts to allay. One means was the collective provision of basic resources. Another was to permit or promote the activities of petty entrepreneurs who were thus temporarily free of official regulation and control. Each of these activities imparted its own particular dynamics to squatter politics.

The squatter communities of the late 1940s were comprised of groups of highly heterogeneous composition. The records for the Tent Town squatter camp in Benoni, for example, reveal that inhabitants originated from all over South Africa and had seldom been born on the Witwatersrand or spent much time in the town. The same was true of all of the squatter camps established at this time. Their inhabitants also came from the poorest sections of the urban population having spent at least the last few years of their lives in a ceaseless quest for security and shelter. When the Alberton squatter camp was established in 1944, for example, it immediately attracted residents from Nigel, Benoni, Evaton, Meyerton and the peri-urban areas of Johannesburg. When the Apex camp was founded in 1950, it drew a flood of workers from New Kleinfontein and neighboring mines.

The dominant picture that emerges is one of people ceaselessly on the move in the hope of finding some urban niche or marginally improving their economic position. This fostered a variety of social discords and strains, the most pervasive of which was marital instability. Although the Johannesburg city council had been apprehensively noting the movement of whole families to the city, from the late 1920s, particularly after 1941, the majority of male migrants still came to town by themselves. As the opportunities for employment in industry multiplied, many stayed for longer and longer periods in the towns, neglecting or even abandoning their wives on the farms and reserves. Many women responded by migrating to the towns, either in search of their husbands or to carve out a life for themselves. The new unions which men and women formed in these circumstances were often transient and unstable. In 1946, a not entirely unprejudiced chief social worker for Orlando location complained of the camps:

Men jilt their wives to go to the squatter camps. Children run away to it. Family life is disrupted in every way. Skokiaan queens and section 29s all find refuge among them.
The controlled squatter camps provided different kinds of rifts. To secure a place in a municipally-controlled squatter camp a man or women had to be living "in married circumstances" to use the parlance of the time. As Brigadier Palmer, of Johannesburg's South African Police, observed, this encouraged "many male natives [to] pick up any odd woman" in order to successfully squat, and the same observation was made by most other Rand municipalities. For women this incredibly fluid environment presented both opportunities and costs. The presence of large numbers of single male workers allowed them the opportunity to change partners and offered more independence than most had previously enjoyed. Conversely, it also left them vulnerable to desertion by established husbands and spouses of convenience. And, without a man, a woman was particularly unprotected. As the sociologist Laura Longmore noted at the time, "a home without a husband is defenseless in the townships."13

Poverty, migrancy, and the quest for security thus wrought havoc with family life, and generated not only a deep-seated insecurity but unprecedented scope for social and familial conflict. The search for patrons and protectors often led women to the doorsteps of the squatter leaders and their lieutenants in the camps. The squatter leadership thus willy nilly found thrust upon them a social regulatory role, which required adjudicating domestic and neighborhood disputes, and ultimately establishing their own courts. This dual role of providing houses and a measure of security and protection ensured the squatter leaders of intensely powerful support from women. Squatter leaders were hailed as saviors and cast in the mold of Old Testament prophets. The response of the women leaders at the Tent Town squatter camp in Benoni to its founder, Harry Mabuya, can be taken as typical: "He was our Moses," said Ma-Ntolkwane, "He was like a priest."14

The social adjudicatory role of squatter leaders was not confined simply to marital disputes. The diverse and impoverished character of the camps meant that problems of crime and social order were always a potential menace. Johanna Mahwaya, who moved from Orlando squatter camp (called Masakeng, or place of sacks—the materials use to built the shacks) to Pimville location and thence to Newlook squatter camp before being finally allocated a site to build a shack by the municipality in Chiawelo (a Soweto suburb), recalled the constant problem of theft among the shack dwellers of Pimville location: "You could not leave your room and go to the toilet without locking it." Squatter shacks made "of sacks,
corrugated iron and cardboard" were likewise easy targets for thieves.  

Juvenile delinquents and youth gangs were one of the principal agents of crime. The shortage of schools (there were places for only 3,661 out of a school-age population of 15,088 in Moroka East in 1951), the absence of employment opportunities for youth, and the general instability of family life encouraged juvenile delinquency and crime. Through the mid to late 1940s, a mounting chorus of complaint made itself heard in all the Rand townships about this growing social menace, culminating in a combined protest by the Joint Advisory Boards of the Orlando/Jabuva/Moroka (i.e. Soweto) locations about the "reign of terror, whether in the house [or] in the street, in the train or the bus, or whether in day time or by night time." 

To cope with these problems, squatter leaders undertook some rudimentary policing: Mpanza, for example, employed twenty police by 1944, set up his own courts and meted out punishments. Municipal officials stigmatized these efforts as intimidation, extortion, and coercion but evidence suggests that these brief periods of self-rule in the camps were more free of crime than any period before or since. Mr. Sekhukhune recalls of Mpanza's Shantytown, "You know . . . when we came home from work sometimes our shacks were destroyed by the wind, but your pot and blankets were still there."

Social policing was required in other areas as well. Even the most elementary of resources could become centers of conflict when they were scarce. In September 1946, Abel Ntoi, leader of the Pimville squatter movement, complained of "the constant squabbles in the drawing of water by women" and the "frequent violences at the tap." Lack of food, shelter, and other resources could likewise spark off squatter feuds. Some squatter leaders regulated these scarce resources while others went further and attempted to supply basic services, normally the responsibility of local authorities. During the Second World War, food, fuel, building materials, and many other basic necessities were in desperately short supply. Black markets flourished and the poor, in their vulnerable positions, often had to pay the highest prices of all. The CPSA briefly addressed this problem by attempting to monitor black-marketeering and to set up food committees. Mpanza attacked the problem in a more ambitious fashion, drawing on a model of economic and political action that the black middle class and some other sections of the black population had long clutched to its
bosom—the cooperative. At the founding of Sofazonke township, Mpanza established a cooperative comprised of Sofazonke members which bought key commodities like maize, coal, sugar, and meat in bulk and sold them through a network of depots at something like cost price. The cooperatives also sold sacking and wooden poles for the shanties. Benoni’s Tent Town leader, Harry Mabuya operated on similar lines, supplying in this case, not only tents but also bricks and other building supplies to build slightly more substantial homes.²⁰

Those squatter camps which were able to survive for longer periods free of municipal control, established more sophisticated structures. Edward Khumalo’s squatter committee in the peri-urban area of Albertynsville, supplied water, pit latrines, and a school for over six hundred children at which twelve teachers taught. As a municipal officer’s report admitted in May 1950, the neat and orderly rows of houses in this squatter camp belied any notion that it could unproblematically be labelled “uncontrolled.”²¹

Undertaking facilities, an additional service offered by camp leaderships remind us of the persistent proximity of poverty and disease. Sickness and death were constant companions at the camps. Sacks and cardboard offered little protection against the elements and exposed the camps’ inhabitants to hazards and ill-health. Fires could easily engulf whole sections of the camps, while any freak climatic change could place them at serious risk. Even fairly unexceptional weather conditions could bring misery to the camps. Mrs. Moteka of Mapetla recalls of Mpanza’s Shantytown:

When it was raining we all got wet. I remember one night it rained very heavily and when we woke up my child was almost covered in water.²²

As this testimony suggests, children were particularly vulnerable to the primitive conditions in the camps. Infant mortality rose sharply during the Second World War as conditions worsened with overcrowding; one of the striking features about many oral testimonies of people living through these times are the number of children in the informants’ families who failed to survive.

The capricious visitations of death and disease led many inhabitants of the camps to seek some kind of insurance. Again, it was up to the squatter leader to fill this gap in social services. According to a member of Mpanza’s shantytown committee, “when a person died we gave the family £1 and a coffin” (made by the camp’s
commissioned carpenter). In Tobruk "all the people who died had had decent coffins and good funerals" provided by Kgoma's camp committee. Both Mabuya and Madingoane, in Benoni's Tent Town and Apex camps respectively, ran undertaker businesses. Other forms of insurance and protection were also sought from faith-healing sects and the practitioners of traditional medicine, who assumed an influential role in the life of the camps.

The last service that the squatter leaders provided was in a sense the obverse of the others so far discussed: holding official policing at bay. In municipal locations, a host of regulations either limited or prohibited a range of formal or informal trading activities. Prospective entrepreneurs had to show evidence of substantial capital and subservience to the authorities before he or she was allowed to lease premises for a business or a shop; as a result, the numbers of licensed traders in the locations were always small. The informal trading and hawking in which many economically marginal women sought to engage was likewise tightly restricted, and the selling of home-brewed beer or indeed any other liquor was completely prohibited and the target of repeated police raids. The squatter camps thus became a haven for scores of frustrated entrepreneurs and hundreds of women who relied on hawking or brewing in order to survive. In Mpanza’s shantytown,
traders could buy licenses for sums of up to £25 and thereafter remain free to do as they liked. Moreover, no restriction was placed on the number of traders so long as they paid their camp dues. An estimated one hundred traders thus operated in Tobruk, a further forty in Khumalo's Albertynsville camp, and twenty-six in Mabuya's Tent Town (and the same was almost certainly true of the other shorter-lived camps).\textsuperscript{23} Illicit brewing was likewise rampant in most other squatter settlements although both Mpanza and Edward Khumalo made efforts to limit the scale of this trade.

The possibility for self-employment and capital accumulation was one of the principal attractions of the camps. It was also at the root of the authorities' alarm: while they framed their objections to the squatter settlements principally in terms of health considerations, the ultimate source of their disquiet was the existence of hundreds of people, many of them members of the formal or informal camp leaderships, who were living outside of the discipline of wage employment and council control. Squatter settlements helped create a spirit of independence and insubordination which the authorities subsequently found difficult to suppress. Vindication of the council's fears came in August 1947 when the coincidence of an apparently discriminatory allocation of trading licenses, and a wave of police raids for beer brewing in the municipally-controlled camp of Moroka triggered a major riot in which local inhabitants looted licensed shops and attacked the police, three of whom were killed. This incident did not put an end to illegal trading. As Johannesburg's Town Clerk Porter complained to the Minister of Native Affairs in 1948, the problem continued to be exacerbated by the arrival of large numbers of ex-squatters in the municipally-controlled camps. Their activities, the town clerk reported, "encourages a general defiance of other persons." Three years later the same battle was still raging as faction leader, Jackson Mtenjane, orchestrated public protests of women against the suppression of the hawking of green mealies and other small goods.

The squatter leaders defended their perimeters in a variety of ways. To begin with, the tightly-packed, unnumbered, and hap-hazardly located shanties and tents made the camps extremely difficult to penetrate or police. Even the inhabitants sometimes had difficulty identifying their own homes, as Mrs. Moteka's description of Mpanza's shantytown camp reveals:

People were working, and they came out of that shack in the morning and went back into it at night. Before the Government put
numbers on them it was a difficult situation. The houses were alike and at night you could hear the men shouting for their wives because they did not know which one was the right place. And the women would shout back. That was sad but very funny.

Equally important in permitting the establishment and survival of these pockets of illegal space were the legal services and protection they were able to command. One of the most striking features of all the squatter movements at this time was their reliance on the law. Mpanza himself was well versed in legal matters (to some extent the result of several long sojourns in jail), and exploited a 1926 test case against the Johannesburg city council in which the court ruled that people employed in the city could not be removed if they had no alternative housing. Eighteen months later, Harry Mabuya, the Tent Town squatter leader in Benoni, invoked the same principle to protect his fledgling squatter camp. He further added to the council’s confusion by establishing his camp on a wedge of land which fell under the neighboring magistracy of Brakpan thereby placing the council’s locus standi in doubt. In his legal arguments, Mabuya drew on expert legal advice furnished by the CPSA lawyer, Lewis Baker. One of the surviving squatter leaders tells how Baker explained that the area “did not belong to Benoni but Brakpan. Meaning Brakpan would arrest Benoni and not Mabuya.”

It was Baker and another lawyer, Slomowitz, who suggested the site of the next squatter settlement in Benoni—a slice of land proclaimed for Benoni’s new industrial township. Benoni was then placed in what for these lawyers must have been an exquisite dilemma: no further industrial expansion until the 19,000 Apex squatters had been furnished with suitable housing. Within five years the massive new housing scheme of Daveyton, the township adjacent to Benoni, was underway.

Even the smallest of squatter movements like those involving the Meyer’s Farm and Rietpan Farm tenants at Alberton and Benoni respectively, retained their own special lawyers; on to the bigger squatter movements lawyers batted in their dozens. In Tobruk squatter camp, Oriel Monogoaha engaged two firms of attorneys and four counsel, while each of the opposition factions in the camp employed their own particular firms. For all but one or two of the squatter movements, these tactics stalled the council for sufficiently long to secure the de facto acknowledgment of the squat, and the ultimate provision of “controlled” squatter camps. Small wonder that Mpanza could proclaim expansively to a squatter gathering in
1946, "I love the law." It was a sentiment in which all of his squatter colleagues would have concurred.

Since these various activities cost money, especially the basic administrative services, another typical feature of the squatter camps was the regular collection of dues. Mpanza collected 2 shillings per family per week along with a host of other irregular levies; Kgoma's compounded dues were between 2 and 4 shillings sixpence a week, while Edward Khumalo charged 10 shillings a month. Such disparate bodies as the Johannesburg city council, the police, and the Communist Party were wont to depict this as extortion and corruption, and there was indeed a tendency toward abuse. However, the reasons for this process of degeneration which shows up in the careers of all the squatter leaders was not simply individual avarice and opportunism and should be sought in some of the fundamental properties of squatter politics as a whole.

The Roots of Squatter Politics

Squatter politics exhibited a number of common traits, developing in the most part out of the common material circumstances of their constituents and the common problems they faced. Nevertheless, from most other perspectives the squatter populations were bewilderingly diverse, encompassing a wide range of cultures, experiences, and political traditions. The precise manner in which squatter politics functioned and the forms in which political authority was expressed were thus subject to considerable variation, depending on the character of the leadership and the cultural materials with which they had to work. At this distance in time these distinctions are not always easy to discern let alone to explain. Nevertheless, if we are to understand black politics at this time and the following three decades, an attempt has to be made. What follows is an uneven and sometimes speculative account, which is to some extent a prospectus for future research. It is with Mpanza and his Sofazonke party that it begins.

Descriptions of James Sofazonke Mpanza, both contemporary and current, are peculiarly culture-bound. The Johannesburg city council at the time wrote him off as a dictator and gangster; twenty years later Mary Benson, who reflected one current of opinion in the ANC likewise dismissed him as a "demagogic township eccentric." More recently, social scientists Kevin French and Alf Stadler presented him as a flamboyant volatile character who, dressed in leopard skins, riding breeches, a helmet, and scarlet plumes, rode
around on a horse and portrayed himself as a Moses sent to lead his people to the Promised Land.  

However sympathetic the overall tenor of their accounts, the portrait nevertheless emerges of a figure who is trifle bizarre. Despite the magnetic effect that Mpanza obviously had on large numbers of his supporters, the cultural logic of his actions and presentation has never been explored.

Such considerations highlight the similarities between such squatter leaders and the charismatic prophet-type leaders of Zionist churches. It is uncertain whether Mpanza, and other squatter leaders of his ilk like Harry Mabuya in Benoni, consciously modelled themselves on Zionist patterns, or whether each drew on a common stock of cultural materials to construct similar bricolages.  

What is evident, however, is that both squatter and Zionist leaders—though on a dramatically different scale—produced similar solutions to meet analogous needs. Zionist movements, most recent studies agree, cater to two basic needs—the healing of physical affliction and the re-establishment of psychological equilibrium. Anthropologists Bengt Sundkler and Martin West both point out the centrality of faith healing and the casting out of spirits in Zionist practice and preaching.  

Fellow anthropologist Jean Comaroff agrees and extends her analysis in a way which is particularly suggestive for the present discussion:

Anthropologists have long insisted that physical disorder indexes social disruption, and that healing is a simultaneously individual and collective process. Indeed the body may be manipulated, *pars proto toto*, in the attempt to reform the immediate world. Thus the symptoms of the Zion followers, symptoms regarded by contemporary observers as "hysterical" and "hypochondriacal" may be seen as somatised signs of a wider social malaise. This was a cult of affliction, but the ills it addressed spoke of more than physical dislocation. They expressed the desire to reconstitute, through the ritualized reconstruction of the body personal, the encompassing orders of power and production that it signified.  

Martin West and Philip Mayer make related observations. West speaks of Zionist congregations as "caring communities... where strangers are accepted and make friends," while both West and Mayer identify the central function of these churches as social control. Most impose a wide range of prohibitions on potentially socially disruptive practices. Drinking, smoking, dancing, fighting and gossiping are banned. Monogamy is demanded, and those co-habiting outside of marriage are presented with the alternatives of
marrying or being expelled. Finally, all sources agree on the preponderance of women in these congregations and their importance in the life of the church, at least partly through the activities of separate, uniformed "manyano" groups (women's prayer groups).

Squatter leaders in the Mpanza mold performed many of the same roles. While in prison, Mpanza himself underwent a profound religious conversion and discovered a hitherto hidden capacity for faith healing. Once head of the Shantytown movement, he depicted himself as a prophet-like figure. According to numerous reports he was wont "to liken himself to Moses, Joseph and Joshua." In February 1945, he told a meeting that he was "sent by God to take the Bantu people to Shantytown." Two months earlier, he was even claiming that "the position of chief was given to me like Jesus. People thought Jesus died but he did not. They thought I was deported but I returned." 33

In pursuit of social regulation and control, each of the Zulu-speaking squatter leaders attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to ban the brewing of beer as well as making efforts to regulate marital and family disputes. However, Mpanza seems to have had a broader vision of social harmony and social order than any other of the leading squatter figures. Much more than other leaders, particularly his Sotho-speaking counterparts, he preached an inclusive non-tribal message. Aside from the occasional lapse, Mpanza was at pains to welcome all comers to his camps, irrespective of ethnic origin. 34 He repeatedly proclaimed that "as far as his party was concerned there were no Zulus, Xhosas, Shanganes, Basutos or anything else. They are all one black race." Mpanza conceived of the camp as an organic unity and promoted communalism. Much of the food, coal, and other supplies were provided through a chain of cooperative outlets. Everything in the township, Mpanza asserted, had to be done on a communal basis. When the government's Director of Native Labour, and Johannesburg's Manager of Non-European Affairs visited Shantytown on 11th May 1944, they were greeted by hundreds of uniformed women singing "specially selected songs" and led by two girls carrying a banner inscribed "Everything done in the presence and on behalf of the community. No private interviews. Strictly public. By Order." 35

The role played by women in the camps highlights further similarities with the Zionist churches. It was in Mabuya's Tent Town outside of Benoni that women occupied the most prominent positions. There, two women sat on the five member executive com-
mittee and women organized the daily running and security of the camp. However, in both Mpanza’s Masakeng and Monongoaha’s Tobruk, a women’s committee was established parallel to that of men. The prominence of women on camp committees may to some degree be ascribed to the fact that they were present daily while men left the camp to work, but it is likely that there was more behind it than that. Sundkler reveals that Zionist churches accord women far more important leadership roles than any other African organizations in South Africa, while Martin West, Mia Brandel-Syrier and others emphasize the enormously influential role of separate “manyano” women’s groups not only in Zionist but in all African churches. These groups, Brandel-Syrier writes, were generally led by the wife of the church minister, wore uniforms, played an important role in regulating social behavior, and were the principal fund-raising institutions of the church. The parallel with Masakeng’s women’s committee is striking. This was led by Mpanza’s wife Julia, was uniformed, and received regular subscriptions from those enrolled in its ranks.

Such prescriptions and practices, however, were not uncontested and faced the competition of other traditions and alternative cultural forces. For example, when Mpanza tried to enforce his monopoly on the provision of supplies in the face of an intrusive municipal soup kitchen, he elicited a wave of opposition which led angry residents to destroy his office, loot his coal dump, and beat his coal guard to death. In the aftermath, a number of petty traders were allowed to begin operations while the ban on beer brewing was quietly dropped. Both Mabuya and Edward Khumalo (in Albertynsville) encountered similar opposition and were likewise forced to relax their proscriptions on the brewing of beer.43

On the basis of present evidence it is unclear whether Mpanza, Mabuya, and others elicited the enthusiastic response they did because their practices corresponded to Zionist influences to which these communities had already been exposed, or because both they and the Zionists were independently drawing on a common store of symbols and ideas. All that can be said at this juncture is that both types of movement began to blossom in the same sections of these new urban communities at roughly the same time and that it would be surprising if they did not in some way intersect. For example, the number of African independent churches swelled from 600 in 1939 to 1,286 in 1955 and the numbers of their adherents doubled from 1 to 2 million during approximately the same time—with Zionist congregations constituting most of the increase.37
influence of Zionism on the politics of Soweto squatter movements thus seems more probable than not.

In the other squatter communities that grew up at this time, different cultural constellations and political traditions left their own distinct imprints; other forms of migrant organization provided the decisive shaping force. The Apex squatter camp, established near Benoni in 1950, displays this legacy in perhaps its starkest form. To a greater extent than appears to have been the case in the Soweto squatter movements, an exceptionally high proportion of residents had previously lived on small-holdings or on the mines and had had only limited exposure to urban life. At the time, a number of mines in the Benoni area were in the process of closing and migrants were finding themselves either returning to the reserves or faced with the need to find urban accommodation and jobs.

Mr. F. Mahungela, who was working at New Kleinfontein mine, recalled the influx of miners into the vacant industrial land which became the Apex squatter camp:

There were people from Rietpan [small-holdings] who came to New Kleinfontein at night . . . having parcels in boxes and so on. I was actually woken up. These people wanted some water and I gave them. [They came] in hundreds. There were men, women and their children. I asked them where they were going to and they told me they had come to build their shacks. Early in the morning there were shacks erected all over the place. I asked if I could put up my shack and they said, “with pleasure.”

There followed a general exodus from the mines, and ex-miners soon constituted the majority of the population.

The political organization of the squatters soon came to reflect the composition of the camp. To begin with, says one resident, “Motswaneng was the Sibonda. So the Sotho and the Kgotla wanted their own leaders.” When groups from the mines and from a predecessor squatter camp called Tent Town near Benoni arrived, they wanted their own leaders. “We [from the small holdings] were threatened and a fight nearly began. We dropped our badges and we went back home.” The main leader put forward by these new arrivals was Madingoane, a Pedi, who like other faction leaders arriving in the camp, had retained his own lawyer, the CPSA member, Lewis Baker. Madingoane's principal qualification, all informants agree, was his familiarity with traditional morality:
“Madingoane’s leadership was not like today when one follows a voting procedure. He knew his tradition.”

Other leaders appear to have acquired their authority on a similar basis and because of their prior position in migrant networks on the mines. Shangane ex-miners called on Mahungela, who worked in the mine dispensary, to represent their interests; the Xhosa summoned a clerk at the new Kleinfontein mine; and the southern Sotho and Zulu called on Pokane, Buthelezi, and Khumalo respectively to carry out similar functions for them. More research needs to be conducted on the migrant associations and the political cultures out of which such organizations sprang. One group about which a little more can be said are the Southern Sotho. Here, leadership was based on the structures of the notorious migrant ethnic gang known as the “Russians” who at this time numbered some thousands across the Rand. In Apex, Pukane was the leader of the locally dominant Molapo faction of the Russians while the leader in Moroka, Ntoi, was closely associated with the rival Matsieng faction. Russian practices consequently imprinted themselves strongly on these sections of the camps. Ntoi, for example, repeatedly resorted to violence and extortion in which the Russians were often alleged to engage. A powerful male chauvinist impulse also seems to have marked their handling of marital and family disputes particularly when triggered by women. A central impulse in the original formation of the Russian gangs appears to have been the wish to control the increasingly independent behavior of Basotho women, as well as the need to gain access to

Russian gangster.
uncontrolled urban space.\textsuperscript{42} This more violent, chauvinist, and ethnic orientation that characterized Basotho-dominated squatter camps most likely impaired the quality of squatter life.

Despite these shortcomings, the leadership of Apex and most of the other squatter camps was genuinely popular. In the Apex Advisory Board election of September 1951, 1,711 men voted out of a potential electorate of 3,923. The following year, the number voting had increased to 5,270, which represented almost two-thirds of those entitled to vote, and this rate of participation continued until the closure of the camp. High turnouts likewise marked elections to the other Advisory Boards.\textsuperscript{43}

This popularity was perhaps facilitated by the constant presence of the leaders in the camps. Virtually all of the leaders in Apex chose occupations which gave them a great deal of freedom and independence. Sinaba sold coal, while in the second rank of leadership Mkhoma was a coal dealer and a minister of the Apostolic Faith church and Mtshali was a herbalist and an Apostolic Faith Church elder. Not every leader tried to establish himself in an equally independent position. Pokane, for example, worked until his retirement at the nearby Amato Textiles factory. Nevertheless, the advantages of self employment to squatter leaders was obvious as it allowed them to be constantly present and central to the camp. The limited information that exists suggests this pattern was characteristic of squatter settlements across the entire Rand.

The Limits of Squatter Politics

The various aspects of squatter politics that have so far been traced attest to its genuinely popular roots. However, each of the strengths of squatter politics was matched by a corresponding weakness. A preoccupation with the daily problems of social order and survival, for example, lent them an introverted character, which narrowed their political horizons and made them peculiarly impermeable to national political organizations. In Apex, and its successor township, Daveyton, squatter residents gave negligible support to the women's national anti-pass campaign, and an ANC-inspired resistance to ethnic zoning proved a total flop. The attitude of the squatter leaders in Orlando to national politics is best captured in the words of Mpanza when he announced that he was "not interested in Communism, Democracy or any other party. He was only interested in his own party."\textsuperscript{45} With the exception of Schreiner Baduza's squatter movement in Alexandra, none of the
squatter communities proved responsive to the broader national appeal of the ANC, and the ANC seemed incapable of devising an approach to local issues which could either incorporate squatter leaders or supersede their influence.\textsuperscript{52}

Squatter politics were not only parochial and introverted, they were also in many instances deeply sectional and divisive. Feuds rent virtually all of the squatter camps, often following a Nguni/Sotho divide. Early in 1946, a second wave of squatting movements broke out in Orlando, the first led by Edward Khumalo and the second by Abel Ntoi. Both were quickly housed in the newly established Moroka squatter camp, where hostility was soon whipped up between what were described as Ntoi's Basotho, who were closely associated with the Russians, and Khumalo's Zulu. Conflict between Ntoi and Khumalo was averted by the departure of the latter to join the leadership of the newly formed Albertynsville squatter camp. However, fresh gang and ethnic conflicts erupted a couple of years later. In January 1951, a gang of fifty Russians stormed through Moroka, stealing from residents, breaking their way into houses, and demanding protection money from those inside. The following month, a group from Ntoi's section in Moroka East "pounced on" Moroka West killing one person. During the subsequent murder trial involving Ntoi, the principal crown witness, Khumalo, was killed. Other groups defended themselves against such depredation. This triggered a set of Sotho-Zulu faction fights which rumbled through the rest of the decade.\textsuperscript{46}

Such conflicts were not just the product of primordial ethnic sentiments. When questioned about ethnic frictions in the Tobruk camp at a meeting designed to resolve some of its internal divisions, a local resident, Llewellyn Ncwana, replied that "this was engendered by certain leaders. Except for this there would be no such friction."\textsuperscript{47} Though Ncwana, an educated man, was concerned to counter the image of backward-looking ethnic divisions, it is likely that there was a substantial element of truth in what he said. People from diverse origins did generally live in peace until problems in the camps—whether the abuses of the leaders or the depredations of gangs—could be projected by rival leaderships in ethnic terms. Indeed, a key problem for the camps was the basic structure of squatter politics and the political cultures on which they drew.

Common to all varieties of squatter politics was the highly personalized undemocratic character of their leadership. Central leadership figures like Mpanza, Mabuya, Ntoi, and Kgoma may have initially been elected or chosen, but thereafter only rarely or
intermittently subjected themselves to any kind of democratic control. Once elected, Mpanza, Mabuya, and the Russian leaders chose key lieutenants, and relied on personal charisma, daring, and largesse to maintain their control. Thus Mpanza boldly obstructed deportation, while Ntoi directly challenged the authority of the Johannesburg city council by hijacking buses bringing passengers to the perimeter of the camp, and forcing them to deliver their cargo to the camp center. Mpanza in particular, and to a lesser extent the other squatter leaders, dispensed money to the needy with extreme liberality. At least partly for these purposes, Mpanza carried huge sums of money around with him, and when he and his wife were arrested on a charge of public violence in June 1946, he was found to have nearly £60 on his person and his wife, about £45.49 According to one of his committee members, "when a person died we gave the family £1 and a coffin. Mpanza gave the needy £1 sometimes £2." It was on the basis of the popularity gained by such acts that Mpanza and the other squatter leaders ruled. The only check on their authority—until subjected to Advisory Board elections—was the mass meeting from which a challenge could not easily be launched.57

The direct, unmediated populist relationship between leaders and followers lent itself readily to abuse. The roles of dispenser of
justice and distributor of largesse presented powerful temptations when not tempered by any kind of democratic scrutiny or check. Most of the squatter leaders to some degree or another succumbed. Mpanza, for example, somehow lost £500 of Sofazonke money at the time of his arrest in 1946. In Tobruk, Kgoma failed to account on different occasions for sums of £200 and £362, and while the treasurer of the camp, Reverend Solomon Sithole, likewise distinguished himself by collecting £28 in the camp square one November day, putting it in a suitcase in his home for safety overnight and then finding only £18 there when he opened it in front of the committee next morning. Behavior of this kind inevitably encouraged opposition, mobilized largely along ethnic lines. When challenged by rival factions, Kgomo imported two lorry loads of Zulu residents from Edward Khumalo’s Albertynsville camp to overwhelm the opposition, and Tobruk also increasingly divided along Nguni/Sotho lines. Monogoaha’s camp was already predominantly Sotho in composition, and Mrs. Methula remembers Kgoma entrenching this division:

If you were a Sotho he would send you to Maseru [Monogoaha’s section]. But when you refused he would not force you to go. But he would warn you not to do what the MaRashea [Russians] are doing.

There nevertheless remained a substantial minority of Basotho in the camp and these increasingly arrayed themselves under the leadership of Michael Mogatle in opposition to Kgoma. Ultimately, only the removal of the camp to Moroka seems to have averted serious collisions.

The above examples suggest the rich pickings to be had at the camps, and the absence of any structures by which squatter leaders could be held accountable by their constituents could easily lead to coercion, intimidation, and violence. The Reverend Michael Scott, who lived briefly in the Tobruk squatter camp, bluntly labelled Kgomo’s lieutenants as gangsters, and the same description was applied to others. Those endeavoring to resist such excesses, or trying to muscle in on the fields of capital accumulation represented by the camps, tended to mobilize support along ethnic lines. Thus while one should acknowledge the force of Ncwana’s argument about the way the leadership element manipulated ethnic categories, it seems likely that in this climate of volatility and insecurity, ethnic identities may have briefly sharpened, before being worn down in the course of the next two decades.
The Legacy of Squatter Politics

As the authorities gradually disestablished the "uncontrolled" squatter settlements and moved their inhabitants into tightly regulated serviced camps, squatter leaders found both their authority and their financial base progressively whittled down. Each responded to these straightened circumstances in his own particular way but some longer-term patterns can be discerned. Figures like Edward Khumalo and Samuel Kgoma sought to regain their former status by organizing new squatter movements, but as the housing shortage was eased and legal loopholes were closed, these became increasingly difficult to get underway. Mpanza continued to pursue his dream of acquiring a farm from the government in the northern Transvaal, assuming, almost certainly without foundation, that a large number of his adherents would follow. Abel Ntoi organized a rent boycott in Moroka to the 15 shillings a month charged simply for serviced sites. This secured a wide measure of support in this particular area but was unable to broaden itself out to the rest of the Johannesburg townships or the Rand, which shared similar problems, partly, if not largely, because of the intensely sectional nature of squatter leadership and squatter politics. As a result the rent boycott ultimately folded.\(^54\)

In the medium-term, squatter leaders or leaders in the squatter tradition moved in two contradictory directions which some managed to keep harnessed for a surprisingly long time. The one was toward explicit gangster and criminal activity. Edward Khumalo, who was arrested for housebreaking in Standerton in 1952, and Abel Ntoi whose "Russian" connections have been previously discussed are representative of this trend. The second tendency was to consolidate authority by collaborating more closely with the municipality and the police in policing the communities. On closer examination the relationship between these two tendencies is clear: as social disorder, particularly the depredations of criminal gangs, grew in the 1950s, squatter leaders were ensured of a social adjudicatory and social policing role which the municipal authorities could or would not fulfill. For the 1950s and 1960s, this role was carried out by Advisory Board members and Urban Bantu counsellors. In the early to mid 1950s, squatter leaders and/or Advisory Board members established civilian guards to curb the problem of crime. Oral testimonies suggest that these officially discounterenced groups were genuinely popular bodies, as indeed for a time were Advisory Boards. According to a local resident, when
Chiawelo was established on the site of the old Albertynsville camp, for example, "crime was rife. Then we held a meeting from which the civil guard was formed. These patrolled the township day and night so that anyone who tried to commit crimes was chased, and if caught sometimes killed. We were all united in one body, Shanganes, Vendas and Nyasas."\(^5\text{56}\) Every male who was not a youth was expected to take part. Mqanduli, an "induna" (Advisory Board member), played the leading role in both Advisory Board and civil guard. Malefactors were, as old-time residents remember, "sent to Mqanduli. Then he would decide whether to punish them himself or send them to the police." Mqanduli is also reported to have settled social quarrels "between husbands and wives, as well as disputes which involved neighbours."\(^5\text{56}\)

The 1960s and 1970s saw a variation on the theme of the civilian guard, when the adherents of both the Mpanza group and the Russians set up separate kgotla movements (parents' courts) to discipline delinquent youth.\(^5\text{7}\) In the late 1970s and 1980s, Community Councils, the lineal successors of the old Advisory Boards became comprehensively discredited, for reasons which are reasonably well-known, but the need to perform some of their functions persists. Where street committees have been most popular in recent years has been where they have carried out a democratized version of the same role. Elsewhere the authoritarian version lingers on—in the squatter camps of Crossroads/KCT, Pietermaritzburg, Durban, and elsewhere.\(^5\text{8}\) However vicious and reactionary these squatter communities have become, both history and recent events bid us not to ignore their social materiality or popular historical roots.

Notes

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9. UG 8/1940, Report of the Committee to Consider the Administration of Areas which are becoming Urbanised but which are not under Local Government Control; Sapire, "African Urbanisation," 172-3, 216-225, 239-304; NTS 6490, File 125/313 (S) Vol. 2; NTS 6491 File 125/373 (S) Part 4; NTS 6470 File 51/313 S.


12. NTS 6470 File 51/313/S1 Vol. 1, Minutes of the Continuation of a Discussion between JCC, government officials and with the Minister of Native Affairs, 18 March 1945.


16. NTS 6475, File 51/313/S(3), Vol. 6, memo., Moroka Advisory Board Members to JCC, 12 Dec. 1951; NTS 7921 File 520/400, PR. Mosaka to Secretary for Justice, 26 Sept. 1950; telegram, L.I. Venables, Manager NEAD to Secretary for Native Affairs, 12 Feb. 1951; memo. to Minister of Justice and Native Affairs from Johannesburg Advisory Board, 23 Feb. 1951.

17. See, for example, Johannesburg Intermediate Archive (hereafter IA), Johannesburg Municipal Records (hereafter JMR), D1942, JCC Supplementary Memo to the Moroka Enquiry Commission, 7; IA, WRAB File 158/8 minutes of meeting of NEAD

18. NTS 4534 File 641/313, General Secretary, Jabavu Township to Native Commissioner, Johannesburg, 28 Sept. 1946.


21. NTS 6470, File 51/313(S1) Vol. 1, Auditors' Report (TD. Young) on Sofasonke Township, 13 July 1944; IA, WRAB File 158/8 minutes of a meeting with squatter leaders 20 Feb. 1947.

22. For some indications of these, see University of the Witwatersrand Library, Historical and Literary papers MIC A1157, Johannesburg City Council Memo. For submission to the Fagan Commission of Enquiry into the Riot at Moroka Emergency Camp, 26 Sept. 1947, and annexure: Applications for Trading Sites.


29. For the use of this notion in a similar context see J. Comaroff, *Body of Power, Spirit of Resistance* (Chicago, 1985), 197-99. Here, following Levi-Strauss, she defines this as " concoctions of symbols already freighted with significance by a meaningful environment."


34. As when he engineered an assault and attempted ouster of the Basotho President of the African Dingaka (Herbalist) Association when its former Zulu President had been displaced. NTS 7253, File 265/326/1; Hearing of K.D. Morgan, Native Commissioner, 3 Aug. 1951.

35. NTS 4534, File 641/313, L.I. Venables, Manager NEAD, summary of address by Mpanza, 4 Aug. 1946; NTS 6470, File 51/313/S1, Vol. 7, Director of Native Labour to Sec. for Native Affairs, 15 May 1944.


38. Interviews, Mr. F. Mahungela, Daveyton, 4 Aug. and 6 Oct. 1986.

42. This issue is partly explored in Bonner, "Desirable or Undesirable Basotho Women?" It will also be the subject of a separate paper.
44. NTS 4534, File 641/313, L.I. Venables, Summary of address by Mpanza on 4 Aug. 1946 (n.d.).
45. Bonner, "Family Crime and Political Consciousness," 419; Interview, Mr. K.S. Komane, 14 July 1988; Benoni City Times, 1 April 1955; Stadler, "Birds in a Cornfield"; French, "Mpanza."
47. IA, WRAFB File 158/8 minutes of a meeting with squatter leaders, 24 Feb. 1947.
48. Interviews, Mrs. E. Ntlowane, and Mrs. Senosi, Watville, May 1983; IA, WRAFB file 158/8 minutes of a meeting with a deputation of squatters, 20 Feb. 1947; Interviews, Madiehe Khoeli, Teyateyaneng (Lesotho) and Muldersdrift (Transvaal) 1986-87.
49. NTS 6470 File 51/313(S1) Vol. 1, C.P. Alport, Director of Native Labour to Sec. for Native Affairs, 19 June 1944.
50. This requires a separate discussion in its own right. For one among several suggestive accounts of mass meetings in this period see NTS 6687 File 310/332 Vol. 2, Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Disturbances of 30 Aug. 1947 at the Moroka emergency camp, 31-32.
51. NTS 6470, File 51/313/S1, Vol. 1, Director of Native Labour to Sec. for Native Affairs, 14 July 1944; IA, WRAFB File 158/8, memo D.F. Hennessy, Assistant to the Manager 6 Feb. 1947; Ibid., minutes of 2 meetings with deputations of squatters, 20 Feb. 1947; Ibid., minutes of a meeting on the squatter camp 24 Feb. 1947; NTS 6477 File 51/313/S(4) Part 1, minutes on memo Under Sec. of Native Affairs and others n.d. 1950.
52. IA, WRAFB File 158/8 minutes of a meeting with a deputation of squatters 20 Feb. 1947.