“…we are being left to burn because we do not count”¹ – Biopolitics, abandonment, and resistance

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Starting from the puzzle posed by the ultimate aim of modern governmental rationality to nurture the population and its tendencies to exclude large parts of the same population from the spectrum of its care, this article argues that abandonment is always already inscribed into this rationality. In contradiction to Agamben, abandonment here is not attributed to the sovereign exception, but is traced back to modern processes transforming the political—as problematized by Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault. Complementing their observations with the empirical and the anti-political implications of “the count” based on Ian Hacking’s and Jacques Rancière’s thought, first a conceptual framework for understanding biopolitical abandonment is outlined, then the materialization of abandonment is assessed. Arriving finally at the possibility of thinking resistance to the power that disallows life through conceiving of politics as disruption, the last section discusses the South African shack-dwellers’ struggle, which, at instances, is able to disturb the dynamics of abandonment and so potentially furthers the conceptualization of resistance to biopolitics.

“…the people is those who, refusing to be the population, disrupt the system”²

Introduction

Michel Foucault once said that one of the biggest antinomies of modern political reason was the coexistence of “large destructive structures and institutions oriented toward the care of individual life”.³ Indeed, if modern governmental rationality includes a strong element of pastoral care and centers on the wellbeing of each and all, then what should we make of the extreme marginalization of millions inherent in the dynamics of global neoliberal governance? How is it possible that a rationality that defines its ultimate aim as the nurturing of the population nevertheless accommodates the abandonment of huge masses of people? The answer seems to lie in understanding the ways abandonment is always already inscribed into it. This paper aims to provide such an understanding and, by way of pointing to instances where the inscribed abandonment is challenged, attempts to offer a possible (although as yet rudimentary) conceptualization of resistance against biopolitical governance. This
problematique seems all the more important in the context of recent contributions to a debate within the discipline of international relations about the potentials of Foucault’s thought and the biopolitics-literature drawing on it. Whereas this literature certainly has its limits—the failure to provide a conception of resistance so far seems to be one of these—recourse to a more traditional, state-centered, or territorial theorization of the political seems even less likely to address present day problems of marginalization and community. Therefore, in what follows, starting from Hannah Arendt’s and Foucault’s observations on the modern transformation of the political, then focusing on the empirical (Ian Hacking) and the (anti-)political (Jacques Rancière) implications of “the count”, in the first two sections I construct a conceptual framework for understanding biopolitical abandonment. Having drawn the conceptual outlines, based on Rancière’s aesthetic approach to politics, the materialization of abandonment is assessed. Finally, arriving at the possibility of thinking resistance to the power that disallows life through Rancière’s concept of politics as disruption, the last section discusses the South African shack dwellers’ struggle, which at instances, appears to be able to disturb the dynamics of abandonment.

One of the existing attempts to understand how abandonment is inherent in modern rationalities of rule is Giorgio Agamben’s, who takes up Foucault’s concept of biopolitics—according to which the governmental concern for the wellbeing of the people implies that human as a biological being enters the realm of the political—but argues that politics and biological life had always been tied together. For Agamben, modernity only sheds light to and reaffirms the fact that “the inclusion of bare life into the political realm constitutes the original—if concealed—nucleus of sovereign power”. Therefore, he claims, it is crucial to study sovereign and biopolitical models of power in parallel, because it is in the very intersection of these two—in the ambiguous zone of the sovereign exception—that we can
locate bare life: the life that can be taken without committing homicide and to which we are all reduced contemporarily.

That Agamben’s theorization of modernity through the notion of exception and bare life resonates with perceptions of our present is reflected (among others) in poststructuralist IR literature which, in recent years, eagerly took up these conceptions. Accounts that took as their analytical point of departure Agamben’s claim that the (concentration) camp is the paradigm of modernity were able to show how bare life is produced through the obscured interplay of sovereign power and biopolitics on sites such as the refugee camp or the detention camp. Doubtlessly, *homo sacer* is an expressive concept when interrogating into the operation of power in such loci. However, assuming that the operation of biopower inevitably leads to the camp and bare life produced in it, can also limit our understanding of the contemporary because this assumption, through forging a connection between the sovereign exception and biopower, generalizes a distribution of power that Foucault referred to as the state of domination. As opposed to relations of power that, in Foucault’s conceptualization, can always be reversed and that are always conditioned upon the freedom of its parties to this reversal, states of domination hardly allow for resistance. Accordingly, accounts of resistance in refugee or detention camps disclose forceful but limited practices of resistance taking shape in individual performances such as lip-sewing and refugee poetry.

Yet, biopower is not at all bound to operate in relations of domination. On the contrary, a vast part of the literature based on Foucault’s conceptualization of modern power and, in particular, his conception of biopolitics, analyzes how biopolitical technologies of government are deployed through the freedom of the governed. Observing this aspect does not necessarily mean disregarding the dark side of biopolitics. Indeed, Foucault famously defined modern power as “the power to *foster* life or *disallow* it to the point of death”. Therefore, in an attempt to understand in what ways abandonment is inscribed in modern
governmental rationality and to consequently be able to conceptualize resistance to contemporary biopolitical abandonment without equating biopolitical abandonment with the sovereign exception (the sovereign ban), I suggest using a different focal lens than that of Agamben (that is the “bare life”), although my point of departure is, similarly, Arendt’s and Foucault’s observations on the biologisation of the political.

The naturalization of the political

Choosing to proceed through this alternative perspective implies that the present discussion problematises characteristically modern phenomena: both biopolitical abandonment and the governmental rationality into which it is inscribed emerged with modernity and neither of them is (directly) tied to ancient sovereign models of power. Thus, the primary question has to address the shift in the forms of power occurring with modernity. What is it in modernity that forces sovereign power to retreat and makes way to a mode of power that either fosters life or abandons it? As hinted at above, enabling this form of power is an assemblage which, based on Arendt’s and Foucault’s parallel observations, André Duarte refers to as the “naturalization of the political”. This process, the ultimate outcome of which is that the political is refocused on the biological existence of humanity, comprises a series of naturalizations, that is, the serial re-conceptualization of certain phenomena as driven by the laws of nature.

If we want to reconstruct the sequence of this series (bearing in mind that its elements are in constant interaction), it seems appropriate to start with the emergence of economy, that is, when economy had begun to be thought about as an autonomous field of intervention and as a fundamental organizing principle and was complemented by its correlative forms of knowledge, political economy in particular. For Arendt, the emergence of economy coincides with the construction of society, and so contributes to the blurring of the line of division
between the private and the public realms. Certainly, as it will be shown in this paper too, the conception of anciently distinct private and political realms is problematic. Nevertheless, as Patricia Owens writes, Arendt “did not believe that the public and private sphere were entirely unrelated”; “she argued that there are distinct principles and motives for political action”. While these claims still need to be assessed from the perspective defined by the conception of the political that the discussion below draws on, Arendt’s following observation is still important: with economy being applied on the “super-human family” of a modern state and the outlines of a “collective housekeeping” being drawn, biological necessities of the human are channeled into the political realm. At the core of this development is the assumption of a “‘collective’ concern” that brings along the concern for the wellbeing of the society as a whole. Indeed, as citing Gundar Myrdal Arendt states: “economics can be a science only if one assumes that one interest pervades society as a whole”. For Arendt, this “communistic fiction” of liberal utilitarianism implies nothing less than the subjection of the human potential for action to a universal behavioural pattern. This pattern, in turn, lends itself to forms of scientific knowledge that operate by and produce predictions on the large scale, so rendering individual action invisible and outstanding deeds deviant.

Claiming that the general framework of biopolitics is liberalism (understood as an art of government), Foucault reconstructs a very similar process of transformation. Hence, it is the économiste critique of mercantilism to which he traces back the emergence of biopolitics. In straight opposition to mercantilist restrictions intended to avoid harmful effects of the market, classical economists of the eighteenth century viewed the market as directed by natural forces that, when unobstructed, strive for harmony. Therefore, instead of intervening into their flows, proper government must let “things follow their course”. Through such notions as the “true price” that is formulated by natural economic dynamics, the market is now reconstructed as a site of veridiction and the sovereign is thought of as incapable to fully
grasp the truth of the market. Consequently, “the principle of the self-limitation of governmental reason” appears.  

 Crucially, this self-limitation based on the naturalization of the market brings about the naturalization of the subject of government. When individuals come to be seen as linked to the natural economic processes through their “longevity, health, and ways of conducting themselves”, a new target of government is formed: the population. Once the attention of the sovereign is refocused from the individual—as the subject of rights but also as the subject/object of disciplinary power—to the populational level, rationality and practices of power change radically. The sovereign gaze—that now becomes governmental—will no longer focus on the actions and behaviors of individuals, but on the natural processes of the population into which individuals are massified by the forms of knowledge attached to political economy. Here again, the intention to regulate the aggregate processes of the population implies the assumption of interest being the sole motivating force: a universal, through which this conglomerate governmental subject/object is accessible and can be governed toward its wellbeing. “[T]he population taken as a whole has one and only one mainspring of action. This is desire”. Beyond designating “the entry of a ‘nature’ into the field of techniques of power”, the collective interest of the population, which adds up from the interests of its benefit-seeking elements, becomes the ultimate end of government. 

 It is exactly here, that Foucault’s aphoristic claim about the major transformation of the forms of power is situated. At the core of this claim is the shift in the main problem of those who govern: with the market reconstructed as a site of truth-telling and with the desires of the population reconstructed as the forces defining the collective interest (which, in turn, is conceptualized as the end of government) sovereign power inevitably retreats. Therefore, the central problem of government will no longer be how and on what legal bases the sovereign can say no to the subject of right under its rule, but how to say yes to desire. When the
sovereign no longer has direct hold on its subjects (including both their belongings and their lives) and when the aim of governmental power becomes the regulation of economically relevant processes through the population and for the population, then indeed it seems that “the ancient right to take life or let live was replaced by a power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death” (Foucault 1990, 138; original emphasis).

Thus, the power to foster life implies the proper stimulation or encouragement of interests present in the massified subject/object of the population.

But what does it mean to disallow life to the point of death? What, in fact, could be thought of as ‘negative biopolitics’? In order to answer this question we have to revisit the interrelated implications of the above discussed naturalizing processes. On the one hand and according to Arendt, with the subsumption of human actions to a behavioural pattern defined by the collective concern, the plurality and contingency of individuality is eliminated from the construction of the (neither private nor public) social sphere:

It is decisive that society, on all its levels, excludes the possibility of action, which formerly was excluded from the household. Instead, society expects from each of its members a certain kind of behavior, imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to “normalize” its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement.

In Foucauldian terms and from the perspective of the art of government, the elimination of the individual occurs (also) through the discussed rescaling of the target of government. It is now the processes on the populational level which are pertinent, and not the actions or behaviors occurring on the level of the individuals or the multiplicity of individuals. This implies that the sovereign attention that still persisted in the omnipresent disciplinary gaze focusing on the individual body is, at least on the primary level of government, replaced by a generalizing gaze of a massifying power. Betterment is now supposed to take place on the level of “life in general”.

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Betterment of life on this level of generality, in turn, is unimaginable without the forms of knowledge that are meant to grasp it in its totality. Biopower is, after all, that which brought “life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculation and made knowledge-power an agent of transformation of human life”. Economic, demography, epidemiology and, most importantly perhaps, statistics, provided the indivisible epistemic element for these two eliminatory aspects of the biopolitics of “man-as-species”.

The laws of statistics are valid only where large numbers or long periods are involved, and acts or events can statistically appear only as deviations or fluctuations. (...) The application of the law of large numbers and long periods to politics or history signifies nothing less than the wilful obliteration of their very subject matter, and it is a hopeless enterprise to search for meaning in politics or significance in history when everything that is not everyday behavior or automatic trends has been ruled out as immaterial.

Foucault’s more nuanced meditation on the differences between the relationship of the regulatory biopolitics of the man-as-species and the disciplinary biopolitics of the man-as-body to ‘norm’ and ‘the normal’ leads to similar conclusions. Whereas disciplinary techniques are based on the differentiation of the normal individual from the abnormal individual according to a set norm, regulatory techniques deduct the normal distribution of cases from statistical trends, and if the actual distribution diverges from the normal, it is this composite line of divergence that has to be acted upon. Indeed, as Ian Hacking argues, when society became statistical, the notion of ‘normal people’ gained shape—with enormous consequences:

People are normal if they conform to the central tendency of [social] laws, while those at the extremes are pathological. Few of us fancy being pathological, so ‘most of us’ try to make ourselves normal, which in turn affects what is normal.

It is thus almost impossible to underestimate the significance of the emergence of statistical knowledge. What the will to statistical knowledge brought along was nothing less than the absolutisation or, better put, the literalisation of the count. What does this slightly farfetched phrase refer to? Clearly, if the primary aim of the fetishistic wave of data collection in the first half of the nineteenth century tackled by Hacking’s analysis was acquiring
knowledge of and intervening into phenomena related to the life of the population, its primary effect was categorization. “Enumeration demands kinds of things or people to count. Counting is hungry for categories”.35 Once categories are defined, not one case of death, disease, or profession will escape clustering; and this is so even if categories themselves change.36 “[B]ureaucrats (…) designed easily countable classifications, into which everybody had to fall—and thenceforth did” 37

This is where ‘literalisation of the count’ falls into place and Jacques Rancière’s work appears to be worthy of much more than an intertextual reference. In his conceptualization of the paradoxical relationship between politics and philosophy, political philosophy features as always aiming to impede the occurrence of the political by accounting for all the parts of the community and distributing forms of participation accordingly. That is, according to Rancière, political philosophy—and thus the common good—is conditioned upon tying political idealities to the appropriate parts of the community; upon “a count whose complexities may mask a fundamental miscount, (…) the very wrong that is the stuff of politics”.38 As we will see below, politics is always the processing of this fundamental miscount: it is always the confrontation of the supposedly total count of the police order with a part that is unaccounted for. What is to be considered at this point of our discussion is however this: what happens to the miscount when modern social science appears? In Rancière’s interpretation, when social science of the nineteenth century emerges and becomes the form of existence political philosophy has taken ever since, politics is eliminated. When “exhaustive counting mechanisms” are introduced, the sum of its parts will finally be equal to the people. “Such a people, present in the form of its statistical reduction, is a people transformed into an object of knowledge and prediction that sends appearance and its polemics packing”.39 The count thus reaches perfection when it becomes literal.
Taking a look at the earliest phase of this process through the example of the classification of occupations will be illustrative. Hacking notes that in the beginning of the nineteenth century, classification of people in terms of occupation radically changed: categories have been formulated with the aim of facilitating the all-encompassing count. While the industrial revolution in itself could justify a drive for the enumeration of proliferating professions, the timing of “statistical enthusiasm” between two revolutionary years (those of 1832 and 1848) suggests that the desire to count everything was conceived of as a means of containing insurgency: “Find out more about your citizens, cried the conservative enthusiasts, and you will ameliorate their conditions, diminish their restlessness, and strengthen their character”. The echo of Foucault’s notion of biopolitics in this paraphrase is, of course, not arbitrary. Neither can thus be the episode cited by Rancière to illustrate a speech scene within which political subjectification disrupts the police order—as the textual locus of disruption is a concrete classification: that of recognized professions. When in 1832 revolutionary Auguste Blanqui declared to the jury that his profession is “proletarian” and redefined ‘profession’ as “a profession of faith, a declaration of membership of a collective”, the count of the police order had been disturbed by the political subjectification of a part that has been unaccounted for. The proletariat was not equivalent to a social group, neither did it become a profession once the judge, accepting Blanqui’s redefinition of the term, ordered adding “proletarian” to the list of professions. Understanding this speech event as a disruption of the police order seems to be justified when considering what, according to Rancière, the role of ‘occupation’ is within ordering: “The distribution of the sensible reveals who can have a share in what is common to the community based on what they do and on the time and space in which this activity is performed”. With political philosophy giving place to a social science that thus vastly outshone the wildest dreams of
statistical enthusiasts, miscounts based on which such scenes can be staged are largely effaced: politics had been eliminated.

**Abandoning the superfluous**

It would be rather odd to claim that the above interpretation of Arendt, Foucault, and Rancière add up into a perfect prism, looking through which we get a full view of the way abandonment is inscribed into modern governmental rationality. However, a parallel reading of their conceptions on how, in interaction with the emergence of the social, political philosophy and governmental rationality has been transformed and what this implies, productively enlarges our perspective on the workings of this inscription. If we had to condense the composite picture we thus gain, its key element would certainly be the emergence of the aggregate subject/object of government: the “super-human family” or the population. In Foucault’s genealogy we have seen that the appearance of this massified domain resulted in the rescaling of governmental rationality and practices: while neither sovereign nor disciplinary modes of power disappear, in the primary focus of governmental concern are now natural processes that are pertinent only on the level of the population; trivially implying that processes below this level are of no pertinence. Whereas Foucault explicitly chooses to trace the emergence of biopower “not at the level of political theory, but rather at the level of the mechanisms, techniques, and technologies of power”, through nearing his analysis to Arendt’s and Rancière’s thought, we also get a view from the perspective of the former level. From this angle, as it was hinted at above, we encounter the incommensurability of the political and the statistical reduction called population.

The super-human family is incapable of spontaneous action: its behavior is determined by social laws. Identical to the sum of its parts, the population is incapable of creating scenes of appearance: it is walled up into a “homogeneous regime of the visible”. We must
not overlook the implications of this homogeneity as, on the one hand, it represents the main feature of the post-democratic order, that is, of the order that emerges after political philosophy takes the form of social science and any acting out of dissensus is ruled out by the consensus of public opinion. When everyone “is included in advance, every individual is the nucleus and image of a community of opinions that are equal to parties”, there is no representable barrier. As opposed to previous ages, which unabashedly divided those worthy of political life from the dumb rest, the consensus-discourse that wages war on “exclusion” impedes the polemical construction thereof.

Taking a look at the level of governmental rationality and practices again, we find an early parallel to the consensual overwriting of representable barriers in the form of the modern readjustment of the divisions that determine proper government. As opposed to the primary problem of the age of raison d’état, once the market had been reconstructed as a site of veridiction, the question facing the sovereign will not be whether his rule is legitimate or it violates the rights of its subjects. The internal limitation against which the formulating liberal governmental reason keeps running up establishes a new division.

[T]his governmental reason will not divide subjects between an absolutely reserved dimension of freedom and another dimension of submission which is either consented to or is imposed. In fact, the division is not made within individuals, men, or subjects, but in the very domain of governmental practice, or rather within governmental practice itself, between the operations that can be carried out and those that cannot, between what to do and the means to use on the one hand, and what not to do on the other.

Consequently, the decision between what must be done and what should be left to its own dynamics is conceived of not as the object of sovereign decision but as directed by the nature of the objects of governance, the truth of which, as mentioned above, the sovereign would be incapable to comprehend and control. Frugal government of the “modest state” leaves limited choices to both governed and governor. In our post-democratic present, which, in many
senses, brought along the perfection of the discussed features of liberal governmental rationality, the assumption of powerlessness becomes ever more crucial:

The legitimacy of state power is [...] reinforced by the very affirmation of its impotence, of its lack of choice faced with the world-wide necessity it is dominated by. The theme of the common will is replaced by that of the lack of personal will, of capacity for autonomous action that is anything more than just management of necessity.\textsuperscript{51}

Ultimately, if the above redrawn trajectory is tenable, the interrelated emergence of the economic and social realms as autonomous fields of intervention—through the naturalization of the processes attributed to them—leads to the elimination of contingency from both the subject/object and the act of governance. Thus, to put it in Arendtian terms, human being becomes superfluous.\textsuperscript{52} Hence, by way of this term, we arrived at the phenomenon that can be understood as the abandonment inscribed in modern governmental rationality, that is, biopolitical abandonment. But how exactly is biopolitical abandonment and superfluity related? Preserving our twofold perspective and first looking at the realm of governmental rationality, here again we are led to the pertinence of the population and the non-pertinence of anything below its aggregate level. Considering Foucault’s discussion of the event of scarcity, however, also clarifies why non-pertinence can at once be understood as superfluous. When scarcity conceived of as scourge that affects both the individual and the whole population and must therefore be avoided is replaced by a conception of scarcity as a chimera that exists on the level of individuals or particular multiplicities of individuals, but does not effect the population as the aggregate object of government; letting people die becomes integrated into governmental rationality. Securing against the emergence of scarcity on the pertinent level of the population means allowing it to develop on particular sites and affecting particular individuals or groups on the non-pertinent level. “The scarcity-scourge disappears, but the scarcity that causes the death of individuals not only does not disappear, it must not disappear.”\textsuperscript{53} We could thus say that modern governmental rationality that aims at the
wellbeing of the population entails a certain “perspectival superfluity”: the particular sites and people on which natural processes are allowed to take effect are superfluous from the perspective of the goals to be achieved on the massified level.

Perspectival superfluity, however, is necessarily paired with political superfluity—and not only because the impotency or self-limitation of government facing the necessities of natural dynamics ultimately evacuates anything reminiscent of virtù from governmental reason. As we have seen above, constructing and rendering governable the economic and the social is conditioned upon forms of knowledge for which the singularity of human action and consequently politics—the appearance of this action—is superfluous as well. Behavioural patterns following natural laws and the homogeneity of public opinion are antithetical to contingency understood—by Arendt—as the correlate of freedom; as the potentiality of “could have been otherwise”. Similarly rooted in the prevalence of necessity and the according reconfiguration of contingency and freedom, the interaction of these two forms of superfluity add up to biopolitical abandonment. Subjected to specific governmental rationalities and by way of mobilizing e.g. racism or the circulatory imperative of neoliberalism, this biopolitical abandonment can then be understood as the vehicle of the power to disallow life.

Materializing superfluity

Having outlined above a possible conceptual answer to our original question addressing the paradoxical relationship between a power that aims at the improvement of life and the extent of abandonment it accommodates, in this section the problem is approached from the perspective of its materialization. In what forms is the biopower to disallow life deployed? How is superfluity crystallized, and how is it being contested? How can we conceptualize resistance to biopolitical abandonment? Pursuing these questions in parallel
reflects Foucault’s claim about the coexistence of power and resistance and his call to study power from the perspective of its capillary ends. Nevertheless, in order to introduce a possible notion of political resistance into our framework, and due to the analytical potentials of his aesthetic understanding of politics—which shares its Kantian inspirations with many aspects of Foucault’s work—below I draw primarily on Rancière’s key concepts.

Central among these is the concept of the distribution of the sensible. As already alluded to through the ideas of the count (that takes account of the community’s parts) and the police (that itself is a distribution of the sensible), this notion refers to an ordering of what is perceptible. It is a double system that at once defines what is common and the distinctive parts’ shares and positions in relation to that.

It is a delimitation of spaces and times, of the visible and the invisible, of speech and noise, that simultaneously determines the place and the stakes of politics as a form of experience. Politics [la politique] revolves around what is seen and what can be said about it, around who has the ability to see and the talent to speak, around the properties of spaces and the possibilities of times. The distribution of the sensible thus refers to a “certain framing of time and space” that eventually designates forms of exclusion and inclusion. The delineation of positions in relation to what is common (e.g. the capacity to speak) therefore form a sensible order, which manifests itself in actual topographies. In a narrower sense—centering on the political community—the police order configures a social hierarchy through allocating places and functions to individuals and groups based on their competencies.

In order to see how this aesthetic approach to governance can bring us closer to conceptualizing resistance to biopolitical abandonment, let us consider what a biopolitical distribution of the sensible looks like. If biopolitics primarily means that with modernity the biological life of the human being entered the center of politics, then what is common, is biological life itself. Therefore, the “community” is the species, what is at stake is fostering and disallowing life, and places and functions are allotted based on what counts as the life to
be fostered and what can be allowed to die. On these terms, and equipped with Rancière’s perspective on the political order as a distribution of places and functions, the crystallization of superfluity can be traced.

Moreover, this perspective provides the point of departure for thinking superfluity’s contestation, as for Rancière the main concern of politics (le politique) is “to resist the givenness of a place” and consequently the division based on which that place is allocated.\(^6\) Politics thus triggers the re-partitioning of the police logic, a reordering of what is visible and audible, and of what is regarded as political. This latter aspect explains why it generally and necessarily “occurs ‘out-of-place’, in a place which was not supposed to be political”.\(^6\) However, this heterogeneity is not a sufficient condition for politics to happen, for politics is not a default attribute of a specific place or a particular social group—be they within or without the supposed boundaries of the political—hence, it is not alternative distribution of the sensible opposing the police. Instead, politics is an event: a singular act of creating a stage of appearance. This is exactly what ‘the part that has no part’ refers to: those who are uncounted appear so because they cannot be identified with any existing or “real” part of the society; they are excessive to the count. When they gain visibility as the uncounted people and thus enact the basic miscount, they do so by filling an empty category: the demos is, essentially, an empty name. It is filled up with a community of people through the process of subjectification and based on the presumption of equality.

Whereas any logic of the police is the logic of hierarchy, of inequality, politics is the process of equality because it always the implementation of the basic presumption of the equality of anyone with everyone else. The tension from which politics emerges, that is, the fundamental wrong is exactly this: the heterogeneity of the hierarchical social order and the basic equality of “any speaking being with any other speaking being”.\(^6\) A social order is always contingent because it rests on this basic equality:
There is order in society because some people command and others obey, but in order to obey an order at least two things are required: you must understand the order and you must understand that you must obey it. And to do that, you must already be the equal of the person who is ordering you.  

The biopolitical dissolution of this basic equality in the homogeneity of ‘public opinion’ and the ‘collective interest’ works precisely against this “sheer contingency” of social orders. What gives rise to the subjectification of the uncounted if representable barriers are effaced by the triumph of the consensus? As Rancière notes, our time, having renounced the (divisionary) promise of politics, entails a space equally freed of division, that is, “a new configuration of political space, the free development of consensual force adequate to the free and apolitical development of production and circulation”.  

Arguably, (neo-)liberal governmental rationality—guarded by the postdemocratic consensus—is a distribution of the sensible that is primarily defined by the necessity of circulation. Thus, the allotment of places and functions reflects above all an account of the capacity or the incapacity to circulate. As such, it crystallizes the literal superfluity of globalized capitalism. Let us therefore take a closer look at the circulatory imperative.

The most evident point of departure for this survey is Foucault’s differentiation between the territorial rule of the sovereign, the prescriptive rule of disciplinary power and the laissez-faire practices of regulatory biopower. This latter model of power operates primarily through apparatuses of security. That is, through assemblages of practices targeting the givens of the domain to be governed in a way that aims to optimize its beneficial processes and minimize those which are potentially detrimental. As Foucault shows on the example of the town, while security apparatuses continue to deploy technologies of power characteristic of sovereign and disciplinary modes of power, their dominant feature is centered on the notion of freedom; freedom not as an ideology but as a technology of power. Freedom as a technology of power implies that reality is allowed to develop according to its own laws—a technology fundamentally featured in liberalism, as Foucault notes. In terms of the governance of the
developing town, this takes the shape of facilitating circulation. All the functions (hygiene, internal and external trade, and surveillance) that were expected to be secured by the restructuring of the eighteenth century town and that were implemented primarily through the construction of roads through and within the town, aimed at “organizing circulation, eliminating its dangerous elements, making a division between good and bad circulation, and maximizing the good circulation by diminishing the bad”. Hence the substantial division that, preserved and generalized in neoliberal governmental rationalities, defines contemporary topographies within which the literal superfluity of marginalized people is materialized.

A possible illustration of how this happens, of how such topographies are molded by different rationalities and technologies of power could be the case of American anti-homeless laws discussed by Don Mitchell. Working within the framework of critical geography, Mitchell’s point of departure is the claim that the globalization of capital is conditioned upon the “production and reproduction of certain kinds of spaces” and that “[f]or capital to be free, it must also be fixed in a place”. Due to the constant circulation of capital and the parallel masking of its need for fixity, places face increasing uncertainty, the antidote of which seems to be the almost unprecedented extent of investment in improving their attractiveness. Redefining attractiveness through such discourses as that of the “livable city”, several cities in the United States complemented projects of building conference halls and sports centers with what Mitchell terms the “annihilation of space by law”: “a legal remedy that seeks to cleanse the streets of those left behind by globalization and other secular changes in the economy by simply erasing the spaces in which they must live”. By means of the anti-homeless laws, a strange combination of disciplinary anatomopolitics and sovereign power is put in place: basic physical needs are criminalized through the prohibition of their practice in public places. As it is only homeless people who are compelled to public urination or sleeping in public spaces, Mitchell’s conclusion that “these laws attempt not just the annihilation of space, but
also the annihilation of the people who live in it” seems to be grounded. Beyond disciplinary and sovereign technologies of power and, perhaps dominating these, we encounter here security apparatuses working to disable bad circulation in order to foster good circulation, and are thus faced with an instance of the circulatory distribution of the sensible.

By pointing to the way apparatuses of security instrumentalise law—typically the means of the sovereign model of power—this example draws attention to yet another aspect of the postdemocratic order, one that further obstructs the occurrence of politics: the factualisation of law. This phenomenon, complementing the constant reference to the objective necessities deriving from the imperative of circulation, serves as the juridical legitimization of the “modest state”. On the one hand, it refers to the “mimesis of the political practice of litigation” consisting in the minimal government’s self-imposition to constitutional control. On the other hand, it implies the equalization of law and fact in service of circulation. As we will see in the next section, this collision has a significant role in the contemporary management of superfluity.

Superfluous and uncounted

Arriving finally at the question of resistance, in this section I look at struggles in and around a kind of space that seems to be paradigmatic of our present—possibly more so than the Camp. Generally subject to similar mechanisms of power to those traced in the example of the anti-homeless laws but present on a much larger scale, this sort of space is the shantytown, the *favelas*, the *gecekondu*: located mostly on the peripheries of mostly “Third World” metropolises and populated by millions of people who cannot afford other forms of accommodation. As I would like to show below, present-day shantytowns that are supposed to be effaced from spectacular visions of urban development might also be paradoxical places
when, eventually bouncing into visibility, they are able to disrupt the distribution of the sensible that constructs them as spaces of abandonment. While this claim implies that shantytowns can be seen as the political spaces of our present, clearly, nothing would be more dissonant with whatever Rancière says about politics than to argue so. Therefore, in what follows, I focus on the particular movement of the South African Abahlali baseMjondolo, for, at instances, their struggle appears to be able to disrupt the dynamics of biopolitical abandonment and so is able to guide a potential conceptualization of resistance thereto.

As my point of departure, I take the distinction between the population and the people, which Foucault, drawing on Louis-Paul Abeille, introduces when discussing the event of scarcity as touched upon above. According to Abeille, scarcity can be the chimera it has to be only if “people conduct themselves properly” and so “really act as members of the population”. Those, on the other hand, who refuse to conduct themselves properly and disrupt the desirable development of the dynamics of scarcity consequently even risking revolution, place themselves outside of the population and thus belong to another category: the people—hence the epigraph of this paper. The significance of this distinction lies in its allusion to Rancière’s understanding of politics and the people (or, alternatively, the demos), as these conceptions posit disruption as essentially political. While not every disruption of the conduct of conduct should be read as at once political, when it is associated to the subjectification of the ‘people’ through processing a fundamental miscount, indeed we encounter politics.

Arguably, the Abahlali’s struggle presents such a case. Their resistance is almost fully condensed in this statement: “We are the people who do not count”—as it is primarily by rejecting-through-assuming the status of superfluity that the South African shack dwellers’ movement emerges as a political subject. A political subject conscious of the disruptive effect of presuming equality: “If you want to unite and to make a culture that people should be
equal then you are invading the space that is forbidden to you, you are threatening the system”.  

The shack dwellers’ persistent invasion of this forbidden space started with a real invasion: a spontaneous road blockade in Durban in early 2005, as a reaction to rumours about the eThekwini (Metropolitan Durban) Municipality selling to a brick factory a piece of land that was promised to the dwellers of the Clare Estate settlement a few weeks earlier.  

It was this event, fuelled by anger and the feeling of betrayal due to the Municipality’s neglect of the agreement that created the community. “The movement grew out of a spontaneous blockade, of our radical anger and frustration. It was not preceded by intellectual work, but afterwards the movement was formed because we realized that we are not on our own”. So emerged the “politics of the poor”, or, as it is more often referred to, the “living politics”.  

In turn, living politics rooted in this process of political subjectification and the notion of life it revolves around that renders the Abahlali’s struggle able to disturb the processes of biopolitical abandonment. Abahlali contest the forced mobility of superfluous life by presenting biopolitics with a life heterogeneous to it; by fissuring the homogeneity of species being. It does so primarily through challenging an element central to governing the life of the population: the messianic spatio-temporality of development. To the effects the circulatory dynamics of development take on the non-pertinent level that incidentally is populated by the shack-dwellers—effects that literally disallow their lives—living politics opposes a manifold insistence on proximity. The appropriation of the idea of in situ upgrade—a policy that has been propagated by the UN-Habitat in recent years—for instance well reflects the motives of this insistence. Relocation to distant housing areas in the unforeseeable future, the no-place of eviction and the no-time of “informality” are opposed to the here-and-now in the demand of developing existing settlements.  

This opposition is further reinforced by the insistence on equality and singularity. Both can be reflected through the role of understanding (the ability and the fundamental willingness
to understand) within living politics. Understanding is at once the form and the content of living politics—indivisibly rooted in and reaffirming the basic presumption of every human being’s equality. On the one hand, one the most important principles of the living politics is that everyone must understand it. With view of the Abahlali’s emphasis on everyone’s capability to think and to comprehend, clearly, this imperative should not be read as a patronizing intention to keep the slogans accessible for an ignorant mass. Quite to the contrary: it reflects an ability of understanding that rests on a fundamental presumption of equality: “we are all human beings, and so our needs are all, one way or another, similar”.\(^91\) Crucially, as the parallel with Rancière’s interpretation Joseph Jacotot’s conception of the equality of intellect shows,\(^92\) so conceiving of the capability to understand defies another aspect of the developmental temporality by eliminating the need for explanation.

I explain an idea to someone because I suppose that he wouldn’t understand it if I didn’t explain it to him. (…) Rather than eliminating incapacity, explanation, in fact, creates it. It does this in part by establishing the temporal structure of delay (‘a little further along,’ ‘a little later,’ ‘a few more explanations and you’ll see the light’) that, writ large, would become the whole nineteenth century myth of Progress: ‘the pedagogical fiction erected into the fiction of the whole society,’ and the general infantilisation of the individuals who compose it.\(^93\)

Singularity, on the other hand, is inherent in the living politics’ insistence on the willingness to understand: as one of its most important functions living politics provides a space for everyone’s narrative of his or her individual suffering and, in turn, it is exactly these narratives that give it its content.\(^94\) Thus, these narratives of pain and injustice trigger the enactment of \textit{dissensus}. In light of this, as Rancière argues, the separation of the political sphere from the sphere of life necessities makes no sense indeed.\(^95\)

To be sure, the above sketch of Abahlali baseMjondolo’s struggle is only the first step in the process of understanding it. In the context of the discussion in this article, however, I did not aim to do more. What this section was intended to point to through outlining the main facets of the South African shack-dwellers’ politics is the possibility to think resistance to
biopolitical abandonment as it has been conceptualized in the preceding sections. The living politics of Abahlali bears this possibility because through their political subjectification stemming from the presumption of equality and the singularity of human life, apparently, it is able to forge the caesura between the pertinent and the non-pertinent levels of governance posited by modern governmental rationality and is thus able to challenge both the perspectival and the political superfluity inscribed into it. For this, at least, in a world where processes of economic and social marginalization materialize superfluity to an unprecedented degree, much is to be learned from their struggles.

**Conclusion**

Starting from the puzzle posed by the ultimate aim of modern governmental rationality, that is, the nurturing of the population and its tendencies to exclude large parts of the same population from the spectrum of its care, this paper argued that abandonment is always already inscribed into this rationality. In contradiction to Agamben, inscribed abandonment was not attributed to sovereign power and its original activity of producing bare life, but was traced back to typically modern processes of transforming the political as problematized by Arendt and Foucault. Complementing these two thinkers’ work with those of Hacking and Rancière, it was argued that due to the naturalization of the political that occurred with the construction of economy as an autonomous field and the forms of knowledge correlative to this construction, and culminating in what was referred to as the literalisation of the count, contingency and plurality of human action has been eliminated from governmental reason. This elimination of contingency, it was claimed, can be understood as the biopolitical abandonment inscribed into modern governmental rationality and, therefore, can be seen as enabling the biopower to disallow life.
The aim of conceptualizing biopolitical abandonment by drawing on the Arendtian notion of superfluity was to enable an understanding of contemporary forms of extreme social and economic marginalization and potential forms of resistance to these. Based on the endorsement of Rancière’s aesthetic understanding of politics that centers on the notion of the distribution of the sensible, grasping the dynamics of biopolitical abandonment as spatio-temporal articulations was suggested. Still in line with Rancière’s thought—that posits politics as the disruption of hierarchical orders of the sensible—and based on a discussion of the South African shack dwellers’ struggle, it was argued that the dynamics of biopolitical abandonment can eventually be diverted—despite the tendency within (global) neoliberal governance to equalize law and fact, so working towards impeding the political subjectification of those who have no part.

Foucault (2003 and 1982) famously claimed that power relations have to be subject to an ascending analysis and that resistance is a diagnostic of power.96 On the one hand, this implies that the close-up study of specific movements such as the Abahlali baseMjondolo potentially sheds light on the larger dynamics of global neoliberal governance. On the other hand, but still tied to studying instances of political resistance, this claim possibly guides an alternative way of conceptualizing communities of our present. As this paper intended to show in contradistinction to recent criticisms of the “biopolitical approach” (e.g. Chandler 2009 and Selby 2007),97 by providing a perspective from which to look at practices and rationalities of power at points where they crystallize and where they are contested, Foucault’s thought does serve as a point of departure for thinking the political today. Although it might not suffice in itself to think contemporary forms of political resistance, complemented with an approach to politics as disrupting spatio-temporal orders defined by governmental rationalities, Foucault’s concept of biopolitics forcefully grounds criticisms of what is thought to be given.

Taking this criticism further through Rancière’s understanding of the political as a singular
event of resisting the givenness of a place, the *demos* might be found where one would never look for it.

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1 Abahlali baseMjondolo, “Fire Devastates the Kennedy Road Settlement – At Least One Hundred Homes are Destroyed”, Press statement (16 June 2009).

2 I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Michael Merlingen and the members of the Abahlali baseMjondolo for all their support. I would also like to thank Nicholas J. Kiersey and Jason R. Weidner for organizing the ISA 2009 panel on which an earlier version of this paper was presented, and Nicholas Kiersey in particular for his efforts and support throughout the edition of this issue. Finally, I am grateful to Erzsebet Strausz and Adam Mestyan for their comments on earlier drafts.


9 On Foucault’s distinction between relationships of power, states of domination, and government (an intermediary category understood broadly as the conduct of conduct), see Barry Hindess, *Discourses of Power: From Hobbes to Foucault* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 96–136. It is based on the Foucauldian conception of power as ‘action upon the actions of others’—or, as Hindess formulates it, as “an ubiquitous feature of human interaction”—that Laura Zanotti criticizes Agambenian interpretations of liberalism. In line with what is stated above, Zanotti argues that the government of disorderly states does not “produce totalizing effects of domination”. Instead, through conducting the conduct of states to be disciplined, normalization inscribes spaces of resistance that allow for diverting and hijacking its original agendas; as in the case of the international attempts to secure order in Croatia. Cf. Laura Zanotti, “Normalizing Democracy and Human Rights: Discipline, Resistance, and Carceralization in Croatia’s Euro-Atlantic Integration”, *Journal of International Relations and Development*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2008), pp. 222–250.


12 While I do not engage here in a detailed discussion of Agamben’s notion of abandonment as the sovereign exception, it is not my intention to dismiss it completely. As it is mentioned below in relation to the notion of superfluity, and as the above references to analyses of power and resistance in contemporary Camps show, this concept indeed has relevance in certain situations. Nevertheless, its relevance cannot be extended to all manifestations of biopolitical abandonment, for these, I believe, are more often inscribed not into states of domination but into governmental rationalities and practices characteristic of biopolitical models of power. This is precisely what enables and at once necessitates thinking resistance to their inscription. As Didier Bigo argues, Agamben criticizes Foucault’s very conception of the indivisibility of power and resistance: “For him, and contrary to Foucault, the polarization between power and bare life is possible and in fact drives all the contemporary practices of power, including those of liberal states and democracies”. The conception of this polarization is made possible by Agamben’s reduction of Jean-Luc Nancy’s notion of the ban. This reduction,
according to Bigo, implies that “by exaggerating the capacity of the actors speaking in the name of the sovereign and by essentialising sovereignty through a conception that plays against (yet with) the rule of law […] Agamben ignores the resistance of the weak and their capacities to continue to be humane and to subvert the illusory dream of total control”. Didier Bigo, “Detention of Foreigners, States of Exception, and the Social Practices of the Control of the Banopticon”, in Prem Kumar Rajaram and Carl Grundy-Warr (eds.) Borderscapes: Hidden Geographies and Politics at Territory’s Edge (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), pp. 3–33. For a criticism of Agamben’s “political nihilism” that entails dismissing “all political options in our societies” see further Ernesto Laclau, “Bare Life or Social Indeterminacy?” in Matthew Calarco and Steven DeCaroli (eds.) Giorgio Agamben: Sovereignty & Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press), pp. 11–22.

13 See Agamben, op. cit., 120.


15 See the most quoted “definition” of biopolitics: “For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity for a political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being into question”, Foucault, The History of Sexuality, p. 143.


18 Arendt, op. cit., p. 33.

19 Ibid., p. 44.


22 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, p. 20.

23 Ibid., p. 22.


25 Ibid., p. 75.

26 Foucault, History of Sexuality, p. 138; original emphasis. It is exactly this shift that is cannot be captured when accepting Agamben’s claim on the ancient bond between sovereign and biopolitical models of power.

27 “Perhaps if Foucault could have seen the way African ‘demography’ is ‘regulated’ by the AIDS epidemic (and a number of other epidemics, all monitored by a ‘World Health Organization’), he might have, ventured to speak of ‘negative bio-politics’”, Étienne Balibar, Politics and the Other Scene (London and New York: Verso, 2002), p. 38.

28 Arendt, op. cit., p. 40.


30 Foucault, History of Sexuality, p. 143.


34 Or, to borrow Hacking’s term, “the avalanche of printed numbers”, Ibid.


36 “[N]ational and provincial censuses amazingly show that the categories into which people fall change every ten years. Social change creates new categories of people, but counting is no mere report of developments. It elaborately, often philanthropically creates new way for people to be, Ian Hacking, “Making up Individuals” in Thomas C. Heller, Morton Mosna, and David E. Welbery (eds.), Reconstructing Individualism: Autonomy, Individuality, and the Self in Western Thought (Stanford: University Press, 1986), p. 223.


39 Ibid., p. 105.


41 Rancière, op. cit., p. 38.


43 Thus, I do not wish to suggest that there is a continuum of thought around the notions of abandonment or superfluity in the work of the authors discussed; in fact, at points, there are significant tensions between them. While some of these are mentioned below, the discussion of discontinuities is not the object of this article. My aim here is rather to place the referred authors’ concepts into interaction, so that they illuminate each other and
thus shed some light on aspects of the problematique of abandonment that has remained obscure in current discussions.


46 Even if these laws are probabilistic and contain an element of contingency, so constituting the crux of security apparatuses. On this aspect of biopolitical governance, see Dillon (2007).

47 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, p. 11.

52 Superfluity for Arendt primarily features as the aim of totalitarian regimes, for which, due to their aim to speed up the progress of the (human) race toward its historical fate, the human potential for spontaneous action is unnecessary, and so—this potential being what makes it what it is—human itself becomes superfluous. In her view, this aim had only been achieved in the concentration camps where, being reduced to mere corpses, human beings were indeed lacking the capacity for action. (This sense of superfluity can be read as Agamben’s homo sacer.) Beyond this notion, however, Arendt uses the term in another, more literal sense: referring to stateless people and the millions of unemployed who were excluded from the protected sphere of their nation-states because they were, for various reasons, unwanted. See Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976). Bauman’s notion of ‘waste’ is very expressive of this state superfluity. See Zygmunt Bauman, Wasted Lives: Modernity and its Outcasts, (London: Polity Press, 2004). Cf. Bernard Ogilvie, “Violence et Représentation: La Production de L’homme Jetable”, Lignes, Vol. 26, (1995), pp. 113–141.

53 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, p. 64.


57 On the relation of racism and the power to disallow life see Foucault, “Society Must be Defended!”, pp. 239–263. On the “circulatory imperative” see the next section of this paper.

58 See Foucault, History of Sexuality and Idem., “Society Must be Defended!”.

59 About his understanding of aesthetics that is at the core of politics see Rancière, Politics of Aesthetics, p. 13.

60 Ibid., p. 12.


67 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population.

68 Ibid., p. 69.

69 Ibid., p. 34.


71 Ibid., p. 305.

72 Ibid.

73 Consider in particular the passages describing the construction of beggars and other homeless people as impediments to the sufficient extent of consumption: “There is another, perhaps more important, danger posed by those sitting and lying on streets: ‘many people see those sitting or lying on the sidewalk and—either because
they expect to be solicited or otherwise feel apprehensive—avoid the area. This deters them from shopping at adjacent businesses, contributing to the failure of some and damaging others, costing Seattle jobs and essential tax revenue”, Ibid., p. 309.

74 Deranty draws a parallel between Rancière’s and Jean-Luc Nancy’s diagnoses of the phenomenon and refers to it by Nancy’s term: “the juridification of the social”, see Deranty, “Rancière’s Political Ontology”, p. 12.

75 Rancière, Dis-agreement, p. 109.


77 The Camp is the “biopolitical paradigm of the modern” according to Agamben, Homo Sacer, e.g. p. 9 and 123.

78 These are the Brazilian and Turkish words for shantytowns. The latter phrase means “it happened at night”.

79 “For years, Turkey’s squatters built at night to take advantage of an ancient legal precept that said, essentially, that if they started construction at dusk and were moved in by sunrise without being discovered by the authorities, they gained legal standing and could not be evicted without a court fight”, Robert Neuwirth, Shadow Cities: A Billion Squatters, a New Urban World (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 8.

80 Literally: ‘the people who live in the shacks’.

81 Beyond available texts of the movement (mostly online at www.abahlali.org), I draw on a field research carried out with the movement. At the time of writing, the research is still going on, the conclusions therefore should be regarded as preliminary.

82 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, p. 65

83 Ibid., 66.

84 Here again Zanotti’s and Best’s (op. cit.) arguments can be relevant.


88 S’bu Zikode, author’s notes (6 May 2009). On the subjectifying force of anger see Simon Critchley (2007, 130): “[Political] disappointment provokes an experience of injustice and the feeling of anger. I think anger is very important, and, contrary to the classical tradition, in Seneca say, I think it is the first political emotion. It is often anger that moves the subject to action.”

89 The most evident manifestation of these processes in present-day South Africa—recalling what was said above about the correlation of the prevalence of the circulative imperative and the factualisation of law—is the series of attempts to change the legislative regulation regarding shack settlements and illegal land occupation. Neutralizing the pro-poor elements of earlier legislation, among them the Constitution that famously endorses a Monthly Review ideology, see Deranty, “Rancière’s Political Ontology”, p. 12.


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101 One of the biggest threats is fire: lacking electricity, people use candles and paraffin stoves, which can cause huge fires in minutes, as the shacks are built mostly of flammable material and are built very close to each other. Lacking water too, a candle flipping over can lead to disasters. Cf. Matt Birkinshaw, A Big Devil in the Jondolos: The Politics of Shack Fires (Durban: Abahlali baseMjondolo 2008), available: http://abahlali.org/node/4013 (accessed: 22 June 2009).

102 See e.g. the UN-Habitat’s Participatory Slum Upgrading Programme at http://www.unhabitat.org/categories.asp?catid=592 (accessed: 22 June 2009).

103 Zikode quoted in Pithouse, “To Resist all Degradations and Divisions”.


106 S’bu Zikode, author’s interview (2 June 2009).

107 Rancière, “Who is the Subject of the Rights of Man?”. 
See Michel Foucault, “*Society Must be Defended!*”, p. 30 and Idem., “Subject and Power”, p. 780.