The Role of Citizens in Post-Apartheid South Africa: a Case-Study of Citizen Involvement in Informal Settlement Projects, eThekwini

By

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<td>BNG</td>
<td>Breaking New Ground</td>
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<td>COHRE</td>
<td>Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions</td>
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<td>COSATU</td>
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<td>EPRS</td>
<td>Elimination and Prevention of Re-emergence of the Slums Act</td>
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UNHCS  United Nations Centre for Human Settlements
WPLG  White Paper on Local Government
Introduction

Citizenship and its parameters have been explored, defined and contested from college corridors of Kerala (Lukose 2005), to the streets of Bradford (Hussain and Bagguley 2003); from Platonic philosophy to post-colonial states (Mamdani 1996). When these debates enter the South African context, they interact with histories of apartheid and current inequalities. Adam (1995 in Croucher 1998:658) claims that the transition from apartheid heralded “a civic nation without nationalism, based on equal rights for every citizen”, but such equality has been elusive in practice. Although political equality was formalised in 1994, socio-economic inequality remains high. South Africa is classified as a middle income country but falls 125th (of 179 countries) on the Human Development Index (UNDP 2008). The black ‘middle class’ or ‘elite’ is growing with support from Black Economic Empowerment, however, with the manufacturing retrenchments that followed the Growth Employment and Redistribution plan (South Africa’s neo-liberal economic reform in 1996) black poverty also increased (Esser and Decker 2008:168).1 These market-led inequalities have prompted some to claim that South Africa has entered a “class apartheid” (Bond 2003). Many wonder whether South African citizenship “simultaneously eroded[d] as it expand[ed]” since 1994.2

This thesis uses the case study of informal settlement projects in eThekwini (KwaZulu Natal) to explore how citizenship, and more specifically citizen

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1 unemployment settled recently at 25.5% (Official Definition, RoSA 2006)
2 originally used by Holston (2009:13) to describe developing citizenship in Brazil
involvement (the borderline between state and citizen), is being defined and contested in post-apartheid South Africa. Informal settlements have received much attention in development studies (e.g., Davies 2006; Huchzemeyer and Karam 2006; de Soto 2000). We should not overlook or underestimate the planning and construction of informal settlements; the strength of some settlement communities; the presence of residents’ livelihood strategies; nor the diversity of settlements. That said, the lack of basic services, adequate housing and tenure security in many settlements negatively impacts the life chances, health and safety of shack dwellers across South Africa, and the world. However, if ‘formal’ dwellings built to replace these settlements place people far from economic opportunities, destroy their communities, or provide sub-standard, undersized housing their opportunities and life choices can be places in even greater jeopardy. For these reasons, informal settlements residents occupy contested or liminal spaces in debates around development and citizenship. Therefore, they make an excellent case study for exploring the parameters of citizen involvement in post-apartheid South Africa.

Within this thesis, informal settlements are defined as: “settlements of the urban poor developed through the unauthorised occupation of the land” (Albertyn 2007:vii). “Informal settlement projects”, are projects aimed at providing informal settlement residents with low-income housing, through the provision of formal housing in a different area (relocation), provision of formal housing on the site of a current informal settlement (and in situ upgrade) or through the incremental provision of basic services, security of
tenure and building materials on their current site (an incremental in situ upgrade). Within such projects there are several opportunities for citizen involvement:

1. **Planning the project:** deciding on location; housing typology; layout of the settlement; the form of upgrade chosen
2. **Managing the project:** administration; procurement of materials; project management; quality control
3. **Construction:** below-ground infrastructure; top-structure construction

As this list demonstrates, areas of involvement are many and varied. This thesis does not advocate any particular vision of citizen involvement in informal settlement projects. Instead, it asks two key research questions:

1. **Why have clashes over citizen involvement occurred in eThekwini?**
2. **How have grassroots groups sought to realise their visions of citizen involvement?**

eThekwini, is on the Eastern coast of South Africa, within the province of KwaZulu Natal (KZN). This municipality constitutes the metropolitan area of Durban and was formed as a single metropolitan municipal entity in 2000 during the final reshuffle of local government structures. The municipality has a relatively high capacity. Annual low-income housing delivery peaks at
a numerically impressive 16,000.\(^3\) However, eThekwini and KZN have been at the forefront of recent conflicts over informal settlements. Whilst many authors have focused on single actors within these conflicts (e.g., Bryant 2008; Patel 2008; Pithouse 2006a; Pithouse 2006b; Swilling 2008), this thesis is noteworthy because it aims to juxtapose the insights of multiple actors and by contextualizing the struggles between them, better understand their visions of citizen involvement, and the opportunities and challenges they face.

This thesis draws on 41 face-to-face interviews and 3 focus groups conducted by the author (see appendix one). Samples were drawn through purposive recruitment and as such, the opinions expressed by individuals should not be considered representative of any wider organisation or sector. AbM and FedUp were chosen as case-studies because they are attempting to achieve specific visions of citizen involvement in informal settlement projects. Whilst their combined coverage of informal settlements is wide, it is not complete and should also not be considered representative of all settlements. In its case-study of AbM, the thesis also draws on a thirty person random-sample survey conducted in the Mjondolo (informal settlement) of Motala Heights. The survey was completed as a separate project on AbM and will be referred to as (survey, unpublished). All interviewees are treated as anonymous and referred to as (Category: Respondent number) e.g. (Municipal Official 1). The settlement area of informal settlement dwellers will be noted.

\(^3\) Although exact figures vary (Pithouse 2008)
Many issues relating to informal settlements in South Africa lie outside the remit of this thesis: access to basic services; the supply (or otherwise) of end-user finance; low-income housing ‘blackmarkets’; and crises (most notably shack fires). Furthermore, my fieldwork ran from 2nd August 2008 - 10th October 2008, this thesis excludes developments after this period.

**Thesis Outline**

Chapter two begins by exploring the category of ‘citizen’ in relation to informal settlements policy in post-apartheid South Africa, claiming that approaches have been conflicted. Chapter three addresses the policy space available for citizens’ involvement within informal settlement projects. It argues that post-apartheid policy has chosen consensus over coherence. Consequently, multiple (often conflicting) visions of citizenship and citizen involvement are incorporated into single policy documents and battles over the role of citizens in housing are deferred from a national policy levels to a local level. Chapter four explores two visions for citizen involvement from Abahlali baseMjondolo (AbM) and the Federation of the Urban Poor (FedUp). Chapter five analyses the space for implementing these visions in eThekwini, highlighting practical and political limitations. With these obstacles in mind, chapter six explores how AbM and FedUp sought to re-open space for citizen involvement by “boomeranging” (Keck and Sikkink 1998;1999) and “jumping scale” (Smith 1993). Whilst demonstrating the progress each group has made, the final chapter explores the Janus-face of such tactics: the opposing interests they may serve and the voices they may leave behind.
Chapter 2: The Citizenship of Informal Settlement Dwellers: are some citizens more equal than others?

The notion of citizenship should always be viewed as contested (Heller 2009:125)

Few concepts in politics are as vulnerable to the risk of conceptual overload as that of citizenry (Weinstock 2002:257)

The minimalist definition of citizenship from which we begin, is that ‘citizenship’ refers to rights, obligations and the membership of a political community. Beyond that, citizenship becomes an “essentially contested term” (Gallie 1955), which has been used to secure or challenge the status quo (from the right and left). In this sense, ‘citizenship’ is an “ideological escape route” (Andrews 1991:12) or an “empty vessel into which speakers can pour their own social and political ideals” (Schuck 2002:131). Part one explores the literature on citizenship most relevant to this thesis. Part two analyses how these concepts of citizenship play into informal settlement policy in post-apartheid South Africa, which has fluctuated between transformative rights-based approaches and legalistic understandings of informal settlements, pushing residents into liminal areas of citizenship.

Part One: Exploring ‘citizenship’
The following literature review will be used to discuss key topics of citizenship that emerge throughout this thesis, although obviously academic scholarship on citizenship is far broader. First, it questions the differentiation
between formal and substantive rights and asks who is being included and excluded. Second, it explores the relationship between citizenship and participation, querying whether citizenship determines participation or whether they are mutually constitutive. Third, given recent shifts in political relations and economic structures, it questions the relative importance of the national state in defining and ensuring citizenship and points to more radical definitions of the concept. Finally, it highlights that, to keep citizenship a useful analytical category, it must not be over-stretched.

Liberal\(^4\) approaches (which have dominated Western scholarship) envisage citizenship as a status granted by the nation-state, encompassing a bundle of formal rights, which guarantee citizens equal opportunities to pursue their conception of ‘the good’ (Dietz 1987; Schuck 2002; Bussemaker and Voet 1998). Grounded in methodological individualism, liberal rights consist of political and civil rights. Social-liberalism, articulated most famously by Marshall (1992 [1950]),\(^5\) adds social rights to basic welfare services. Citizen involvement entails citizens utilising their formal rights, to vote for representatives, exercise free speech or form associations (Gaventa 2002: 4).

This (brief) definition of liberal citizenship raises three issues mentioned in our introduction. First, it overlooks the gap between formal and substantive rights (Held 1991:21). Take voting, for example: studies demonstrate that

\(^4\) A fractured school, liberalism is rooted in Hobbes (1968[1651]), Locke (1772) and JS Mill (1982[1975]), emphasising the sanctity of the free market, private property and constitutional, minimalist state

\(^5\) Rawls (1961) being another famous social-liberal
poverty (Moon 1991); illiteracy (Franklin 2004:16) and gender (Hassim 2003) prevent citizens from practicing their formal right to votes (a concern for countries as unequal as South Africa). Even Marshall’s (1950) social-liberalism (which stops short of industrial and economic rights), does little to help the most marginalised put their ‘equal’ citizenship status into practice (Delanty 2000; Yuval Davies 1997:16). Furthermore, the formal rights of liberal citizenship cover the public sphere and have, historically, confined women and their issues to the (‘apolitical’) private sphere (Seidman 1999; Pateman 1988). Taken together, these shortfalls have led many to reject liberalism’s citizenship-as-status. Perhaps like civic-republicans (Arendt 1958; Barber 1984), we should instead see citizenship as a process.

Mention of ‘citizenship-as-process’ leads to our second area of interest: the relationship between citizenship and participation. Liberal citizenship defines participation as the right to vote in representative democracies, freedom of speech and the ability of civil society to control state expansion (Held 2006). For, civic-republicans, this conception is far too shallow. However, civic-republican conceptions of direct democracy have been critiqued by many as practically impossible (Oldfield 1998:86) or undesirable (Almond and Verba 1963). Communitarians also pursue high levels of participation (Sandel 1982; Maclntyre 1981; Walzer 1983; and Taylor 1989) but because they view citizens as socially- and culturally-embedded, the extent and form of citizen

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6 Although the concept that institutional access is the key to participation and power is critiqued below.

7 Some claim citizenship and feminism are inherently antagonistic, some argue for a gender-blind citizenship, others for a “citizenship of difference” (see Voet 1998; Lister 2001).

8 For Ancient Greeks citizenship, was defined as “giving judgement and holding office” (Aristotle in Held 1996:36)
involvement will depend on the nature of a citizen’s society and culture. Critics argue that \textit{democratic} participation is consequently \textit{not} a constituent part of communitarian citizenship.\textsuperscript{9} Despite the flaws of communitarianism and civic-republicanism, recent works on citizenship have been dominated by ideas of “citizenship-as-process” or “citizenship-as-practice”. These take on two, extremely divergent forms.

One approach is neoliberal citizenship, theoretically grounded in the theories of Friedrich Hayek and Robert Nozick. As Hindess (2002:140) argues, neoliberalism “attempt[s] to introduce market and quasi-market arrangements into areas of social life which had hitherto been organised in other ways”. Consequently, the state becomes increasingly marketised and citizens’ duties expand whilst their rights contract. In one respect, citizen participation decreases as citizenship becomes framed as consumption, with citizens as ‘customers’ of the state.\textsuperscript{10} However, as the state shifts from delivering to ensuring services, citizen participation expands to fill the resulting gap. Assuming the state’s constitutional role, citizens begin delivering to themselves. Such delivery is couched as “social capital”, “empowerment”, “entrepreneurism” and “participation” by neoliberal advocates although critics claim such ‘participation’ marks the erosion, not the expansion of citizenship (Miraftab 2004 and Fine 2003).

\textsuperscript{9} Despite Etzioni’s (1996) assertion that citizens can critique their own cultures
\textsuperscript{10} A trend Selbourne criticises as amoral and “trivial reduction ad absurdum” (Selbourne 1994 in Dagger 2002).
Conversely, other approaches adopt radical perspectives on participation. They historicise, politicise and critique the concept of citizenship bestowed only by the nation-state and the restriction of citizen participation to “invited spaces” (Kabeer 2002). Their theories emerge from two empirical trends: The first is ‘globalisation’, which has increased connections and disconnections between sub-national, national and supranational levels, with divergent consequences (see Massey 1998; Swyngedouw 1997; Miller 2002). Movement of capital, communication and people across borders means “the national state need not be the only (or the primary) identity a citizen holds” (Purcell 2003). This raises possibilities for “multi-tiered” (Yuval-Davis 1997) “multi-layered” (Fox 2005) or “cosmopolitan” (Hutchings and Danreuther 1999) citizenship. Second, studies of grass-roots organisations in countries as diverse as South Africa (Miraftab and Wills 2005; Robbin and Lieres 2004) Brazil (Dagnino 2005) and Canada (Field 2007) demonstrate the increasing importance of citizenship and rights discourses in recent political struggles. These two factors have prompted a move away from state-centric to actor-centric citizenship, which is experienced not only in “invited” spaces but also in “invented” spaces (Miraftab 2004). As McEwan (2003:480), for example, concludes:

[South African] women and poor people have to be thought of not as recipients of citizenship but rather as agents in its construction

Consequently, citizens struggle for the realisation of current rights and the expansion of “dominant conceptions of politics itself”, for example, the
“right to have rights” (Dagnino 2005), or “rights to realise the claim to other rights” (Gaventa 2002 see also Holston 2002; Purcell 2003). These citizens may work with, or against, the state. Holston (2002) uses the term “insurgent citizenship” to capture “grassroots mobilisations and...everyday practices that, in different ways, empower, parody, derail or subvert state agendas” and which define the meaning of contemporary citizenship.

In short, radical citizenship is both a status and a practice, with “inclusive participation [at] the very foundation of democratic practice” (Gaventa 2002). Citizen involvement is at the heart of civic-republicanism, communitarianism and “radical” citizenship (henceforth referred to as “insurgent citizenship”). However, communitarianism and civic-republicanism accept state-society relations as they are, whereas the latter seeks an “overall transformation of the relationship between state and society” (Delanty 2000:37).

These recent developments are academically stimulating, but Fox (2005) warns us not to stretch the concept of citizenship or rights too far. “Influence”, he argues, is not synonymous with rights, nor are rights synonymous with gaining citizenship (not all communities have citizens) (Ibid:176). Crucially, he concludes, claiming and gaining rights are distinct: claims are normative statements, whereas acquired rights are (technically) enforceable. With these theories and warnings in mind, we address ‘citizenship’ in the context of informal settlements in South Africa.
Part Two: Citizenship and Informal Settlements

The following section explores how the theoretical debates above relate to legislation on informal settlements in South Africa. It begins with a brief overview of constitutional housing rights. Recognising the deficit between formal and substantive rights, South African legislators have attempted to make constitutional rights enforceable, with some success. The section concludes by exploring the role of other legislation on informal settlements, arguing that whilst some laws depict informal settlement residents as citizens with (unfulfilled) rights, others criminalise these residents, pushing them into liminal spaces of citizenship.

Constitutional Housing Rights in South Africa

As Ndulo (2001: 101) claims, “the most important legal instrument” in a country is its constitution. If sensitively produced and widely supported, the Constitution can be the democratic compass of a fledgling government and the rallying point of a state in transition. South Africa’s final constitution (1996) contained the 34 inviolable principles of the interim constitution (1993) but was more socially progressive (see Gloppen 1997:165–264). Enjoying widespread support in the legislature and wider society it became “the darling of both liberals and social democrats around the world” (Mattes 2002:24). Key to its popularity were attempts to overcome the flaws of
liberal citizenship (above) by including socioeconomic rights. This was crucial, given the centrality of bread-and-butter issues to anti-apartheid campaigns. As Kader Asmal (a CODESA negotiator) highlighted:

*The struggle for liberation in South Africa was not only a struggle for the right to vote, to move, to marry or to love. It has always been a struggle for freedom from hunger, poverty, landlessness, and homelessness. Our Bill of Rights therefore must reflect...the multidimensional and all-encompassing nature of the struggle for liberation.* (in Christiansen 2007:3)

Consequently, when the ANC released the *Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa* (RoSA 1989) they appeared to echo the economic focus of the organisation’s *Freedom Charter*. Crucially, legal practitioners and judges in South Africa supported this economic approach:

*We live in a society in which there are great disparities in wealth...[to] transform our society into one in which there will be human dignity, freedom and equality, lies at the heart of our new constitutional order* (Thiagraj Soobramoney vs. Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 in Christiansen 2007:1).

However, as Christiansen (2007:1) emphasizes, socioeconomic rights are usually considered “non-justiciable” because their realisation requires judgements on economic viability and social values, which are functions of
the legislature. Realising this, the ANC emphasised the need for “appropriate mechanisms” of enforcement (RoSA 1989).

With reference to Housing, two key constitutional statements are Chapter 26: 1 and 2:

1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing (2) the state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right (RoSA 1996)

In addition to this progressive right, children in South Africa have unconditional constitutional rights to housing (Chapter 28 1(c)). In a broader context, these rights are framed by constitutional guidelines for local government to “give priority to the basic needs of…and promote the social and economic development of the community” (in Cashdan 2002:159).

In practice, the most notable legal challenge for informal settlement dwellers was Government of the Republic of South Africa vs. Grootboom 2001. The ruling, claims Liebenberg (2001:232), set a “positive precedent” for the enforcement of socioeconomic rights in general and housing rights in particular, obliging the state to assist those in crisis with emergency accommodation. However, not all constitutional rulings support informal settlement dwellers. Some judges still see socioeconomic decisions as legislative or executive functions, whereas others emphasise the constitutional right to property over incremental rights to housing, producing more business-friendly rulings against “land invasion” (Huchzermeier 2003).
In summary, South Africa has recognised and attempted to overcome some weaknesses in liberal citizenship, by attempting to create enforceable socioeconomic rights. Thus, informal settlement citizens have had some success putting their rights into practice. However, constitution rulings do not always support informal settlement dwellers because judges must balance the constitutional rights to housing against rights to private property. In other words, they must decide between the land’s ‘exchange value’ to business and its ‘use value’ to informal settlement citizens.

Citizenship within informal settlement policy

Internationally, state approaches to informal settlements are diverse. Huchzermeyer et al (2006:22) categorise six approaches, ranging from “repressive” to “transforming”. Repressive approaches deny the rights of citizens and destroy their settlements, whilst transformative approaches upgrade settlements, formalise tenure and address broader socioeconomic and legal contexts (Ibid). Nationally, policy approaches have moved fairly progressively from one pole to the other. KZN’s provincial policy and ministerial rhetoric, however, have oscillated between the transformative “upgrading of informal settlements” and the “elimination of slums”. Advocates of the latter claim these two approaches are indistinguishable.

This chapter, however, argues that they fit two very different “chains of equivalence” (Laclau and Mouffe 2001) and reflect the constitutional division noted above between (incremental) rights to housing and private property
rights. The former frames informal settlement dwellers as citizens with (unrealised) constitutional rights and the latter criminalises informal settlement dwellers, undermining their attempts to put citizenship in practice. Both approaches directly and indirectly impact the space available for citizen involvement within informal settlement projects.

Apartheid-era approaches to informal settlements (Slums Act 1934, 1939 Squatting Act 1977, 1981) were set in the context of a wider body of legislation (e.g. Land Act 1913; Native Urban Areas Act 1923) that racially determined patterns of settlement (Maylam 1983; Worden 2000; Kuper et al 1958; Howe 1982). Even after the pass system of influx control was replaced by policies of “orderly urbanisation” in 1986, these approaches can be classified as “repressive” (Geyer 1993). However, informal settlements continued grew throughout apartheid. By the 1990s, new settlements were increasing fast, as citizens sought economic opportunities, social freedoms and safe-havens from the violence in many of KZN’s established informal settlements. Settlers also hoped that a post-apartheid government would secure the tenure of any land (re)claimed (FedUp staff 1; UN Habitat 2003:209). As state control declined, new settlements increased in the “buffer zones” surrounding white and Indian lands (Huchzermeyer 2002:89).

Alongside this repression, more tolerant approaches emerged that would shape post-apartheid policy. Following the Soweto Uprisings of 1976, the Urban Foundation (a policy think-tank founded by Anglo-American

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11 Although such policies were always actively resisted, especially from the 1970s onwards (Pithouse 2008; Hindson et al 1994; Walker 1991)
Corporation) was established to address the issue of urbanisation (Gilbert 2002). Seeking stability for economic reasons, it recognised informal settlements as an urban reality and advocated providing site-and-service plots with freehold titles via a capital subsidy system. Their proposal was adopted by the government (from 1990) and implemented through the Independent Development Trust (IDT) (Tomlinson 1999:1350).

Although various approaches to informal settlements emerged in the 1990s (including that of the Homeless People Federation’s, see chapter four) elite political attention rested on the National Housing Forum (NHF). The IDT and the Development Bank of South Africa, established the NHF in 1992 to tackle issues with workers’ hostels and the wider housing crisis (Rust 1996; Goodlad 1996:1635). Whilst presented as a consensus-based exercise, NHF was dominated by business interests and parastatals who favoured market-oriented approaches; freehold tenure; commodification of land and housing; and the continuation of the capital subsidy system. Their commodification and individualisation were opposed by the ‘Mass Democratic Movement’, including ANC, Azanian People’s Organisation, Pan African Congress, Inkatha Freedom Party, South African National Civics Organisation (SANCO) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) (Nell et al 1996:55). However, the Mass Democratic Movement was relatively small and unresourced in negotiations. Furthermore, they were out-maneuved by the government’s special budgetary allocation of R1.2 billion to NHF, which

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12 A once-off monetary grant given to eligible households to provide sites and services (now also used to build starter structures)
13 Referred to by many informal settlement residents as “I Do Toilets” (FedUp member 1)
switched the forum’s focus from long-term policy goals to “short-term initiatives” (Rust 1996). Under pressure and lacking solid alternatives, the MDM agreed to a slightly-increased capital subsidy system, which would have long-term impacts on citizen involvement (see chapter four) (Lalloo 1998; Tomlinson 1999; Huchzermeyer 2002:92). Despite the flaws of capital subsidies, McCarthy and Hindson (1993) could claim that “national policy towards informal settlements has evolved from outright antagonism through to grudging acceptance”.

After 1994, neither the National Housing Board (formerly NHF) which replaced racialised housing departments, nor the National Housing Summit convened in 1994 broke with capital subsidies (Tomlinson 1998:139). Despite its title, the *Housing White Paper, A New Housing Policy and Strategy for South Africa* (HWP RoSA 1994), largely mirrored the “Urban-Foundation paradigm” (Huchzermeyer 2003). Positively, it recognised that informal settlements reflect a failure in housing delivery (RoSA 1994). Implicitly, this supports the constitutional duty of government to (incrementally) provide “adequate housing” for its citizens. However, alongside *Prevention of Illegal Eviction of and Unlawful Occupation of the Land Act* (RoSA 1998) (PIEUOL), it precludes the right of citizens to correct this imbalance themselves through land invasion. Here, HWP supports the constitutional right to private property ownership. Not mentioning expropriation, HWP does not prioritise between these two (potentially contradictory) constitutional principles.
However, a decade later, post-apartheid informal-settlement policy would become more transformative. After 2000, with informal settlements growing in South Africa and beyond, national and international attention on housing issues grew. Interviewees consistently raised three international influences of South African policy: (a) the *Cities Without Slums* initiative launched by the Cities Alliance (a cities coalition established at Habitat II conference in 1999 by the UN Habitat and the World Bank); (b) *The Challenge of Slums: Global Report on Human Settlements* (2003) from the UN Human Settlements Programme and; (c) the *Millennium Development Goal 7* (target 11), which aimed “by 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers” (in Huchzermeyer and Karam 2006:2).

Nationally, Mbeki mandated parliament in 2004 to improve and refresh housing approaches (Huchzermeyer 2006). These international and national drivers culminated in *Breaking New Ground: A Comprehensive Plan for the Development of Sustainable Human Settlements* (BNG RoSA 2004). Elements within BNG tackling informal settlements were later adapted to form Chapter 13 of the *National Housing Code*. These two documents adopt a “transforming” approach to informal settlements, consonant with the concept of informal settlement dwellers as rights-bearing citizens. Crucially, this legislation moves away from the legality of land invasion to appreciate the broader reasons why citizens form settlements. Chapter 13, for example, claims informal settlements are part of a wider “structural social change” and therefore:
A paradigm shift is necessary to refocus existing policy responses towards informal settlements from one of conflict or neglect, to one of integration and co-operation. (C13 RoSA 2005:4-5)

Indicative of this paradigm shift, BNG advocates demand-driven delivery, paying attention to diverse tenures and typologies, integrated locations, facilities, settlement density, land use and public transport. Both BNG and Chapter 13 “adopt a phased in-situ upgrading approach to informal settlements, in line with international best practice” where “possible or desirable”. Possibility and desirability are determined by environmental concerns, the project’s fit with municipal Integrated Development Plans and “sound financial and socio-economic indicators”. However, BNG does allow for expropriation as a last resort (DoH 2005:7 in Huchzermeyer 2006:49). Finally, both policies stress the importance of informal settlement communities, calling for participation (see below) and area-based (as opposed to individual) capital subsidies (Huchzermeyer 2005:255).

If BNG and Chapter 13 represent positive, “transformation” approaches to informal settlements, these stand in tension with other policies and rhetoric focusing on “elimination” not provision, and “slums” not informal settlements. In policy, KZN’s Elimination and Prevention of Re-emergence of Slums Act (EPRS RoSA 2006) fits this trend most clearly. ‘Slums’ is a contentious word in South Africa. Politicians and officials who use the term

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14 Although interestingly Chapter 13 stresses community protection based on its “fragility” rather than its strength
draw on international precedents and argue that it refers to a category of structures much wider than shacks, including dilapidated formal structures. Many informal settlement residents (amongst others), however, claim the term has negative connotations:

_The word slum it’s something useless...it is something we are not recognising. Something that make the place dirty, something filthy...So when they say it is the slums clearance it means we just clean up every dirty, every filthy thing...But they forgot that there are human lives...living under that ‘rubbish’_ (AbM member 2, Joe Slovo)

Whilst recognising that the “provision of affordable housing” is important, EPRS criminalises land invasion (with up to five years imprisonment and R20,000 fine); mandates land-owners to prevent land invasions; uses evictions to stop informal settlements from re-emerging; and allows transit camps as interim solutions for formal housing (RoSA 2006). The language of criminality is important. As studies on vigilantism demonstrate, criminals operate in liminal spaces of citizenship if they are considered citizens at all (Nina 2000). Caldeira’s (2001:39) study of Sao Paulo highlights that crime narratives “re-signify and order the world” by polarising good and evil, encouraging stereotypes which “separate and reinforce inequalities”. Furthermore, crime narratives
[Do] not incorporate the experiences of dominated people (such as the poor...and women); rather, it criminalizes and discriminates against them...the talk of crime is also at odds with the values of social equality, tolerance and respect for others’ rights

By framing informal settlements dwellers as criminals breaking laws on private property, rather than citizens surviving in absence of their constitutional rights, EPRS pushes them towards these liminal citizenship spaces. Thus, whilst local officials claim that EPRS is “not worth the paper its written on” given that evictions must still follow the legal proceedings stipulated in PIEUOL (Anonymous interview), EPRS still negatively effects perceptions of informal settlement residents and, therefore, opportunities for them to practice their citizenship.

Many critics focus on EPRS but rhetoric around ‘elimination’ not ‘provision’ is older and more widespread. In 2001, KZN launched its Slums Clearance programme with eThekwini Unicity Council, targetting the “elimination of slums” by 2014. In 2004, housing minister Sisulu (2004) praised Gauteng’s “war against the shacks” and promises of “eradication” as “the best news I have ever heard in my tenure as Minister”. In 2007, General Manager of KZN Housing Nxumalo, re-emphasised the province’s planned “eradication of the slums” by 2014 (although by then, many doubted his target was achievable).
In interview, advocates of “slums elimination” saw their policies as indivisible from BNG and Chapter 13. However, this thesis argues that the two approaches form differing “chains of equivalence”. According to Laclau and Mouffe (2001:127), chains of equivalence are strings of terms or concepts which individuals or groups see as analogous, defined in opposition to a chain of ‘disequivalence’ made from contrasting concepts. If one link (or concept) in this chain is ambiguous, its definition is determined by other links in the chain. For example, ‘participation’ in a chain with ‘efficiency’ and ‘neo-liberalism’ would be defined differently to ‘participation’ in a chain with ‘direct-democracy’ and ‘deliberation’.

If the “elimination of slums” and the “informal settlement upgrading” approaches form different chains of equivalence, the same ‘link’ (concept/policy) would adopt different meanings within each chain. In this case, the Milennium Development Goal to bring “a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers” by 2020 forms such a link.\footnote{Although the same argument could be made using the Cities Alliance’s slogan “cities without slums”.}

The “informal settlement upgrading” chain defines “improvement” as the provision of interim services (as mentioned in BNG) ideally followed by in situ upgrading:

\textit{The Millennium Development Goals provide a useful basis for South African target setting. It is projected that...The total number of households in informal settlements which would need to be upgraded over a period of 15}
years is estimated to be in the region of 2.9 million (Chapter 13 RoSA 2004 emphasis added)

In this chain, eradication is only mentioned as an indirect result of delivering houses. The “elimination of slums” chain, however, interprets “improvement” solely in terms of slums eradication:

*World leaders have committed themselves to eradicating a minimum of 100 million slums dwellers by 2020, we as African Ministers are keen to see the world committing itself to a higher number because we are convinced that if we are serious about poverty we have to find where it resides and breeds, in our slums, and surrounding areas and there make a difference.* (Sisulu 2005 emphasis added)

Here, “making a difference” becomes synonymous with “eradication” and rhetoric around informal settlements becomes somewhat Faustian (see Berman 1983:76) or high-modernist (Scott 1998).

**Conclusion**

This section has argued that policy towards informal settlements has fluctuated between ‘informal settlement upgrades’ (congruous with rights-based approaches) and ‘slums elimination’ (congruous with criminalisation). Whilst the former recognises shack-dwellers as citizens the latter destabilises both their citizenship-as-status and their citizenship-as-pratice. Eradication and criminalisation are likely to preclude the opportunity for in
in situ upgrades and evictions remove practical opportunities for citizen involvement in informal settlement projects. In contrast, informal settlement upgrading provides the discursive, temporal and physical space for citizen involvement.
Chapter 3: Consensus over coherence: policy space for citizen involvement

The loudly acclaimed ‘consensus’ supposedly hammered out by the stakeholders in the National Housing Forum which should have been achieved by hard bargaining among the parties was, in fact, the result of fudging vital differences between them. (Tomlinson 1998: 144).

All government...every virtue and every prudent act is founded on compromise and barter (Burke, in Menkel-Meadow 2006: 159)

South Africa’s consensus-based negotiations were, Croucher (1998:639) highlights “put forth as a model of successful transition to democratic rule”. However, this chapter argues that in post-apartheid urban governance and housing policy a consensus on the role of citizens was not forged. Instead, crucial areas of policy were often left vague enough to satisfy a range of diverse (and possibly contradictory) stakeholders. Consequently, many different (and sometimes conflicting) living social contracts emerged from a single written social contract. Rather than reconciling or managing divergent interests post-apartheid policy allows them to coexist, devolving struggles over meaning to a local level. The following section explores how this process is captured with Mosse’s idea of “mobilising metaphors” and the antithesis to Rawls’ “overlapping consensus”, which I term the “consensus to coexist”. It subsequently highlights two key examples of the consensus to
An “overlapping consensus” or a “consensus to coexist”?  

John Rawls revived the concept of a ‘social contract’ for modern political philosophy. His work is vast and complex. Here, we need only briefly address his ideas on ‘consensus’ in Political Liberalism (1995). As Young (2002) argues, this text differs from his earlier works, focusing on “the problem of political justice” in situations where actors have divergent and possibly irreconcilable “reasonable comprehensive doctrines” (Rawls 1995:4). To form a mutually agreeable and functional political organisation, these actors must find an “overlapping consensus”: areas on which they agree, without having to compromise on their own beliefs. Such consensus is possible because all people accept (for varying reasons) foundational premises for a conception of justice (Scheffler 1994:6).

South Africa’s transition often relied on the emergence of an ‘overlapping consensus’. The NHF, for example, mandated divergent representatives to find a consensus on housing without compromising their core values. However, this chapter argues that urban governance and housing policy did not find an “overlapping consensus” but a “consensus to coexist”, whereby negotiating parties made legislation broad enough to contain multiple interests. As, David Mosse (2004) highlights, one way of making policy broad enough to absorb multiple interests is the use of “mobilising metaphors” such as “participation” which (his case-study in West India
demonstrates) can mean all things to all people. In South Africa, mobilising metaphors like “urban sustainability”, “participation”, “democracy” and “housing” became lynchpins of post-apartheid housing policy. As Mosse concludes, these terms make policy good (i.e. well-supported) in theory, but unimplementable in practice. This analysis of post-apartheid policy differs subtly from Bek et al’s (2004) suggestion that “something has been lost in the translation of wording” of South African legislation. Whereas they imply definable policy has been subsequently misinterpreted, I argue that no core, stable meaning existed.

A consensus to coexist not only produces unimplementable policies, it also implies that transformative policies can be apolitical (Pieterse 2004:18). Afterall, under a consensus there is no need to choose between competing interests and no power relations are at play. However, restructuring an apartheid city is fundamentally political and involves clear winners and losers. If, for instance, land is categorised by its ‘use value’ rather than its ‘exchange value’ (an approach implemented in Brazil), businesses aspiring to access city-based land clearly lose out (see Huchzermeyer 2003). Failure to acknowledge and support such power shifts, limits the impact of urban policies, no matter “how transformative the rhetoric may appear on paper” (Pieterse 2004:18).

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16 This apolitical approach is demonstrated by the fact that urban policy (which unlike rural policy is made by the Department of Housing, not the Department of Land Affairs) makes no mention of land rights, a key (and highly political) determinate of housing possibilities (Huchzermeyer 2003).
By casting urban transformation as a matter of co-ordination, not politics (Chipkin 2002), the government risks delaying conflict over the future of South African cities, not removing it. When conflicting visions re-emerge at the local implementation stage, it will be the more structured, resourced and connected interests groups that will triumph (Khosa 2002:151). Frequently (though not always) this will be locally elite groups.

The following analysis demonstrates how a “consensus to coexist” between different ideologies and “mobilising metaphors” affect policy prescriptions on citizen involvement. It concludes: “we are at present, if not operating in a total policy void, reconfiguring our cities through ‘policy’ trajectories devoid of meaningful substance and content.” (Pillay 2008:114).

**Developmental Local Government: caught between Public Management and Participation**

*The local government elections are a continuation of April 27 because there cannot be full democracy without democratic local government* (Nelson Mandela in Lemon 2002:18)

Whilst all tiers of government are relevant to this thesis, the following section focuses on policy for Local Government reform. This may appear strange, as housing is a national and provincial function with local government only “tinkering at the edges” of housing policy (municipal official 1). However, whilst other spheres provide the legislative and financial frameworks for housing, policy implementation is a local government
function. In fact, given BNG’s (RoSA 2004:9) focus on demand-driven location and typology “municipalities will play a significantly increased role in the housing process”.

Consequently, post-apartheid Local Government has practical and political impacts on citizen involvement in informal settlement projects. By the end of apartheid, local government was both dysfunctional and discredited in most black, coloured and Indian areas. Black Local Authorities in particular were violently rejected in protests like the Vaal Uprisings of 1984 (Seekings 1992). Both symbolically and pragmatically government structures needed to change if municipalities were to become the “arms and legs of the Reconstruction and Development Programme” (Mandela 1994 in Lemon 2002:18). Consequently, many policy documents after 1994 were committed to “reconfigure critical new relationships and patterns of engagement between the newly elected local governments and civil society” (UDF RoSA 1997).

However, to placate the “old guard” within government structures, this transformation occurred in three stages between 1994 and 2000. Much legislation guided the process, beginning with The Local Government Transition Act (RoSA 1994; Mabin 2002). Arguably, however, the key document for synthesising the government’s vision on local government transformation was the White Paper on Local Government (WPLG RoSA 1998).
WPLG envisioned a “Developmental Local Government”, resting on three key pillars: participation, efficiency and partnerships (Pieterse 2002:6; Parnell and Pieterse 2002). This ‘developmental’ model marked a distinct shift from apartheid local government, which was far more technical than strategic, focusing on mechanical issues of land use rather than budgetary or managerial approaches (Mabin 2002:43).

Whilst ‘partnerships’ are a means to any end (Miraftab 2004), ‘participation’ and ‘efficiency’ constituted the dual objectives of WPLG. Henceforth, local government must be more efficient at service delivery and more democratic to encourage and accommodate community participation. These goals emerged from two different schools of thought (Pieterse 2002). Efficiency arose from neoliberal New Public Management thinking, emphasising the importance of fiscal ‘responsibility’ and public-private partnership. Participation stemmed from people-led development and responded to a constitutional duty to “encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the matters of local government” (RoSA 1996:Chp152). In citizenship terms, efficiency drifted towards neoliberal citizenship whilst participation supported civic-republican ideals and provided spaces, which “insurgent citizenship” could utilise.

This mix of efficiency and participation is found in other post-apartheid policies, reflecting the ANC’s belief that: “state machinery needs to be transformed into a representative, efficient and loyal instrument of democracy” (ANC 1994, emphasis added). Internationally, WPLG mirrored
the mixed (but widespread) support for decentralisation, which had similarly
diverse goals (Goebel 2007: 296). Crucially, WPLG claims that participation
and efficient service delivery are complementary principles. In other words,
it claimed to have found an ‘overlapping consensus’ between radical
democrats and neoliberals on the functions and focus of local government.
However, in practice, the two strands are often mutually corrosive if not
mutually exclusive. Genuine participation is often a messy and drawn-out
process, which consumes financial and temporal resources. Whilst it may
create an effective, sustainable and empowering products, the process itself
is not necessarily efficient. In combining efficiency and participation, WPLG
actually created a ‘consensus to coexist’.

WPLG avoids reconciling these principles by granting local government
extensive autonomy to deciding how their dual mandate should be
executed. Building on the Local Government Transition Act (RoSA 1993),
WPLG confirmed local government’s position as an “equal sphere” rather
than a “lower level” of government (Mabin 2002:46). In the housing sector,
BNG even raises the possibility of municipal accreditation (BNG RoSA 2004:
24). That said, local governments are far from independent: they act within
national and provincial legislative frameworks and the constitution (which
prioritises the delivery of basic needs, Chipkin 2002:71). Conditions
accompanying provincial and national funding also restrict local government
freedoms (Provincial Official 2; Oldfield 2002:96). However, by granting local
government autonomy in policy implementation, the task of reconciling
policy contradictions is devolved. Thus, battles between neoliberal efficiency
and participatory democracy occur at a local level, between asymmetrical interest groups with varying access to resources.

**Caught between different meanings: citizen involvement in post-apartheid policy**

*Words that once spoke of politics and power have come to be reconfigured in the service of today’s one-size-fits-all development recipes, spun into an apoliticised form that everyone can agree with* (Cornwall and Brock 2005:1043)

It is a truism that citizen involvement can be defined in vastly different ways, and deemed ‘good’ for a whole range of reasons. One of the more popular (and contested) terms denoting citizen involvement has been “participation”. As Cornwall and Brock (2005) demonstrate, the word has a long history, used during colonialism to both mobilise and demobilise people’s involvement in government. More recently, “participatory development” emerged from several coalescing trends beginning in the late 1970s and becoming widespread by the 1980s. Two particularly important trends were the growth of participatory research methods (Chambers 1994; Mitlin and Thompson 1995:232) and declining faith in the state’s ability to deliver based on top-down, macro planning (see Scott 1998).

In South Africa, these international trends filtered-through very slowly into government thinking. The apartheid state relied on state-initiated, top-down approaches and conceived of participation in terms of ‘involvement’ *(read*
co-option), although de facto spaces for participation opened as state control fragmented in the 1980s (de Beer 1996). Gradually, rhetoric around “process” rather than “blueprint” planning began to emerge at a local and national level (Goodlad 1996: 1633). In rhetoric at least, participation became a central tenant of the RDP, which increased the popularity but not the clarity of this “mobilising metaphor” (see Lyons et al 2001:1239).

Why advocate citizen involvement?
Understanding why citizen involvement is advocated is crucial to understanding the form and content of participation on offer and its impact on conceptions of citizenship. Miraftab (2003:227) highlights three different reasons why citizen involvement might be pursued: (1) increased efficiency (2) increased effectiveness (3) empowerment (see also Cashdan 2002:169; Lyons et al 2001:1258). This thesis argues that each factor is supported by a different vision of citizens: (1) the resourceful citizen (2) the sustainable citizen (3) the empowered citizen. Each, in turn, encompasses a range of ideological standpoints:

- The Resourceful Citizen

Resources here could refer to physical skills; insights (for example, into livelihood strategies); ‘social capital’ (see Putnam et al 1993; Fine 2003) or project management skills. Such resources may already exist or they may need developing. Either way, the resourceful citizen can be utilised as a means-to-an-end (of service delivery) or an end in itself. The former suggests a neoliberal approach to citizenship, which uses ‘participation’ as a
source of cheap labour (Miraftab 2003; Mitlin and Thompson 1995). If participation is justified with the claim that citizens will learn vocational skills, we should critically assess how commercially viable such skills are and the communal effects of up-skilling individuals who may consequently leave the community (see Lyons et al.’s (2001) case-study of community builders in Masisebensizane).

- **Sustainable Citizens**

Environmentally sustainable development gained popularity with Brundtland Report (1987). However, ‘sustainability’ has an ‘elastic core or ideas’ (Pieterse 2004) and in BNG, the concept of ‘sustainable human settlements’ incorporates environmental, economic and social sustainability. (a conceptualisation mirrored in the discourse of UN Habitat). Arguably, non-participatory development could ride roughshod over citizens’ livelihood strategies, environmental management and social networks crucial to sustaining their way of life.

- **The Empowered Citizen**

The concept of participation for empowerment creates a ‘seductive mix’ of ‘buzz words’, which demands deconstruction (Cornwall and Brock 2005). Moore (2001) charts the use ‘empowerment’, which emerged from sources as diverse as liberation theology, feminist theory and the World Bank. He claims that definitions of empowerment revolve around two poles: materialist and political. Materialist empowerment claims people become more empowered and less dependent through material advancement. Such
empowerment may occur without participation (Moore 2001: 325). In contrast, political empowerment requires that citizens becomes ‘visibly more powerful’ as they organise to make their influence felt at higher levels. Zimmerman and Rappaport (1988:726) employ this definition of empowerment and link it directly to individual and communal participation. Such correlations, however, have been complicated by studies highlighting that ‘participation’ that is ignored, or captured to reinforce the position of already-powerful interests is far from empowering (McEwan 2003; Miraftab 2003:227-228). Links between citizenship, involvement and empowerment cover all conceptions of citizenship although ‘insurgent’ citizens gain empowerment by being able to act inside and outside institutionalised utilises insitutionalised and non-institutionalised opportunities for empowerment through participation.

This brief summary demonstrates the elasticity of “participation” and the different visions of citizenship it can support. Such elasticity increases if we also consider the ‘depths’ of citizen involvement possible.

_Ladders: the highs and lows of citizen involvement_

Key to understanding conflicts around informal settlements in eThekwini is understanding the different depths at which citizen involvement can function. Analytically, these layers of involvement are captured in Arnstein’s (1969) ‘ladder’. Whilst acknowledging that degrees of involvement are infinite, Arnstein defines eight distinct levels of involvement:
<table>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Citizen Control:</strong></th>
<th>Participation</th>
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<tr>
<td>“[a] degree of power (or control) which guarantees that participants or residents can govern a program or an institution, be in full charge of policy and managerial aspects, and be able to negotiate the conditions under which &quot;outsiders&quot; may change them.”</td>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Delegate Power:</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>After negotiations, citizens obtain “dominant decision-making authority over a particular plan or program.”</td>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Partnership:</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>Power is “redistributed”, decision-making and planning are shared and mechanisms exist to rectify disagreements. “After the groundrules have been established through some form of give-and-take, they are not subject to unilateral change.”</td>
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<th><strong>Placation:</strong></th>
<th>Tokenism</th>
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<td>Tokenistic involvement and influence e.g. citizens constitute a minority on an advisory board</td>
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<th><strong>Consultation:</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>This may be a legitimate route to participation, but if citizens have no means of ensuring their input is acted upon, participation is “a sham”</td>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Informing:</strong></th>
<th>Non-participation</th>
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<tr>
<td>One-way communication between citizens and officials</td>
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<th><strong>Therapy:</strong></th>
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<td>“it is both dishonest and arrogant...[as it] assume[s] that powerlessness is synonymous with mental illness...citizens are engaged in extensive activity, but the focus of it is on curing them of their &quot;pathology&quot; rather than changing the racism and victimization that create their &quot;pathologies.&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Manipulation:</strong></th>
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<td>“people are placed on rubberstamp advisory committees or advisory boards for the express purpose of &quot;educating&quot; them or engineering their support”</td>
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Arnstein’s scale ranges from non-participation to full participation. ‘Manipulation’ and ‘therapy’ form the bottom section, and their aim is not to equip people to participate but allow “powerholders to ‘educate’ or ‘cure’ the participants”. ‘Consultation’, ‘information’ and ‘placation’ provide space for citizens to “hear and be heard” but they remain unable to push through their agendas. In contrast, the higher rungs of ‘partnership’, ‘delegated power’ and ‘citizen control’ allow citizens graduated amounts of “decision-making clout”. Put together, this ladder was intended by Arnstein (1969:217) to:

*Cut through the hyperbole to understand the increasingly strident demands for participation from the have-nots as well as the gamut of confusing responses from the powerholders*

More recently, Choguill (1996) has attempted to adapt Arnstein’s ladder for developing countries. Whilst useful, her taxonomy has several flaws. Primarily, she wishes to cover both citizen participation in decision-making and the delivery of goods and services that would be otherwise unobtainable. However, this places both deontological and teleological variables into a uni-variate analytical tool, eliminating any sense of logical progression. Second, she emphasises the low capacity of developing states whilst alleging that they design consultative institutions to become ‘rubber stamping’ forums, not considering they may simply be unable to institutionalise participation effectively. As Gaventa (1998) highlights in
theory and Bek et al (2004)’s study of the Western Cape demonstrates in practice, the institutionalisation of participation is extremely challenging. States may sideline their citizens but institutionalised participation may also fail despite the best of intentions. Lastly, this thesis rejects Choguill’s claim that citizenship is an inappropriate classification for ‘underdeveloped’ countries. In South Africa, one can argue that service delivery must be administered with the wider community in mind, whilst still maintaining a sense of the individual citizen. Furthermore, her advocacy of “community”-based approaches over-looks the power relations, divisions and fluctuations of communities over time and specifically within a project life-cycle (Lyons et al 2000; Lyons and Smuts 1999:2152).

Given these flaws, Choguill’s insights need incorporating into a new taxonomy.

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<tr>
<th>Citizen-defined</th>
<th>Actively</th>
<th>Two-way</th>
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<tr>
<td>State-defined</td>
<td>Consulted</td>
<td>Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agenda</td>
<td>Informed</td>
<td>One-way communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ignored</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Harmed</td>
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This taxonomy builds on the terminology in OECD’s *Citizens as Partners* (Gramberger 2001): Active Participation, Consultation and Information. To this it adds the categories ‘Ignorance’ and ‘Harm’. It incorporates Arnstein’s and Choguill’s insights, but simplifies their models. There is a clear progression between terms (from ‘harmed’ to ‘actively participate’) but
unlike Choguill’s and Arnstein’s models, no specific category talks of ‘tokenistic’ involvement or ‘rubber stamping’. Each mode of interaction can become increasingly tokenistic until the interaction is better characterised by a lower form of participation. Furthermore, levels of participation or citizenship are not defined teleologically: in other words the value of participation is not judged by the success of its outcomes. I maintain their caveat that infinite gradations of participation exist within each category: this framework is intended to facilitate nuanced analysis, not limit it. With a clearer conception of the breadth and depth of citizen involvement, we can explore how policy envisages citizen involvement in informal settlement projects.

Policy Visions of Citizen Involvement

The vision of a ‘resourceful citizen’ runs through much housing policy. Whilst claiming that “communities are no longer required to shoulder the risk of bad housing alone”, The National Housing Code (NHC RoSA 2000) adds that “in the current socio-economic environment, government alone cannot afford to relieve them [citizens] of this burden”. Consequently, citizens must mobilise resources in partnership with the private sector and “other parties” to tackle the housing crisis.\(^{17}\) This focus on the resourceful citizenship is clearest in Chapter Eight, which explains the People’s Housing Process (PHP). The PHP gives technical training and support to those seeking to access their

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\(^{17}\) Given that BNG admits the failure of housing policy to entice private sector interests, one wonders how much communities have held the baton in the interim.
housing subsidy to build their own house. To be eligible, individuals must own an undeveloped site, and work with accredited facilitators and a ‘support organisation’ (either elected ‘beneficiaries’ or a professional team) to submit a business plan, create housing plans and build their houses. NHC claims:

Experience has proved that if beneficiaries are given the chance either to build houses themselves or to organise the building of houses themselves, they can build better houses for less money

PHP provides the opportunity for active participation, but its reasons for doing so are unclear. It prescribes both ‘sweat equity’ for fiscal efficiency and ‘intellectual equity’ for effectiveness (see BNG 2004:18). As we discuss in chapter four, this could reflect neoliberal or radical visions of citizenship. HWP also perceives citizens as potential resources to be mobilised, enabled and supported “towards participating in the satisfaction of their own housing needs” with the private sector although it stipulates that such processes must “lead to transfer of skills and economic empowerment”. The depth of involvement envisaged here is ambiguous:

South Africa’s housing inheritance [from apartheid] can largely be attributed to top-down and ideologically driven development approaches. It is held that, by making housing development people-centred, the major disadvantages resulting from these past approaches will be overcome...meaningful and structured participation by communities in the
processes of needs identification, prioritisation, planning and the implementation of housing development projects will increasingly become central requirements of Government policy and subsidy assistance

This paragraph seemingly advocates ‘active participation’. However, ‘people-centred’ is an ambiguous term and refer to policies ‘for people’ (with a state-driven agenda) or ‘with people’ (a people-driven or joint agenda). Reacting against the former, a key AbM slogan states: “nothing for us, without us”. Furthermore, whilst the term ‘meaningful’ seems to mitigate against one-way communication, reference to ‘structured’ participation should lead us to question how participation is structured: does it work to the advantage of the most vulnerable? How are the structured insights incorporated into projects? What force do they hold?

NHC expands on issues of institutionalising participation: government will ‘ensure’ a ‘people-centered’ development, it claims, by ‘facilitating’ multiple groups (including communities) in “contribut[ing] their skills, labour, creativity, financial, and other resources”. Institutionally, a common project vision and a balance between key ‘stakeholders’18 (communities, government and the private sector) was meant to be secured through mutual agreements, termed ‘social compacts’ which were made obligatory by HPW (Miraftab 2003:226). However, as NHC acknowledges, social compacts proved “much more complex” than originally thought and have

18 see Butler and Ntseng (2008) for an insightful critique of the term ‘stakeholder’
since become optional, minimizing hope of ‘active participation’ in practice (see chapter 5).

Placing clearer emphasis on the importance of active participation, BNG provides community development workers for more fragile communities and gives space for citizens to monitor and evaluate the policy (Huchzermeyer 2006:58). It also aims to place this project-level participation within participatory municipal-wide Integrated Development Plans. These hopes, however, have been tailored by the limited success of IDPs (see chapter 5).

In contrast to BNG’s prescriptions, EPRS does not mention ‘community involvement’, ‘people-led’, ‘people-driven’ or ‘participation’. Indeed, it omits references to ‘citizen’ or ‘citizenship’ beyond the first paragraph of the preamble (which acknowledges a constitutional right to housing). Whilst not precluding participation, this policy leaves all levels of the citizen involvement open, from ‘active participation’ to ‘harm’, although arguably the tone of the document makes ‘active participation’ unlikely.

In sum, HPW, NHC and BNG oscilate between visions of the ‘empowered citizen’ and the ‘resourceful citizen’ (although the two are not mutually exclusive). The depth of involvement envisaged ranges from ‘active participation’ to ‘consultation’ although in implementation ‘consultation’ or ‘information’ are far more likely. If we add EPRS to the mix, informal settlement projects may pursue any depth of citizen involvement whilst claiming policy support.
Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that South Africa’s transitional focus on consensus overlooked key conflicts within urban and housing policy. The emerging “consensus to coexist” has deferred key ideological debates and power struggles to local implementation stages. Two examples of this “consensus to coexist” were addressed above. First, the coexistence of conflicting ideologies: New Public Management and participatory democracy. Second, the multiple meanings of “mobilising metaphors” for citizen involvement. The chapter concludes that whilst potential space for citizen involvement in informal settlement projects exists, it is both contested and confused.
Chapter 4: The Living Social Contracts of Abahlali baseMjondolo and the Federation of the Urban Poor

Previous chapters have demonstrated the multiple visions of citizens and citizen involvement emerging from post-apartheid policy. These allow groups with differing living social contracts to find support in a single written social contract. Based on my fieldwork, this chapter explores two such living social contracts: that of Abahlali baseMjondolo (AbM) and of the Federation of the Urban Poor (FedUp).

Abahlali baseMjondolo’s living social contract

AbM was founded in 2005, following Kennedy Road’s first demonstration. This protest was sparked by the realisation that land promised to the informal settlement for relocation had been sold commercially. Residents from Kennedy Road burnt tires on the street, blocking routes to the nearby N2 and the Clare Estate. Since 2005, the group have grown, with members in about 40 informal settlements around Durban and in Kahyelitsha’s QQ section, Cape Town. The AbM executive is elected annually at mass meetings and drawn from numerous AbM settlements. AbM has no party-political allegiances.

AbM’s living social contract is based on the idea of dignity (based on common humanity) combined with service delivery. This vision of citizenship demands services (rights) but also respect:
The city treats us it is like we are not the citizens of South Africa, it is like we came from another country and we live in South Africa. But we are born, and grew and bred in this country. But the way that they treat us...[they do] not give us that humanity (AbM member 2, Joe Slovo Settlement)

We were expecting development - public services - not only houses. Just to give us a green light that we are also the South African people....people who stays in a very poor place like this (Kennedy Road Development Committee 1)

The government treats us with contempt, believing that because we are not rich, we have not earned their respect. Therefore, we demand participation in genuinely democratic processes of consultation and citizenship (Memorandum for ‘March on Cllr Baig’ September 2005).

Consequently, whilst AbM demand houses, they cannot be satisfied through service delivery alone. They demand a paradigm shift in the way that shack dwellers are treated by the state and by wider society (see also Patel 2008 and Pithouse 2006a):

Getting love and support may be half of goal we would be achieving 50% of our aims...That forms part of our humanity. Because our fear is that we would be given a house without, a house that is not decent, without respect and dignity...a house that would turn into a shack, where there is unemployment, [where] there is poverty...above all, we demand that the
shackdwellers and the poor be recognised as human beings by being treated with respect and dignity (AbM member 1, Kennedy Road Settlement)

This opinion was reinforced by other interviewees, who referred to low-income housing as “shacks”, “concrete shacks” or “small shacks” (AbM member 3, Joe Slovo Settlement, AbM member 4, Motala Heights). For AbM, respect and human equality demands that members determine or co-determine their futures, through active participation. This perspective is not unique: Tomlinson’s (1999) study of low-income housing recipients in South Africa concluded that satisfaction was not based on the size of house received, but “the degree of participation they [recipients] experienced in the decisions around what was to be delivered” (Tomlinson 1999:1358). In Fraser’s (1999) terms, AbM are fighting for justice of “redistribution” and “recognition”. The former is economic, materialising as “exploitation, economic marginalisation, and deprivation”. The latter is “rooted in social patterns of representation, interpretation and communication” and causes “cultural domination, non-recognition, and disrespect” (p.27).

Interviews suggested that for AbM, ‘recognition’ demonstrated through citizen involvement was what differentiated apartheid non-citizenship from post-apartheid citizenship. After all, the apartheid government did deliver houses. Furthermore, informal settlements like Kennedy Road were beneficiaries of the IDT’s site-and-service scheme, also receiving a community hall. Whilst not all AbM settlements gained such services, this
highlights that a lack of service-delivery was not the defining flaw of apartheid.

Under apartheid, interviewees claim they were de-humanised because of their race and their position as shack dwellers, being classified as unclean, unthinking and uncivilised (AbM member 5, Motala Heights, AbM member 1, Kennedy Road). One AbM leader, for example, remembers being turned away from local government offices with other Development Committee members because he was considered a ‘dirty shack dweller’. Such prejudices are mirrored in local apartheid publications, like The Durban Housing Survey (1952).

In sum, apartheid has not just left physical legacies in the city’s concrete and patterns of service delivery; it has also left a psychological legacy amongst those stripped of full citizenship and humanity (see Fanon 1963). If shack dwellers today feel that they are forcefully evicted from their homes, without choice or consultation, apartheid’s psychological legacy will remain (even if its physical legacy disappears).

Affirming shack dwellers’ humanity, plays an important role in AbM’s day-to-day functioning. In interviews, AbM was described as a “congregation” and “somewhere to cry to” (AbM member 1, Kennedy Road Settlement, AbM member 13). Friere (2000) and Hill (2001) both highlight that a person’s ability to critique their political and economic situation depends on “the level of self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem they enjoy” (Hill 2001,
As an organisation, AbM builds members’ self-confidence by providing tangible skills (e.g., IT classes), by struggling together and by developing group narratives. The latter may take the form of proverbs or longer stories shared in speeches at mass meetings, talk in the eMijondolo, and introductions to outsiders (e.g. new members, the media, researchers). These narratives re-affirm shack dwellers’ humanity and capabilities by recounting past struggle victories or reaffirming truths, e.g., “we are poor in possessions, but not in mind”. In this way, AbM does more than criticise the “identities, knowledges and discourse that make economic injustice possible”, it creates new, alternative identities and discourses that form the basis of their struggle (Swanson 1995; Foucault 2002).

Bourdieu (1989) claims these “struggles over classification” are key political struggles, because the “symbolic power” to “impose and to inculcate a vision of divisions” can “manipulate the objective structure of society”. However, to exercise such “symbolic power” one must possess “symbolic capital”. Such capital is held by those who obtain “sufficient recognition to be in a position to impose recognition”. Arguably, given their social and economic exclusion, no individual shack dweller possesses such symbolic power. A critical mass of shack dwellers, however, feasibly possesses the collective capital necessary to create new “classifications”.

So far, we have established that AbM seek citizen involvement as recognition of their humanity and in contrast to their de-humanisation under apartheid. But what form of involvement do they seek? Some mention the
importance of building their own houses to develop a sense of ownership and relieve unemployment but support for this approach was far from universal (AbM member 6, Kennedy Road Settlement; AbM member 4, Motala Heights). The phrase in several interviews that “government must build a house for me, here” suggested that for some, physical involvement denigrated their right to housing (Survey, unpublished). This focus on state-delivery marks a key cleavage between AbM and FedUp (Swilling 2008; PPT staff 1). Primarily, AbM strives for intellectual equity, not physical involvement. As AbM leader, S‘bu Zikode, claims:

*We have...decided to take our place in all the discussions and to take it right now. We take our place humbly...but...we take it firmly...We take our place as people who count the same as everyone else.* (Zikode, Diakonia 2008)

Such intellectual equity does not rest on claims to equal, technical knowledge but on claims to *superior* experiential knowledge through what AbM term “living politics”: the politics emerging from rational actors able to reflect on their daily experiences (AbM member 7, Foreman Road). In short, AbM’s demand for involvement is based on a statement of equality (in their capacity to reason through their situation) and their positionality (as citizens who live in informal settlements). As a member of Church Land Programme, an NGO working with AbM, explains:

*It occurs to me that they are more aware of where they are, what they want, and what they hope to get as people living in shacks. What gives that more*
weight is that they live their life in the shacks, they have to develop their politics in the shacks...they have to strategise to counter their experience of being in the shacks, from the shacks...its difficult to pretend or try to mentor those kind of people because they are lot more aware of what effects them than anyone else (Church Land Programme 1)

Using this analysis, we can extend the taxonomy developed in chapter three to reflect AbM’s belief that service delivery is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for citizenship.

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Here, ‘active participation’ is the ultimate recognition of citizenship, although citizenship is also coterminous with ‘consultation’. One-way communication, however, does not constitute citizenship, even if services are delivered. Standing in opposition to ‘dignified citizenship’ is the category of ‘polluted citizen’. If shack dwellers are seen as ‘polluted others’, then ‘citizenship’ and ‘shack dweller’ become mutually exclusive categories:
We dream of a tomorrow where all of us can rightfully and proudly proclaim our citizenship...We dream of a tomorrow free of slums. (Mabaso, Provincial Spokesperson, 2007)

In this category, shack-dwellers are treated as threats to be managed, rather than citizens to be served: they are a danger to the social fabric, a health hazard to the population or an unsightly blemish in a ‘World Class City’. In short, shack dwellers are a ‘pollution’ to society and any service delivery must cleanse them (through formalisation), remove them (from central city areas), or both.

However, this taxonomy is insufficient because AbM do not just participate in “invited spaces” of citizenship, they also seek to invent spaces, by practicing “insurgent citizenship” and claiming “a right to the city”. This phrase is not unique to AbM or South Africa, emerging from countries as diverse as the US (Lepofsky and Fraser 2003); Delhi (Bhan 2009); and Brazil (Fernandes 2007). Whilst such claims reflect location-specific, they often overlap (or consciously draw on) Lefebvre’s (2002) concept of a “Right to the City”. As Purcell (2003) highlights, Lefebvre’s vision is based on two concepts: the right to appropriate the city, claiming citizenship on the basis of city inhabitance; and the right to shape that city’s future. This radical vision would place the city in the control of its inhabitants, who could utilise the land according to its use value, rather than its exchange value. AbM have repeatedly called on their right to the city, in banners, press statements and articles. Such calls combined with desires to be included in “invited” spaces
of citizenship, form the basis of their living social contract best captured by the term ‘insurgent citizenship’.

The Federation of the Urban Poor’s Living Social Contract

*Whereas civics within SANCO have focused on citizenship rights and have made political demands about their realisation, the Federation has focused on the practical fulfillment of formal rights through resource mobilisation and community mobilisation* (Millstein 2003:464)

FedUp was previously a part of the South African Homeless People’s Federation (SAHPF), a South African organisation working in partnership with the People’s Dialogue. At a conference Broderstrom (1991), residents of informal settlements and backyard shacks realised their need for credit to gain suitable land and housing. Saving groups followed in 1992 and the SAHPF was established in 1994 (Millstein et al 2003:462). However, following various divisions over leadership and autonomy the group split around 2004 (Swillings 2008). FedUp now functions in partnership with the uTshani Fund and is associated with the NGO *Community Organisation Resource Centre*.

FedUp centers on the ability of the poor to save in multiple, communal saving pools (not individual accounts). Focus lies on the consistency of their savings, not the amount saved and serves to counteract accusations that the poor are too irrational or fiscally irresponsible to save (Huchzermeyer 2001:315). FedUp stipulates that savings groups should be led by women, for two reasons. First, they seek to transform community relations by
empowering women. Second, it views women as ‘naturally’ more fiscally responsible than men (FedUp member 1)\textsuperscript{19}

The aim of FedUp’s savings groups is to create strong communities, who are able to supplement their housing subsidies and bargain with local power-holders to leverage access to development: “[securing] both material and discursive political inclusion of homeless people” (Millstein et al 2003:463-4). For FedUp, inclusion in housing projects covers all stages of project cycle: enumeration surveys, house modeling, site layout, material procurement and building. \textsuperscript{20} Unlike Tomlinson’s (1999) groups, FedUp connect human dignity and satisfaction to house size, aiming to construct “dignified” 50m\textsuperscript{2} houses (state-delivered houses are generally 36m\textsuperscript{2}). Like AbM, however, they also reaffirm their own dignity and abilities through group activities. For example, although savings groups are teamed with technical advisors, external advice is often gained through national and international community exchanges (Baumann and Mitlin 2003:32). These exchanges emphasise the value of experiential knowledge available to all informal settlement dwellers (Bolnick 1996:169). However, unlike AbM, FedUp emphasises the equal importance of intellectual, financial and physical input. Essentially FedUp advocate a self-help model.

\textsuperscript{19} The fiscal responsibility of women is a commonly cited in various development interventions (e.g., Guyer 1988)
\textsuperscript{20} Economically, the uTshani fund (established in 1994) provides FedUp with bridging finance and small housing loans (see Millstein et al 2003:464, Bauman and Mitlin 2003:33). However government failures to dispense subsidies as needed can leave the poor and uTshani out of pocket (Baumann and Bolnick 2001: 103)
Linking FedUp’s approach to the citizenship paradigms discussed earlier is difficult because ‘self-help’ is open to polarised interpretations. As interviewee stated:

*There’s a definite tension between the state saying “we’ve got a duty to provide certain things to people …and the state wanting people to help themselves* (PPT staff 1)

Advocates of self-help argue that pure state delivery promotes dependency and passivity, however, the alternatives they suggest stem from radically different perspectives of citizenship.

As a development paradigm, self-help housing became popular through Turner’s (1972) work, later adopted by the World Bank. However, Marais et al (2008) and Harris (2003) claim the World Bank approach diverged greatly from the spirit of Turner’s (1972) text. In our terms, Turner advocates insurgent citizenship, advocating something similar to “a right to the city”. His ideas of “freedom to build” and his belief that “housing is a verb” (an incremental process) were grounded on the principle of “dweller control”: a term that mixes Lefebvre’s (2002) concepts of appropriation and participation. In contrast, the World Bank de-emphasise dweller control, advocating a neoliberal citizenship that emphasises the poor’s ability to deliver their own housing. As mentioned in chapter three the People’s Housing Process, which followed the People’s Housing Partnership Trust in 1997
FedUp, it seems, is either becoming a neoliberal citizen *par excellence* or it is using ‘neoliberal’ spaces to serve ‘insurgent’ purposes. One member highlighted that unless they supplemented state subsidies financially and by staffing their own projects they would not receive a dignified home, just a minimal starter structure (Housing practitioner 1, Baumann and Bolnick 2001:105). This could be framed a challenge to government interpretations of a ‘right to housing’. Alternatively, it could be framed as a coping-mechanism which justifies further state retreat and the spread of neoliberal citizenship.

**Conclusion**

AbM and FedUp have developed unique but comparable living social contracts based on their perceptions of citizenship and the importance of citizen involvement. Both emphasise the importance of experiential knowledge, arguing that shack dwellers are best-placed to shape their own solutions. Through their group praxis, each overturns the idea of shack dwellers or “the poor” are irrational, unintelligent or short-sighted. Despite these similarities, their parameters of citizen involvement differ: whereas AbM seek citizen-defined state delivery of houses, FedUp demand citizen-defined, citizen-delivered houses. Crucial to both visions, though, is belief that service delivery alone does not constitute citizenship. Citizenship requires ‘active participation’ in the housing process. However, whilst AbM advocates ‘insurgent citizenship’ FedUp vision is more ambiguous. Both living social contracts fit post-apartheid housing policies. However, the following chapters explore what space exists for them in practice.
Chapter 5: Practical and Political Space for Citizen Involvement

Meaningful involvement in informal settlement projects requires the practical resources and political space to pursue various alternate futures. This chapter begins by addressing the practical limitations of the capital subsidies and government capacity, which limit citizens’ options. Section two argues that various routes for political influence, through councilors, corporatism and “invited spaces” have narrowed space for critical citizen voices, not least because of the ANC’s political intransigency. The chapter ends by charting the rise of post-apartheid social movements in reaction to these practical and political barriers.

Part One: practical obstacles

The capital subsidy system

The evolution of the capital subsidies was explored in chapter two. Developed by business interests, it aimed to improve housing enough to passify workers and stabilise the country without undermining business interests (Gilbert 2002). Consequently, the capital subsidy funding mechanism has certain limitations. First, fixed capital subsidies have largely limited the government to developing on cheaper land outside the central business district, skirting the urban edge and “perpetuating the existing structure of the South African city” (Hurchzemeyer 2003:591; BNG 2004:13). Second, designed for “breadth not depth” the capital subsidy can only provide minimal starter homes, not the four-room structures promised by
the ANC (Tomlinson 1999), especially since demand for building materials created by World Cup stadium construction has inflated the price of building materials. Lastly, as BNG (2004:7) recognises, there are inevitable tensions between uniform subsidy payments and non-uniform housing products, which encourages the reproduction of ‘matchbox’ or ‘RDP’ houses.

By introducing area-based subsidies, collapsed subsidy brackets; extending subsidy eligibility; linking the subsidy to inflation and making more money available for land acquisition and pre-project land preparation, BNG overcomes many of the flaws noted above. However, at the time of fieldwork, these alterations had not affected delivery in eThekwini (Municipal Official 2; Housing practitioner 1). In fact, with so many factors fixed or limited by the subsidy system, one official claimed that all citizens could decide was “the position of windows and doors”: a far cry from citizen-led development (Anonymous Interview).

Civil Service limitations: attitudes and abilities within eThekwini
The post-apartheid civil service has suffered from three key problems: first, thanks to a negotiated sunset-clause (ending April 1999) South Africa retained many of its apartheid-era staff, who had been socialised into racialised, top-down, compartmentalised working cultures, unsuited to post-apartheid democracy (Bolnick 1996:155; Maphunye 2002; Report of the Presidential Review Commission 1998). To resolve this issue, The 1997 Public Service Laws Amendment Act gave political heads (ministers and MECs) powers to appointment and promote civil servants. Unfortunately, this
act served to politicise the civil service, undermining its capabilities. Second, the civil service has lacked human capital, due to the detrimental effects of Bantu Education and apartheid-era school strikes (Hirsch 2005:17; Goebbels 2007:296). Organisational reshuffles and streamlining (from the Demarcation Act 27 onwards) have further undermined the short-term capacity of departments (Pieterse 2007:14).

eThekwini, however, has relatively high municipal capacity. My interviews suggested its largest problem, was a lack of intra-government communication and cooperation. Despite ‘co-operative government’ being enshrined in the constitution and most subsequent legislation, horizontal and vertical cooperation have proven elusive. This has had three key consequences. First, policies like BNG have not been well disseminated: one well-established local official I interviewed claimed he knew only what he “overheard in the corridors” (municipal official 3). Second, misalignment between departmental budgets and priorities has led to green-field projects in which houses are built but social and economic facilities are missing. Third, provincial approval and funding for housing projects has been infuriatingly slow. Many interviewees claimed that the Provincial Housing Department22 was in disarray, due to high staff turnover, organisational restructuring and appointments that seem to value political allegiance over technical merit. Planning applications face long lead-times and seem to disappear into opaque processing systems. On occasion, funding

22 The Provincial Housing Board’s issues are mirrored in the Department of Land Affairs, which also takes inordinately long periods of time to complete intra-government land transfers for housing projects.
mechanisms are completely absent and municipalities become left with ‘unfunded mandates’ (Municipal official 2). Municipal accreditation would allow eThekwini to adopt provincial housing functions and avoid these weaknesses but accredited status has proven elusive (housing practitioner 1). eThekwini can only bypass such systems by bridge-financing housing projects and using unspent housing budgets (see BNG 2004:5) to recoup its costs. Such bureaucratic hindrances delay project implementation and, at community-level, are indiscernible from government (or contractor) intransigence. Therefore, the inefficiencies of un-cooperative government jeopardise fragile relations of trust between citizens and government.

**Part 2: Political obstacles**

Towards the end of apartheid, “repertoires of contention” (Tarrow 1993) were very broad, ranging from bond boycotts to marches, pass-burning to petitioning. Many township civics, protest groups and anti-state NGOs (though not all) were united under the broad Charterist banner of the United Democratic Front, formed in 1983 (Suttner 2004; Seekings 1992). Meanwhile other NGOs filled the gaps of apartheid service delivery (Habib and Taylor 1999). Following the unbanning of political parties in 1990, the United Democratic Front disbanded although many of its member groups continued (see Louw 2004:150). In 1992, the South African National Civics Organisation formed, providing an organisational home for civics (Seekings 1997:1). Along with NGOs, SANCO played a key role in the transition. Both contributed to
forums like NHF and SANCO played a crucial role in negotiating local government reform in 1992-1993. With the elections of 1994, however, this political landscape shifted. Civics could no longer claim to being the “most representative” structures (Steinberg 2000). Popular mandates, insisted the ANC, flowed through elected, representative structures. Although some NGOs adopted a “watchdog” role, many optimistically demobilised or shifted to development issues (Bond 2001). Despite sporadic struggles over labour and crime, most adversarial groups disbanded (Ballard et al 2006:2). In lieu of apartheid’s repertoire of contention, the post-apartheid government proffered three spaces for citizen involvement: municipal political structures, corporatism and “invited spaces”. The nature and limitations of each will be addressed below.

**Municipal Political Structures**
As chapter three noted, Chapter 13 gives municipal political structures responsibility for securing citizen involvement in housing projects. Consequently, their ability to function is key to this thesis. Local political structures were established by the Municipal Structures Act (RoSA 1998), which included a Ward Committee (consultative body of up to ten elected ward members) and an elected councillor in each ward (Pycroft 2000).²³ Ward councilors were intended to channel the needs and opinions of their communities to the municipality and ensure that delivery met those needs, providing services “equitably, effectively and sustainably within the means of the municipality” (MSA RoSA 1998). In reality, however, councilors often

²³ Henceforth, ‘councillors’ refers to ward councillors although half of municipal councillors are elected through party lists, not wards.
narrow this channel of development and citizen involvement directly (through corruption) or indirectly (by eroding the trust necessary for participation). The following analysis on councilors is written in reference to informal settlement projects in eThekwini but arguably has wider implications.

The following argument differentiates between the differing party-political approaches councilors take towards informal settlements and the similar personal benefits they can secure by using housing for political or economic gain. It focuses on the latter. Although the argument is somewhat structural, this thesis realises that over-deterministic structural accounts are unconvincing (see Giddens 1984; Bourdieu 1984;1989) and acknowledges the agency of individual councilors who can (and do) act otherwise.

- **Directly closing spaces: corruption**

Corruption is defined here as “the misuse of entrusted power for private gain” (Transparency International). Perceived to be a growing issue in South Africa\(^{24}\), corruption can occur at all stages of a housing project (from land purchase to housing allocation) for political or economic gain. Politically, housing rewards loyalty in past elections, secures future support or punishes political opponents:

> Many of them [shack dwellers] are aware of the fact that they will only get houses through the vehicle of the ANC and always through the municipality.

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\(^{24}\) see Klanderman et al 2001:181
but again through the ANC...with the result we enjoy a good membership of them (Councillor 1)

This new councilor will come with an attitude and say “oh I will not support these people they did not want to vote me in” (FedUp Staff 1)

At times you select a particular project area only to find that that is not the councillor’s priority...you might find that the councilor previously had differences with that area. Now, when you said [sic] you are coming to do something with that area, the councillor will try and divert [it]. (PPT 1)

Politically-motivated corruption effects all stages of the project cycle. Economically-motivated corruption, however, tends to restrict access for groups like FedUp, who are seeking to construct their own housing. If councillors take a financial cut of a construction firm’s profits in return for recommending the firm to municipal officials, their income decreases if citizens access subsidies directly (not through construction firms) and build houses themselves (FedUp staff 1; FedUp staff 2; FedUp member 1). Government interviewees claimed the government was taking strong action against corruption (Provincial Official 2; Municipal Politician 1; Municipal Official 1). However, other interviewees claimed government lacked the political will to tackle this issue, perhaps because corruption stretched far beyond local councillors (Anonymous Interview 1; Gumtree Road 1; Gumtree Road 2).
Indirectly closing space: electioneering

The injustice of apartheid’s forced evictions, a lack of housing delivery under Black Local Authorities and promise of housing in the Freedom Charter and ANC manifesto made housing a highly political issue (Seekings 1988:201; Huchzermeyer 2001). Therefore, it is unsurprising that many councillors use housing delivery as a campaign promise. This electioneering, however, has been deeply problematic. First, its success (given the desperate need for housing in eThekwini) removed incentives for councillors to engage with communities outside election time. If housing remained undelivered, the need for it also remained and councillors (if supported by their party) could campaign again on the pledge to deliver:

*The poor are just made the ladders of the politicians. The politician is an animal that hibernates. They always come out in the election season to make empty promises and then they disappear.* (AbM member 8, Pemary Ridge Settlement)

Second, election promises disguised the complexity of housing development, which may take five years from inception to completion, outlasting any political term (Housing Practitioner 1). When the Project Preparation Trust drew a timeline for the Kennedy Road Settlement charting delivery milestones, many residents were surprised and disappointed that the finished product would not appear until 2012 (PPT staff 2; KRDC member 1). Rhetoric from political figures (including the ANC’s promise of one million houses in five years) leads citizens to believe that (with enough political will)
housing delivery could be far faster, eroding public trust in the municipality.²⁵

Third, election promises suggest that councillors have the power to initiate development, whereas in actuality they are only a valve, channeling (or curtailing) development and democracy. Housing projects are prioritised on a technical basis. Whilst political pressure “from above” can reshuffle municipal priorities, councillors generally lack such power (Municipal Official 1: Municipal Official 2: PPT staff 2). Their only power is to argue that a settlement has been wrongly categorised in its technical assessment. By promising housing, councillors not only make promises they cannot deliver, they also undermine municipal claims that housing projects are prioritised on the basis of technical assessments, not political advocacy. If housing fails to materialise, citizens’ faith in the municipality is unlikely to return but trust between citizens and their councillors will fracture.

In short, councillors have directly (through corruption) and indirectly (through electioneering) closed spaces for citizen involvement in housing projects. The following section questions whether corporatist structures are any more promising.

Corporatist Structures

²⁵ That said, it may be unfair to categorise all promises of speedy delivery as acts of deliberate deception. As Misselhorn (2008b:47) highlights, councillors often lack “the sort of technical project expertise that can be expected of officials”. His statement is supported by a recent SALGA report that claims many councillors lack many specialist skills needed for local government delivery.
Although the ANC advocated representative democracy, it secured the support of important trade unions and civics through corporatist structures, intended to replace the antagonistic state-civil society relations of apartheid. SANCO was absorbed into the tripartite alliance with the ANC and COSATU, with a mission to defend “people-centred, people-driven development” that focused closely on housing (Zuern 2004). The corporatist equivalent to SANCO for NGOs was the Development Chamber of the National Economic Development and Labour Council, formed in February 1995 (www.nedlac.org.za).

Corporatism, however, has become an empty promise. Both bodies are restricted by their own internal weaknesses and the ANC’s unwillingness to tolerate dissent. Membership transfers (or dual membership) between SANCO and the ANC have confused SANCO’s status. Its oscillations over privatisation policy demonstrate its inability to withstand political pressure from the ANC (Zuern 2004; Hassen et al 2004). The National Economic Development and Labour Council, on the other hand, has been dominated by economic interests (community interests are only represented in one of its four chambers). In the case of controversial policies like the GEAR, it was bypassed completely (Parsons 2007; Baccaro 2006). In short, it seems that corporatism structures have become co-opted or obsolete. This leaves only the “invited spaces” left for potential citizen involvement.
Invited Spaces

In the context of housing, two crucial “invited spaces” (Thompson 2007) for citizen involvement were Social Compacts (HWP) and Integrated Development Plans (which were “hastily added” in the WPLG, Harrison 2006).

As mentioned in chapter three, Social Compacts were pacts between private companies and communities (supposedly facilitated by government) made compulsory by HWP. Unsurprisingly, in practice, private sector companies lacked the will or ability to engage in protracted community negotiation (Goodlad 1996:1642; Bek Bins and Nel 2004). For simplicity’s sake, many persuaded community leaders to sign social compacts, but these leaders could not always secure wider community support (Tomlinson 1998:143). Given such difficulties, Chapter 13 makes social compacts optional, claiming that “community partnership” should be undertaken through Ward Committees although “special steps may be required to ensure the ongoing involvement of vulnerable groups” and the municipality must prove that “effective interactive community participation” has occurred throughout the project.

In other words, when the difficulties of combining fiscal efficiency and participation became apparent, new policy prescriptions neither abandoned participation nor granted communities more institutional clout. Instead, they maintained a “consensus to coexist” but withdrew the tool that made policy contradictions obvious. Without sufficient means to institutionalise
participation, NHC’s gestures towards ‘active participation’ appear unrealistic.

A decade later, BNG relied on IDPs to develop citizen-driven frameworks for local development. IDPs were local planning tools, designed to encourage ‘decentralised centralism (Todes 2006: 3). IDP formation was meant to include diverse groups, from traditional leaders and organised stakeholders to ward committees and unorganised groups (IDP Guide). However, combining “technocratic managerialism” with “bottom-up processes” has proved difficult (Harrison 2006:202). In part, this reflects the difficulty of institutionalising any participation (Gaventa 1998). However, it also reflects the governments refusal (or inability) to “qualitatively change its own mode of operation” in response to critical engagement (Miraftab 2001; 2003:23). Organised stakeholders who fit within current development paradigms are usually privileged over less organised, less technical or more divergent interests.  

For them, IDPs have become participatory cul-de-sacs: channels for participation which are ‘dead ends’ because people’s opinions do not get incorporated into government practice.

So far, this chapter has argued that space for citizen involvement is narrowed or closed by councillors, weak corporatism and the difficulties of institutionalising participation. Throughout, however, it alludes to the government’s inability to absorb criticism. This crucial factor is explored in greater depth below.

26 Especially those not speaking English or living in hard-to-reach locations
The ANC: absolutely no criticism?

In exile from 1960 until 1990, the ANC adopted secretive, hierarchical structures founding a military wing Umkhonto we Sizwe and favouring Guevara-esque tactics. Despite their role in mass-actions like the Defiance Campaign of the 1950s, the ANC did not initiate the majority of mass-action in the late 1970s (Seekings 1992). Rather, they became the ‘ideological broker’ between protestors and the wider international community (Barrell 1992; Marks and Trapido 1992).

Whilst many civic movements attempted (with varying success) to achieve mass deliberation (Cherry 2000), the ANC consistently advocated representative democracy:

While civics are central to the struggle for democratic local government, they cannot be seen as local government structures of the future. These structures will be formed on the basis of votes won by organisations in local elections (ANC 1990 in Seekings 1996: 152)

These representative structures would allow the ANC to pursue ‘democratic centralism’, using a strong central drive to overcome the structures, interests and legacies of apartheid (Huchzermeyer 2003). This mix of mass-based and representative political visions created “uneasy tussle between

27 although different ANC leaders (e.g. Tambo, Zuma and Mandela) had very different apartheid experiences (in political exile, military exile and imprisonment)
the contradictory centralising and decentralising tendencies at the heart of the national liberation struggle” (Liepietz 2008:140).

Encouraged by their brokerage role, the ANC saw itself as the embodiment of the people’s voice, using this to justify the concept of ‘democratic centralism’. Mbeki has even maintained that when ‘the people’ rally against the ANC, they rally “against our movement and against their own interests” (Mbeki 2001, emphasis added). This claim to embody the people’s voice became part of the ANC’s “symbolic capital” (Bourdieu 1989) as a movement, used to fend off any political challenges they faced. This claim sat along two others. First, that the ANC were “the liberation movement” leading anti-apartheid struggles (Gibson 2006:3):

...it was the ANC that led the struggle for the victory of the democratic revolution in our country, the one political formation whose members and supporters sacrificed everything, including their lives, to achieve this outcome. (Mbeki 2004)

Second, that only the ANC could fulfill these struggles, as the people’s “tried-and-tested political vanguard” (Mbeki 2001b). In other words, criticism is not constructive, it could only “undermin[e] the revolution, which is not completed” (Chaskalson 2008). Sabotaging any of these claims: that the ANC is the voice of the people; the liberation movement of the anti-apartheid struggle; or the torchbearer for this struggle poses a threat to the ANC’s grasp on power. Consequently, the ANC seeks to keep a tight rein on
such claims inside\(^{28}\) and outside the movement. Despite (and because) of this tight line on dissent post-apartheid social movements have recently re-emerged: a phenomenon explored in the final section, below.

**Post-apartheid Social Movements**

We must stop this business of people going into the street to demonstrate about lack of delivery. These are the things that the youth used to do in the struggle against apartheid (Mbeki in Pithouse and Patel 2005)

Since the end of the 1990s, post-apartheid social movements have emerged in South Africa (McKinley 2004).\(^{29}\) Ballard et al (2006:399) have classified these movements into five (overlapping) groups: those tackling “distributional issues” like the lack of basic services;\(^{30}\) those opposing evictions and seeking land tenure security; unions and labour movements; pollution and environmental groups and finally, those representing the rights of vulnerable groups and minorities. These movements lack “a common counter-hegemonic political project with a focus on state capture” (Ibid.). Some have memberships largely supportive of the ANC (Madlingozi 2007:93); some critically fight the ANC for constitutional rights, whilst others target wider regime change (Ballard et al 2004:400). Most scholars now agree these movements blend post-apartheid and apartheid experiences,

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\(^{28}\) See Southall 2007; Gumede 2005; Mattes 2002; Francis 2008 for the ANC’s control of its MPs and branch regionalism


\(^{29}\) An indepth discussion of ‘social movements’ is beyond the remit of this thesis. Many key issues will be dealt with in the text but readers are directed towards (references) for a fuller definitions and discussions.

\(^{30}\) In this, they differ from many Western new social movements which have formed around “post-industrial” cleavages (Ingelhart 1990)
approaches and grievances. Bond (2006), writing on the Anti-Privatisation Forum, uses the term “resurgent” to capture this sense of partial continuity. Mbali (2006:130) claims that TAC draws on “patient-driven” anti-apartheid, gay rights activism to tackle pharmaceuticals and AIDS denial in the post-apartheid era (Mbali 2006:130). Similarly, Gibson (2006:4) argues, that AbM arise from post-apartheid conflicts but can “trace a lineage to the militant township ‘civics’ “ of the apartheid-era. Regardless of their approaches, almost all movements have faced universal condemnation from the government for being anachronistic, members of the “loony left”, and/or criminals (Ballard 2006). Furthermore, although some have enjoyed ‘defensive’ successes (i.e. preventing or delaying government action) few (bar TAC) have had ‘positive’ successes (i.e. forcing government to provide services, or create legislation).

Conclusion

In conclusion this chapter has argued that opportunities for citizen involvement have been restricted practically and politically. Practically, capital subsidies, civil service capacity and uncooperative government has limited citizens’ options. Politically, the patronage politics of councilors; co-opted or conflicted corporatist structures, and participatory cul-de-sacs constrain citizen involvement. These political restrictions are caused and/or exacerbated by the ANC’s sensitivity to any opposition it feels may erode its symbolic capital. Since the late 1990s, a growing number of post-apartheid social movements have emerged to challenge (in very different ways and

31 Although ‘practical’ and ‘technical’ issues are never apolitical
with differing degrees of success) the lack of political space for citizen involvement.
Chapter 6: Boomerangs and Scales

As the previous chapter demonstrates, political and practical space for AbM and FedUp to realise their living social contracts is narrow. To explore how such groups seek to re-open space for citizen involvement, we introduce the concept “boomeranging” (Keck and Sikkink 1998) combined with Smith’s concept of “jumping scales” (Smith 1993), before exploring the successes and set-backs each group experienced putting these processes into practice.

As mentioned in chapter one, the increasing flows of politics, communication, resources and people across borders, has encouraged scholars to explore concepts like “cosmopolitan citizenship” (Hutchings and Dannreuther 1999) “transnational communities” (Bhabha 1990) and “global civil society” (Chandhoke 2002). In this context, Keck and Sikkink published their book on transnational advocacy networks (TAN) and the “boomerang model”. TAN are principled networks in which transnational actors are “bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchange of information and services” (1998:2). Focusing on human rights and environmental causes, the authors argue that grass-roots groups facing obstructive national governments can form transnational alliances to re-open national spaces ‘from above’:

*International contacts can “amplify” the demands of domestic groups, pry open space for new issues, and then echo these demands back into the domestic arena* (1999:93)

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32 see Castells 2000; Giddens 1998
33 Although as Keck and Sikkink (1998) and David (2007) highlight, TANs are not a new phenomenon
Such networks function through information politics (the provision of “political usable information quickly”); symbolic politics (creating/challenging frames\textsuperscript{34} for key issues); leverage politics (reaching stronger actors who can push through change) and accountability politics (obliging political actors “to act on vaguer policies or principles they formally endorse). TANs are defined as horizontal networks with no pre-determined hierarchy between actors in terms of knowledge, ability, or agency although the risk of co-option always exists (Corntassel 2007; Stewart 2004).

Although Keck and Sikkink (1998) emphasise NGO and international NGO networks, I follow Martens (2004) and Zippel (2004) in stressing the importance of International Government Organisations such as the UN, which are utilised within activist networks without being activist organisations themselves. Furthermore, like Stewart (2004) I address how local/national causes are re-shaped to engage transnational actors. Third, Keck and Skikkink (1998;1999) focus on national obstructions but I argue that ‘boomeranging’ could occur at any political level (e.g., personal blockages may be resolved through municipal boomeranging), although this would not always require transnational advocacy networks.

To complement transnational network-based analysis, this thesis draws from work on scale, which originates in materialist, geographic analyses of how capital functions over space (Harvey 1993). Here we focus on Smith’s (1993:90) work, which tackles the politics of scale. These scales are socially and politically constructed arenas of engagement, which actors can form, erase, transgress, transform and jump (Prytherch 2007). By ‘jumping scales’,

\textsuperscript{34} see Benford and Snow (2000)
Smith argues that groups can “resist oppression and exploitation”. Consequently the mobility of actors is highly political and dominant actors will attempt to “confine” their subordinates to “a manageable scale” whilst dominated groups may battle these “imposed scale constraints” by “harnessing powers and instrumentalities at other scales” (Jonas 1994). That said, ‘jumping scales’ is not apriori empowering. For some actors, battles of scale may be “deeply exclusive and disempowering” (Swyngedouw 1997 see also Haarstad and Floysand 2007:294).

To analyse the politics of scale, Moore (2008) highlights, we must separate scale “as an everyday category of practice” from scale “as a substantial category of analysis”. She concludes that: “just as we can research nationalist practices without assuming that nations are real entities, it is possible to develop theories of scale politics without scales” (Moore 2008:213). In other words, we must always ask why certain scale patterns “solidify in consciousness and practice” (Ibid. 2008:214), recognising that any “fixity” of scale is “ultimately temporary, and...always the result of a political project” (Purcell 2003). Otherwise, ‘scale’ becomes conceptually conflicted (see Marston 2005).

Using the “boomerang model” and ideas of “jumping scale” this chapter examines how AbM and FedUP have sought to realise their living social contracts: How do they seek to create opportunities for participation? Who do they approach and how? How are key narratives shaped accordingly? What barriers do they face?
Spanning a number of different settlements and thousands of individuals, AbM is both interesting and difficult to analyse. In 2005, settlements fitted ‘ignored’ or ‘harmed’ categories of our taxonomy. Now, they span all categories. This reflects, and is reflected in, the tactics that AbM use, the “scales” they construct, and the networks they build. The following sections cover three such tactics: “street talk” (i.e. marches and protests), negotiation and court cases. Although more tactics undoubtedly exist (petitioning, vote-boycotts, protest music, etc.) these three case-studies allow the most in-depth analysis on issues of citizenship and citizen involvement.

AbM’s “street talk”³⁵

During its “year of action” in 2005, AbM marched frequently as a movement and as individual settlements within the movement. Such marching continued sporadically in 2007. Since mediation began in 2007/2008, however, the whole movement has not marched, although individual settlements like Siyanda have, with the movement’s support. Given the

³⁵ Marching is de jure an invited space of citizen involvement, because South Africans are constitutionally entitled to protest. However, we refer to it as an invented space of citizenship because the government discourages marches so vociferously and AbM have faced much difficulty gaining permission to march locally, with marches being violently dispersed.
government’s reaction to previous protest movements, what encouraged AbM to take this route of protest? What scales did they construct and target? What narratives did they form?

AbM members insist that marching (or toyi-toying) is the last resort of political engagement, although this is not obvious to many external observers, because attempts to conventionally utilise municipal structures are largely un-newsworthy. One AbM member explains:

In Pemary Ridge we have…old residents and elder people. Now most of [the] people don’t believe in opposing government officials but they believe in listening and obeying every rule…people have the great hope since 1994…[but then] it became 2000, 2004, 2006 and they realise “no this is too long”. And therefore they decided we must rise up. (AbM member 8, Pemary Ridge Settlement).

By 2005, residents had been trying other channels of influence for eleven years. Marching or “street talk” (AbM member 9, Kennedy Road Settlement) became “the poor people’s media”: a last attempt to gain the attention of politicians and the wider public (Jeenah 2007). The target, purpose, and form of protests by AbM have differed. Roughly, these marches fall into two groups.
The first category are far more specific in their grievances, pressurising individuals to resign\textsuperscript{36}. Sometimes these marches are extremely functional, like the march against Cllr. Bachu from Asoka Park (Reservoir Hills) to his offices in October 2005. Marchers submitted a memorandum which concluded: “if Bachu does not resign then we, ourselves, will declare that Ward 23 does not have a councilor”. Other protests were more symbolic. Residents in Ward 25, for example, (led by but not limited to AbM) acted the burial of their councilor in their march of September 2005. Alongside banners declaring a “year of action”, “fighting forced removal” and “more land: give us back our land” marchers carried a black wooden coffin, with the words “RIP Councillor Baig”. In front of the coffin, a pastor led the ‘funeral ceremony’ and behind it, an AbM member playing Cllr Baig’s mother, wailed. Again, the memorandum demanded Baig’s resignation, after detailing Ward 25’s grievances, which ranged from employment to HIV/AIDs. These marches all targeted the removal of obstacles that prevented members from practicing their citizenship. Rejecting empty citizenship rights as shams, as AbM have done through vote boycotts (which carried the slogan “no land, no house, no vote”) and the rejection of obstructive councilors, is an integral part of forming their insurgent citizenship.

The second category of marches were not ward-specific and “jumped scale” to the municipal level. This jumping scale was a conscious maneuver for AbM. When marching on Mlaba, they stated:

\textsuperscript{36} For example, Cllr Bachu, Cllr Baig, Sgt Nyagar of Sydenham Police Station
We stand here because our councillors do not represent us and so we have to represent ourselves.” (Memorandum 2007).

However, whereas boomerang throwers usually target group with whom they share key principles AbM jumped scale to hold the municipality to account, accusing it of “making deals” with private land owners, illegally using forced evictions and breaking previous promises of development (Ibid). That said, whilst municipalities were seen as a current obstruction they were also viewed as possible ally, should they make the necessary paradigm shift.

This view of councilors as irredeemable but municipalities as redeemable reflects a wider trend amongst respondents to place more trust in higher scales of government. Explaining why marching was an effective tactic, on AbM member highlights:

Marching is a good idea. Because when we are marching the journalists are there, everybody is there, it can even get on the TV, even Thabo Mbeki knows that is going on, even the president can see what is going on. Even the premiers...the housing premier Linda Sisulu knows what is happening (AbM member 10, Kennedy Road Settlement)

This reference to national political figures is telling. Whilst most AbM interviewees refused to vote locally (even if no vote boycott were called), many would vote nationally37. Perhaps, the ANC’s symbolic capital is not fully

37 Also reflected in my survey (survey, unpublished)
exhausted. Whilst interviewees felt it had “forgotten” the poor, many hoped to “remind” the ANC of its promises and of the continued poverty in South Africa:

*There are some other people who think that if you are toy-toying you are just fighting they don’t know that you are just reminding...we fight for what the ANC promised us* (AbM member 6, Kennedy Road Settlement)

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**The successes and set-backs of “street talk”**

Using Keck and Sikkink’s (1998;1999) framework the following section explores the successes and set-backs of “street talk” by comparing the first protest of Kennedy Road to the march against Mlaba in 2007.

In 2005, by their own admittance, Kennedy Road settlement “jumped onto the street” (AbM member 1, Kennedy Road Settlement). Unfamiliar with the legal requirements for protests, and angry at their betrayal, residents staged an illegal demonstration, which succeeded in closing down Kennedy Road, and led to the arrest of 14 members. At this point, AbM refused any links with external actors, including any representation in court. Only after the failure of this first court case did they obtain a lawyer.

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38 *Kennedy Road proper, not Kennedy Road settlement*
The protest allowed AbM to broadcast their issues across different scales. Unfortunately, however, protests are usually communicated in the media spectacles (rather than precise manifestos) and, as such, are open to interpretation by external actors. Consequently, they tend to reinforce an observer's current opinions on the issues and actors involved, rather than invoke a paradigm shift. If, for example, shack dwellers are paradigmatically seen as trouble-makers, the spectacle of their protest would be further evidence of their incorrigibility.

Consequently, the network support that grew from this initial ‘broadcast’ was largely limited to activists and academics who paradigmatically saw shack-dwellers as citizens with unfulfilled rights. AbM has since split from some groups over issues of autonomy but links with organisations like War on Want, The Church Land Programme, Indymedia and Pambazuka have grown increasingly strong. Furthermore, the forging of a Poor People’s Alliance (which includes Anti-Eviction Campaign, KZN’s Rural Network and Johannesburg’s Landless People’s Movement) has strengthened ties between AbM and other post-apartheid social movements. According to Keck and Sikkink (1999) TAN share values, discourse and information. AbM’s network shares a large overlap of values and discourses but all members have slightly different living social contracts, agendas and means of (dis)engagement with the state. One key strength of the network is “information politics”, which functions through (extremely up-to-date) movement websites and widespread mailing lists. Information sharing and broadcasting means that whilst the network has a relatively stable core, its
parameters are broad and stretch across what has problematically been termed “global civil society”. With regards to symbolic politics, this TAN frames issues in a mix of empathetic-humanist terms (“imagine you live in a cramped shack...” www.waronwant.org/support-us/south-africa-appeal) and rights-based language (“fighting for their right to safe housing” ibid). Limited to activist/academic contacts, however, the TAN as it stood around 2005-2006 had limited power for leverage and accountability politics. Whilst it could negatively resistance the state effectively, it was unable to prompt positive changes (AbM member 13). Dismissed as the “extreme left” or “troublemakers” by the municipality, the TAN made AbM “unreasonable” by association.

To create a boomerang model that unblocked local and municipal structures, AbM needed to frame themselves as citizens with legitimate concerns and attract the support of a wider cross-section of society that could not be dismissed and “far left”. To do so, they needed to publicly claim the moral upper ground, which had been key to the success of social movements like TAC. As TAC leader Zach Achmat argues:

TAC is not a numbers game. It is more about the ability to create a moral consensus. The button we were aiming to push (in planning civil disobedience) was that the government is morally weak...The left needs to give a sense of morality to politics (in Friedman and Morriar 2004:28)

39 See Delaney 2000 definition and discussion.
40 This is certainly not to denigrate such networks, suggest that such opinions represent reality, or imply activist/academic relations should not be formed
In this quest, framing their struggles favorably in the media was crucial. This was achieved with the empathy and attention of journalists, such as Niren Tolsi of the Mail and Guardian and academics with media access like Pithouse, Patel and Huchzermeyer. Eventually, AbM members were able to access the media themselves, unmediated (Zikode 2007;2006;2005). This ability to frame struggles has been challenged by the state’s ability to access newspapers. However, more recent coverage is a far cry from early coverage in the local *Rising Sun* (2006:1) paper, which accused AbM’s leader of being a “dark spirit who flies around at night”.

Links to *Freedom of Expression Institute* and Lawyers at the *Centre for Applied Legal Studies*, have helped AbM to emphasise their status as citizens with (unfulfilled) rights. In the process of linking their “living politics” (see above) to specific laws and rights, AbM have gained confidence with rights-based language. This confidence has enabled AbM to develop “insurgent citizenship” approaches, claiming rights to the city and a right to participation, in memorandums, speeches and banners (AbM website).

Alongside this rights-based frame, AbM has attacked the ANC’s symbolic capital (see previous chapter). First, AbM challenged ANC attempts to create an hegemonic memory or “narration of the nation” (Bhabha 1990) that made ‘freedom’ synonymous with the gaining of formal rights on 27th September 1994 through the annual celebration of “Freedom Day”. Contesting the idea that formal rights have brought significant change to
their lives AbM re-signifies this day as “unFreedom day”, organising events and demonstrations to re-narrate the nation (publicised through their TAN). Strengthening their network, this event received solidarity declarations and publicity from organisations as far spread as Christian Aid (Wales) and Abu Dhabi Woman’s Forum.

Second, AbM has garnered church support, using regional contacts like Bishop Philip Rubin and Diakonia to leverage support at parish levels (church leader 1 interview). Churches were key to anti-apartheid TANs, generating “international interests and...[making] removals and resettlement household words” (in Duncan in Russell 2003:318). However, in the post-apartheid era, churches have faced an identity crisis over their relationship to the state (church leader 1 interview; church leader 2 interview). In the March on Mlaba, however, several church leaders joined the front-line of AbM’s march. When the march was tackled by police and water hoses, the presence of church leaders secured both media coverage and wider condemnation, consolidated by a statement of support by church leaders (see Matsaneng 2007). Conjuring-up parallels to attacks on Desmond Tutu in the apartheid, this solidified AbM’s claim to the moral upper-ground.

The resolution of the march on Mlaba also prompted a reaction from the Centre on Housig Rights and Eviction (COHRE), an international human rights NGO based in Geneva.\footnote{COHRE had previously met AbM at a workshop but this was arguably their most decisive intervention for the group} COHRE has consultative status with the UN and Observer status with the African Commission on Human and People’s\footnote{COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLE’S RIGHTS}
Rights. Such status, claims Bettati (1986 in Martens 2004) is a “label of international credibility”. In terms of leverage and accountability politics it has influence over eThekwini municipality (as an international body with links to UN HABITAT) and particular individuals within it (Cogulan Pather, head of eThekwini’s housing department and COHRE are both members of an Advisory Group on Forced Evictions, which reports to UN HABITAT’s Executive Director).

Following the march on Mlaba, COHRE wrote to Mike Sutcliffe, copying in Lindiwe Sisulu, the Housing Minister, and Brigitee Mabandla at the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Department. Interviews with officials suggested that eThekwini measures housing success on the number of houses delivered. Previously, these achievements have been vindicated by numerous housing awards\(^{42}\) and my interviews suggested that this external praise was an important to defense for local officials and politicians when they were challenged on their housing record by local citizens. COHRE’s letter, however, shifted external focus from quantitative targets towards the qualitative relationships between the municipality and its citizens, highlighting the legitimacy of AbM and condemning government responses:

*The methods used on the day [27th March 2007] were reminiscent of scenes in pre-1994 South Africa and are universally regarded and totally unacceptable...COHRE urges the eThekwini Municipality to become more attentive to shack dwellers' concerns and demands, and for the Municipality*

\(^{42}\) KZN local authority of the year 1999 and 2002; SA local authority of the year 1999; Impumelelo innovation award 1999 and 2001; Govan Mbeki Housing Award 2006
to encourage, instead of repress, a democratic process of consultation and cooperation to address land and housing issues in eThekwini.

AbM also claim support from Kothari the UN Special Rapporteur on Housing, who released his critical report on South Africa in 2008. My interviews suggest that it was mounting national and international pressure after the March on Mlaba that pushed the municipality into opening institutional space for negotiation with AbM, mediated by the Project Preparation Trust (PPT). PPT worked with AbM to draw up settlement plans, planning basic services for all settlements and upgrades for three settlements (Pemary Ridge, Arnett Drive and Kennedy Road). In opening negotiation space, the boomerang model has succeeded. AbM’s ability to ‘jump scales’ and create ‘invented spaces’ for participation suggests a broadening of citizen involvement away from exclusively-liberal models of citizenship involvement. However, even if AbM have achieved a de facto shift in the practice of their citizenship, my interviews suggested that street talk is still considered “out of order” by government politicians and officials. For both political and practical reasons (addressed below) AbM’s citizenship claims have arguably not created corresponding duties or obligations from the state, which may impact on their realisation of a participatory right to housing.

- Political objections to “street talk”

43 A local, not-for-profit group, specialising in project management
Political objections to “street talk” took two forms. Either interviewees objected to participation through any invented spaces outside representative structures or they objected to the form of these invented spaces. In the first case, interviewees emphasised the importance of limiting involvement to representative structures (the liberal approach to citizenship):

*We’re in a constitutional set up that is one where representative democracy in the end must guide you. Now the difficulty is that...all of those groups...have not contested elections, they have not contested to say their views must dominate over the views of in this case the leading party, the ANC* (Municipal Politician 1)

This interviewee stresses that AbM constitute only a minority (around 5%) of all informal settlements and concludes that: “In the end that’s what representative democracy says, you can’t only focus on a narrow or limited group of areas, you’ve got to have a bigger perspective here”. This reflects the determination of Mike Sutcliffe in his response letter to COHRE, in which he claimed that the city:

*Will not be...held ransom by the Abahlali baseMjondolo movement which only represents a small proportion of the total informal community in the City* (letter 12 October 2007).
However, if channels of representative democracy appear to be blocked (see chapter four), this argument is problematic. Even Burke (who championed representative democracy) claimed it was better that decision-making bodies “be infected with every epidemical frenzy of the people” than to become “wholly untouched by the opinions and feelings of the people out-of-doors” (in Beetham 2003:600). Furthermore, such perspectives ignore the ways other interest groups, such as business groups, can influence government outside formal democratic channels.

Defences of liberal citizenship have prompted fears that AbM’s space for citizenship involvement may just be a placatory device or a ‘participatory cul-de-sac’. Given past betrayals over promises of delivery, representation and participation (see chapter four), AbM initially viewed the PPT as a “thermometer for the government” to test how “hot” (angry) residents had become, or a “condom of the government”, intended to deal with Kennedy Road Settlement safely (without endangering its reputation) and “keep us off the streets” (AbM member 5, Motala Heights; AbM member 6, Kennedy Road Settlement). Trust is now growing between AbM and PPT, but such trust will remain incomplete until AbM see proof that their rights claims have illicited a government response.

In contrast to the opinions above, most provincial officials I interviewed did not object to citizen involvement outside representative structures per se, but complained that AbM’s approach lacked a “civil and democratic manner”
(Provincial Official 1). For one interviewee, AbM are a step behind FedUp who, he claims, know how to work within municipal structures:

For me... there are issues of protocol that people by no fault of there’s do not follow. They are not aware...It is so simple, they could write a simple letter to the head of the department and seek an audience. But they don’t do that. They only want to come when they are complaining about something...somebody should advise them...request an audience or come and make a presentation come and meet the department then you get told how the department works...the federation [FedUP] did that - Pat [Magebula] and his company...then government [and] they [sic] friends because he has mastered the craft of working through government. (Provincial Official 2)

Interestingly, this suggests that citizens may invent spaces outside representative structures but that the politics of protest specifically is considered too ‘primitive’ for post-apartheid South Africa. Arguably, PPT embodies this form of genteel “jumping scales’ between a locality and the municipality.

Importantly, both opinions imply that AbM could participate in other ways, but prefer marching an assumption made by some AbM sympathisers who assume that AbM have not tried other routes (Church Land Programme 2) If, as AbM interviewees claimed, they are marching as a last resort, why do such opinions arise? Possibly, these individuals are simply unaware of local political blockages due to the lack of media speculation around negotiation
or prejudices about the political intelligence of shack dwellers. Alternatively, observers feel that AbM are agitators, using the public spotlight for ulterior motives: an opinion was raised by many interviewees in business and government. Some suggested that AbM leaders were profiting from the protests:

*We say look...you’re negotiating in bad faith, some of you guys are... publicity gathering for yourselves or whatever...If you come with a genuine need for housing...we will engage with that*  (Provincial Official 1)

Others claimed that an external ‘Third Force’ is using both leaders and residents. Interestingly, this ‘Third Force’ is ambiguous. Many claimed the Centre for Civil Society (University of KwaZulu Natal) was manipulating Abahlali. However, as of 2006, the movement broke with the Centre and now “refuses all offers of solidarity that do not respect that decision” (AbM website). Other interviewees claimed that Richard Pithouse was steering the group. Pithouse has been with AbM since the after math of its first protest in 2005. Interviewees within AbM claimed Pithouse “shared their pain” and engaged with them as a member (or a resource) but not a leader (AbM member 5, Motala Heights; AbM member 11, Motala Heights; AbM member 9, Kennedy Road; AbM member 3, Joe Slovo Settlement).. However, as a white, middle-class academic his position in the movement has been analysed and contested by observers. At the core of this debate are key insider/outside questions revolving around issues of cooperation versus co-option: what are the nodes of power within a group? Where do the “real”
decisions get made? How are resources acquired and administered? These questions have been tackled publicly by AbM and guide its praxis. Stances against elitism or cooption, however, have done little to quell the accusations and fears of the officials/politicians I interviewed.

During my fieldwork it was unclear how such political tensions would play out. Certainly, such opinions mean that AbM will have to work to keep spaces for citizen involvement open and AbM have not secured a route for others to make similar claims: new groups will have to throw boomerangs of their own. Arguably, however, if AbM retains the ability to leverage pressure through its advocacy network, spaces for citizen involvement may stay open despite the misgivings above. This section will conclude that the practical objections below pose far more intransigent obstacles.

- Practical Objections to “street talk”

Municipal officials I interviewed implied that AbM’s protests were “out of order” because they tackled political barriers when practical barriers were the real limiting factor. Officials claimed they were working at full capacity to deliver against an enormous backlog that was the product of apartheid, urbanisation and population growth. Officials felt they were providing opportunities for citizen involvement where possible but that practical limitations meant such spaces fitted categories of ‘information’ or ‘consultation’ not ‘active participation’. Similarly the housing offered to Kennedy Road on the urban-edge (rejected by the settlement as unsustainable) was the best they could offer within the capital subsidy
system. In this context, political opposition appeared “ungrateful” and provincials became less inclined to help AbM, not more. Given that low-income housing was in such demand, they preferred to redirect attention onto more ‘grateful’ targets (Municipal Official 1; Municipal Official 2).

The issue, claimed one interviewee from the PPT, was that AbM used “rights-based language” instead of “developmental language”. AbM have resisted the PPT’s calls to move towards a ‘developmental’ language, fearing it may lead to co-option or the depolitisation of development (AbM member 1, Kennedy Road Settlement; AbM member 13). Certainly, as Escobar (1994) and Ferguson (1990) highlighted, development can put technical facades on political issues. In illustration, AbM members point to shack fires, which are presented as technical mishaps but actually stem from political decisions to de-electrify informal settlements in 2002 (Birkenshaw 2008).

Their argument is convincing, but it may miss an important point. The PPT worker quoted also argued that unequal service provision was highly political and undemocratic. Furthermore, he highlighted the need for ‘rights-based language’ in battles over policy and policy mechanisms. His objection to such language at a municipal, project level, was that it fought the right battle, on the wrong battleground. He highlighted that if, at a municipal level, all informal settlements protested:

“look, we’re not interested in your difficulties, and your lack of funding and you’re lack of capacity state, we have got a right to this, give it to us”
Residents would simply be “battling over limited resources”. The distribution of resources is a highly political decision, but it is not one that the municipal officials can necessarily change. Arguably, either AbM or the municipality needs to ‘throw’ a different boomerang: not one aimed at establishing AbM members as citizens with legitimate (unfulfilled) rights, but one that opens resource channels so that those rights can be fulfilled.

**Abahlali and the courts**

All court action is “jumping scales” to a higher body for jurisdiction and the higher in the court system one goes, the more impact legal precedents have geographically and across time. The importance of the law for informal settlements was established in chapter two. However, courts have also been a “powerful legal and political tool” for TAC and other post-apartheid social movements in South Africa (Mbali 2006). TAC used the constitutional right to life as a basis for their court challenge in 2001 to force the government to roll out Nevirapine, which could stop AIDS transferring from mother to child. (Mbali 2006; Friedman and Mottiar 2004: 20). Courts have also been utilised by groups more sceptical of government engagement, like the Anti-Eviction Campaign, which uses legal proceedings to hamper evictions (Ballard et al 2006:405).

Since its formation, Abahlali has used the court both “as a shield and as a sword” (AbM member 1, Kennedy Road). Defensively, the courts have been used to prevent private evictions (e.g. in Motala Heights) press for the release of those who have been arrested during marches and stop
government-initiated forced evictions (using the PIEUOL Act). Forced removals treat informal settlement residents as ‘polluted others’ (see chapter 4). To move up the participatory ladder the government must (at minimum) not move settlements without notice. The municipality claims that forced evictions do not occur, although other interviewees and documents (see Pithouse 2008) contest this. AbM has recently been highly successful at fighting evictions, although this is not without substantial financial costs. Most recently, AbM have taken the provincial government to court over the EPRS, which they claim contradicts legislation like BNG and lies outside the legal remit of the provincial government (which, they argue, should not be a legislating body). The case is being appealed in the Constitutional Court, having been turned down in the high court. However, the process highlights the value of court cases not just in producing a legal decision but in provoking wider societal debate.

Offensively, AbM have used the Freedom of Information Act, to gain details from the municipality of plans for settlements in which they are represented. In this way, they have forced the municipality to enter into the ‘information’ category on our taxonomy. Furthermore, by equipping themselves with such knowledge they are able to challenge or plan according to the council’s future plans. However, court cases are naturally antagonistic and can damage relations between AbM and the municipality or the province further (Municipal Official 1).

**Summary**
In summary, AbM have successfully “jumped scales” and created a transnational advocacy network, which used rights-based language and symbolic re-signification to claim the moral upper ground, and construct shack dwellers as citizens with legitimate concerns. Having created this new frame of reference, AbM’s street talk invented spaces for citizen involvement, ultimately though the mediation of the PPT. However, their tactics and their rights-based claims were considered “out of order” by many interviewees. Some objected to any citizen involvement outside representative structures; others insisted that “street talk” was unacceptable, although jumping scales *per se* was not. As noted above, this may not undermine AbM’s achievements. A far more intransigent problem for AbM are the resource barriers that they still face.

AbM has also been relatively successful at “jumping scale” through courts. However, these methods are not fiscally sustainably. If each perceived forced eviction has to be contested, AbM’s limited resources will be quickly drained. Unable to rely indefinitely on the *pro bono* support they have received thus far, AbM must search for more sustainable option outside the court. Nonetheless, as Huchzermeyer (2003) claims, courts have provided an opportunity to “fight for what they perceive as their democratic right to a home in the city”.

**Part Two: The Federation of the Urban Poor**
FedUp came from a history of fierce Toyi-Toying against the government. However, with the pull of a new democratic government and push factors such as the declining access to external funds (Hlangwe interview 2008 see Bond 2001 and Habib 1999 for the wider picture) it entered a “strategy of critical engagement” (Bolnick 1996) with government, becoming formally endorsed by Lindwe Sisulu, through the People’s Housing Process. Subsequently, FedUp have sacrificed protest tactics, for negotiations and agreements which they perceive to be more successful (Millstein 2003:466). In part, this willingness to engage stems from FedUp’s living social contract, which (unlike Abm’s) is relatively autonomous and therefore requires little from the state, reducing contact (and conflict) points (Millstein 2003; Baumann and Bolnick 2001; Swillings 2008). However, willingness to engage has also been determined by the way FedUp have “jumped scale”, allying with Shack Dwellers International\textsuperscript{44} (an organization supported by the World Bank), the UNCHS and Cities Alliance, organizations which tend towards neoliberal models of citizenship and favour state engagement (Bond 2006).

As highlighted in chapter four, FedUp’s self-help approach to housing could either be seen as exemplifying ‘neoliberal citizenship’ or practicing

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\textsuperscript{44} SDI originated in India in the mid 1980s and then spread to include South Africa, Latin America and later other Southern African states and South-East Asia. It was launched as Shack Dwellers International in 1996 and formally registered in 1999.
‘insurgent citizenship’ within neoliberal spaces. The latter would require them being willing to subvert state intentions.

Despite their engagement with the state, a FedUp interviewee refuted claims that the movement has been co-opted by the state or its own advocacy network, arguing that “table talk” with the municipality were far from comfortable:

_The meetings. You must tell the meetings are tense with us there...some people think its lovely dovey stuff there. No. very tense...In the face: We will not live with that small site but have agreed that we work together to get a site. But that small site will be not deliverable. You are not going to build for us, give us the money so that we can build out own house_ (FedUp member 1)

That said, he is clear that negotiations are the most effective means of leveraging government support because it gives groups the chance to bargain over what the state offers:

_You’re right there at the table and saying ‘no ways’. You do not give me [that size plot]. You ask him:
“How many children have you got?”
“I’ve got 5.”
“How big is your house?”
“Oh its 3 bedrooms with 2 garages and this and this.”_
“Why do you expect me with 8 children to live in such a floor that has been designed [by you]?”

So its right there on the table and you dela with the issue there, and upack it there and spit it out when its complete

(FedUp member 1)

This willingness to assert their right to build in the face of conflict with government suggests elements of the ‘insurgent citizenship’ approach: using personal contact to push a paradigm shift towards engagement where possible, but unambiguously defending ‘rights to the city’ and rights to decent housing if challenged.

Perhap’s FedUp TAN is an alliance of convenience. The personal contact they enjoy with authorities is only possible thanks to the Federation’s success in forming alliances both horizontally with shack dwellers in other nations and vertically with Shack Dwellers International, UN Habitat and the Cities Alliance:

They had links...[with] high profile people and through that they have managed to engage with the department of housing, national department of housing...yes they were vocal at local level but they also forged relationships at a very high level and that worked for them (PPT staff 1)

These partners have been able to frame shack dwellers as fiscally responsible and an efficient and effective resource. They also have more direct leverage power at national and local level (Bond 2006), and were able
to challenge the state’s perceived intransigence. The Cities Alliance, for example, was able to call conferences in KZN that drew together government ministers, FedUp, themselves and the Mayor. During the meeting, one interviewee claimed, Cities Alliance acted as an “international watchdog” questioning the unwillingness of the state to “talk to the poor” (FedUp member 1). In subsequent meetings, FedUp could (by proxy) utilize the leverage and accountability politics of this advocate:

*Because when you walk into the city and they say:*

“Where are you from?”

“Inanda [or] we come from Cato Crest”

“Get out from here”

When you walk in they must know that they are talking to people…who have capacity. When they scream there will be people who watch. So they get forced into talking even if they don’t want to. Forced into meeting

Despite such connections, the Federation has not managed to resolve their differences with councilors in many areas. One interviewee claimed that space was restricted as FedUp was “seen as a direct political threat to the local councilors” (housing practitioner 1). In Inanda, he claims, “it will probably require a change of councilor or a change of Federation leadership before that space became open to FedUp again”. In some instances, conflicts with councilors relate to issues of corruption (see chapter four), but elsewhere disputes are the legacy of earlier dynamics forged when FedUp was still a protest group. This posturing is proving hard to reform (Municipal
Despite having policy support through PHP, a powerful TAN, and an understanding with the Durban municipality, FedUp's power to secure space for citizen involvement is limited by micro-level power structures.

Aside from personnel change, resolutions do not seem forthcoming. Project managers complain that the municipality often fails to intervene in conflicts between councilors and local savings groups.

And...you go back to the municipality and the municipality says “no if the councillor does not want to support this programme, we can’t” (FedUp staff 1)

These are exacerbated by conflicts between FedUp’s plans and municipal IDPs:

At the high level at the level of the minister there is a directive that people’s housing process be implemented in partnership with the Federation. But at the practical level at the local level there are confrontations because officials will plan projects in...a particular way and Federation will have their own ideas. But at the level of policy and at the level of the directive from the national office we should be working with the Federation. They are a partner. And we just have to find the right mechanisms of working together. (Provincial official 2)
In other municipalities, with less capacity and fewer bureaucratic layers, FedUp has been able to surmount such problems more easily (Housing Practitioner 1). Their self-help schemes are welcomed by struggling municipalities (FedUp member 1). In eThekwini, however, they lack this leverage.

That said, not all the limitations FedUp face are external. Several housing practitioners highlight that the group limited by their own technical expertise, although this is increasing. Technical difficulties limit the project with which they can engage: whilst top structures can be constructed relatively easily, sewerage systems (like those attempted in Umlazi) are often less successful (Housing Practitioner 1; PPT staff 2; Provincial Official 2).

In summary, this case-study demonstrates that transnational advocacy networks need to be able to apply pressure at every area where there is a political blockage. Furthermore, models of citizenship need to be made acceptable to all political levels. Whilst FedUp has managed to boomerang back to the municipal level, they have not yet been able to fully break through micro-level political struggles, no matter how compatible their vision of citizenship may be with South Africa’s neo-liberal policies. Furthermore, the space to practice citizenship is not sufficient, FedUp must also have the technical capacity to realize their own ‘right to build’.

**Conclusion**
This chapter has explored the ways in which AbM and FedUP have sought to realise their living social contracts by overcoming the practical and political blockages noted in chapter four. In some senses, the conclusion is positive: AbM and FedUp have both managed to construct powerful TANs, which emphasise their rights and abilities as citizens to be involved in housing projects. Both have succeeded in reopening institutional space for their involvement (AbM at a municipal level and FedUp at a national policy level). However, there are limitations for both groups. At a municipal level, AbM’s methods of reopening spaces have not been politically endorsed nor have the practical obstacles that limited options for citizen involvement been overcome. Given that AbM’s success depends heavily on state co-operation and delivery, such obstacles could jeopardise their future success. In the case of FedUp, their route has been heavily endorsed at a national level, but the leverage of their TAN has not resolved micro-conflicts between councillors and FedUp leaders. Furthermore, whilst they experience more freedom from the state they are limited by their own technical expertise.
Chapter 7: The Janus-face of “boomeranging” and “jumping scales”

Yet if the city is in this sense an arena for Rousseauian self-creation of new citizens, it is also a war zone for this very reason: the dominant classes meet the advances of these new citizens with new strategies of segregation, privatisation, and fortification. (Holston 1998:52)

This final chapter critiques the idea that jumping scales and throwing boomerangs will expand spaces for citizen involvement. It highlights that transnational advocacy networks are not only utilised to open citizenship spaces, using the case study of the 2010 World Cup.

The World Cup boomerang

[The 2010 FIFA World Cup] will be in our ability to showcase South African and African hospitality and humanity - to change once and for all perceptions of our country and our continent among the peoples of the world (President Kgalema Motlanthe 2009)

One day you are going to... get up in the morning and find thousands of people squatting on your Kings Park Soccer Stadium (FedUp member 1)

Using the example of hosting the 2010 World Cup, this section demonstrate how transnational networks can shut down spaces for citizen involvement. eThekwini is keen to use its involvement in the World Cup as evidence of its
“world class” status. The transnational network of those organising this mega-event, however, place implicit and explicit pressure on host cities to “polish up” the area before the international guests arrive (business interview 1 2008). “Polishing up” the city has arguably pushed eThekwini towards “slums elimination”, closing opportunities for citizen involvement in informal settlement projects by speeding-up evictions and introducing the use of transit camps. Event-led development per se also encourages the municipality to follow pre-figured plans rather than demand-driven agendas.

The World Cup has been positioned as being for the sake of the poor (Corneliseen 2004), an argument contested by many I interviewed in informal settlements:

*We have taken Seb to all these areas to say look, look the passion people have for soccer in these areas...because of the love of their soccer they are ready to sacrifice their last cent to which they are used to buy bread [sic] to come along to the soccer...It is actually one sport that for 90 minutes take them out of their misery...so we had to bring that world cup to us.* (Provincial Official 1)

*Everything is done in our name. We are even told that the 2010 World Cup is for us when we can’t afford tickets and will even be lucky to watch it on television. The money for stadiums should go for houses and water and electricity and schools and clinics* (Hlongwa 2007)
Fifa’s guidelines constrict any benefits to poor communities further by insisting that stadiums be located in media-friendly, picturesque locations. Most officials have accepted the fact that informal settlements cannot all be upgraded by 2010 (PPT staff 2; Councillor 1; Municipal Official 2). However, many seem plagued by the idea that shacks are untidy, dangerous and unclean in their informality, and need to be tidied up or formalized (Cornelissen and Swart 2006):

*We want formalise the way people live and make sure that we don’t have new informal settlements because they are a danger to society and they are going to create the kind of society we don’t want.* (Provincial Official 1)

*In our brochures, we’ll normally put the ICC, Ushaka and our beaches, we’re hoping that people wont notice our big informal settlements, but they come to know about it and some of them want to come and see* (Councillor 1)

That said, those two interviewees insisted that shacks would not be ‘hidden’ or destroyed before 2010:

*We show them the reality of what apartheid did to South Africa. Every tourist. And its to show them what they should resist in their own country* (Provincial Official 1)

*It’s a reality anyway. We have it, its there. We don’t hide the fact.* (Councillor 1)
Such reassurances are countered by other officials, who claim they have been asked to relocate informal settlements *en route* to the stadiums. Given that there is now insufficient time to build houses for relocation, these residents will be moved into transit camps until their new houses are built:

*In Umlazi there is stadium that is being used as a training venue so some upgrading work is going to take place in Claremont and KwaMashu...[we have been asked that] en route to those stadiums and round those stadiums make sure that all the informal settlements get relocated. You make the surrounding beautiful...there is not much time to build houses for all those people we are going to put them in temporary shelter...personally I am still confused...People must see who we are this is a developing city. As long as we make sure that there is no crime...I guess as a city that's what they want.* (Provincial Official 2)

Supported by a network of national and international interests, opponents to the world cup like AbM and StreetNet have been unable resist all these proceses. Many interviewees felt they had regressed to ‘polluted others’ being rejected by the state. As one FedUp member argued, that the government would “put pretty clothing on all of these shacks” for the “beautiful coaches from Germany or Brazil or England” (FedUp member 1). Residents also express frustration that the money being channeled into the World Cup is narrowing resources and inflating building prices, further
limiting the practical options available to citizens looking to shape their informal settlement projects.

There is an impact because I see no need to waste such a big money on 30 days – the world cup is about 30 days, right?...whereas there are people who started living inside the cardboard for 20 years or 50 years...and after [they World Cup] they are going to tell you there is no budget for the poor houses. (AbM member 6, Kennedy Road)

Interestingly, the business men interviewed also critised 2010 as an economically wastefulness “ego project” for the city management, arguing that it would not improve economic performance but would spark “legitimate criticism from society in general and poor people specifically” (Business interview 2). Some businessmen feared this may be the beginning of a series of event-led development projects. One contended that the only benefits to an economy could be “enthusiasm and confidence” and believed the city “would be better off promoting sustainable development where the investment comes from outside developers” (Business interview 3). A position supported by literature on the subject (Matheson 2006)

Conclusion

This chapter first explored how jumping scales affects (and is affected by) tackled how transnational networks can be utilised to shut down spaces for citizen involvement. Spaces for citizenship were constricted both directly (by forcefully moving informal settlement residents) and indirectly (by
increasing building prices and therefore decreasing options for residents with a fixed capital subsidy). Furthermore, by framing the issue as “cleaning up” the city, informal settlement dwellers once again became “abstractions” (Lalloo 1998), robbed of their status as citizens or human beings.
Conclusion

To conclude this thesis, we come back to our two research questions:

**Question One: Why have clashes over citizen involvement occurred in eThekwini?**

The clash over citizen involvement in eThekwini’s informal settlement projects occurs in large part because no one vision of citizenship (and therefore of citizen involvement) has been established in post-apartheid South Africa. Fairly inevitably, the broad repertoire of contention prior to 1994 gave birth to multiple different ideas about citizenship (the contrast between the ANC’s focus on representative democracy and civic’s penchant for mass democracy being explored in Chapter 5). This thesis argues that the root of current conflict over citizen involvement stems from the failure of post-apartheid urban and housing policy to choose between these different conceptions of citizenship, and spell out a vision for citizen involvement in post-apartheid South Africa. Opting for a “consensus to coexist” policy is broad enough to contain innumerable (and often conflicting) living social contracts, each with their own vision of citizenship and citizen involvement. Thus, important debates and compromises that should occur at the national, policy-making level get deferred to the local implementation level.

However, due to the practical limitations of government (the capital subsidy system, weak civil service capacity and inadequate intra-government
cooperation) and the closure of political spaces (namely municipal political space, corporatist structures and invited spaces) not all groups have equal opportunity to realise their vision of citizen involvement. Acting in defence of its symbolical capital, the ANC marginalises and dismisses as “unreasonable” all challenges to the current liberal /neo-liberal status quo.

**Question Two: How have grass-roots groups sought to realise their visions of citizen involvement?**

Faced with such challenges, this thesis explored how AbM and FedUp sought to realise their vision of citizen involvement. Using Keck and Sikkink’s (1998;1999) boomerang model, and Smith’s (1993) notion of “jumping scales” it analysed how each group tried to build (local and transnational) advocacy networks, to prise open spaces for citizen involvement. Although they used different tactics and had differing visions of citizen involvement both had some success: FedUp at the national policy level and AbM at the municipal level. Despite this success, however, neither could secure the realisation of their vision of citizenship on the ground, due to micro-political struggles between themselves and ward councillors; ongoing practical limitations (of either the group or the municipality); or the political resistance of official and politicians to new forms of citizen involvement.

Such findings are important, because much literature on global linkages between grassroots groups and transnational or ‘global’ actors has been overly-optomistic or normative (for discussion see Delaney 2000; Held 2001;
Pithouse 2006). It is vital that advocacy networks are not seen as a panacea. Further deconstructing the process of throwing boomerangs and jumping scales, the final chapter explored how these tactics could be used to marginalize citizens and shut down spaces for citizen involvement.

Based on our findings, how can we suggest as a way forward? Perhaps the most tempting solution would be to return to the policy drawing board. But, as this thesis has highlighted, South Africa already has enough policy to pursue whatever future vision it chooses. We must be careful not simply to add to these sedimentary layers or to create to mechanisms which disturb (again) the way an already-confused civil service functions. Instead, I would suggest two ways forward. The first, is (unglamourously) to methodically clear the pathways of government, resolving issues with funding mechanisms; ensuring that department heads are recruited on technical merit and retained long enough to establish stable working practices; increase the capacity of government by recruiting more well-trained staff and up-skill those in post. In some cases, officials and politicians may share similar ideals for citizenship but lack the resources to realise their visions. In this case communication must improve so that all are aware of the limitations within which they are working. However, the local political structures have currently lost the trust necessary to make such communications. The process of earning back that trust will be slow and frustrating for both parties. There are no shortcuts. Furthermore, practical barriers must not be accepted or hidden but publicised and tackled. The second recommendation is far more amorphous: to re-open spaces for
dialogue in South Africa about the nature of citizenship and citizen involvement. In some cases, living social contracts will conflict and tough choices need to be made at national, provincial, and local level about the form and place of citizenship and citizen involvement. What is the role of the state? Should citizens have a role in delivery? If so, what are the parameters and purposes of this role? As this thesis demonstrates, closing formal political space will not make such debates disappear, it will simply transfer them to the streets and to the global stage, as a new wave of citizens stake their claim to shape the future of post-apartheid South Africa.
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