

23. Barot's *Guide pratique* (Paris, 1902), 329.
24. Bergner, "Who Is That Masked Woman?," 81.
25. *Nini* was written by a man, Abdoulaye Sadjji. Sadjji wrote frequently for *Présence Africaine*.
26. Robert Coiplet, "La négresse blanche (revue)," *Le Monde* (April 22, 1950): 7a.
27. Exile is a recurring theme in postcolonial and colonial writings. However, Capécia's pursuits of exile do not fit the traditional paradigms of the novel of exile. She longs to go to France in order to avoid a racial identity. But it is precisely in the metropole that the constructions of these racial identities were born. See M. Salvodon's discussion of exile in "Contested Crossings: Identities, Gender, and Exile in *Le baobab fou*," in *Spoils of War: Women of Color, Cultures, and Revolutions*, ed. Sharpley-Whiting and White (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997).
28. It is interesting to note that, in the autobiographical novel, Capécia eats the *r* like all the other black women and natives. There are even Creolisms sprinkled throughout the first part of the book. André does try to teach Capécia to roll her *r*'s, but her tongue, she tells the reader, just wouldn't cooperate. Again, the desire to flee the black body was exclusively premised upon white male love. In this novel, the escape route is multilayered.
29. Maran won the *Prix* in 1921 for his novel, *Batouala*. He also wrote *Le Coeur serré* (1931) and documentaries on Africa (*Le Tchad*, 1931). He was considered a forerunner of the négritude movement, and he hosted many Afro-Caribbean writers at his home in Paris.
30. René Maran, *Un homme pareil aux autres* (Paris: Arc-en-Ciel, 1947), 185. Andrade also assumes that Fanon's discussion of the ways that interracial sex between white women and black men is perceived by the colonized as a "giving rather than a seizing," as something "romantic," reflects Fanon's own perceptions; hence, he endows white women with an agency he denies black women. He was merely remarking on the way the "duped" Antillean thinks of the relationship, particularly Mayotte Capécia and Veneuse. She was astounded that any white woman would want a Martinican. Thus, her white grandmother had to have really loved her grandfather. And because of white men's consistent and not so often clandestine exploitation of black women, leaving in their wake thousands of mulattoes, etc., Capécia could cling to the notion that her mother was not "made in the bush." The fact of the matter is that, even today in the United States, most black-white interracial relationships are made up of white women and black men, a fact that may lead one to conclude that Capécia's observation that "a woman of color is not altogether respectable in a white man's eyes" has some validity. Studies have shown that African-American women are the least likely to marry outside of their race. Whether this is due to choice is debatable.
31. Lorde, *Sister Outsider*, 147.
32. In bell hooks, *Black Looks: Race and Representation* (Boston: South End Press, 1992), 80.

Chapter Three

Colonialism, Nationalism, and Fundamentalism: Liberating Algeria

I made up my mind to fight for my country's independence. . . . Why? . . . Because our cause is just. Because, come what may, we shall achieve it.

—Djamila Boupacha, in Simone de Beauvoir's and Gisele Halimi's *Djamila Boupacha*

The Angel and the Man work for unity; Satan and the Woman for division.

—Algerian proverb

Algeria! . . . "When your son has grown up, treat him like your brother," says an Arab proverb; it was certainly painful, but the son had become a man, our equal, our brother. That was what one had to understand.

—Jacques Soustelle, Governor-General of Algeria, 1955–1956

The unveiled Algerian woman, who assumed an increasingly important place in revolutionary action . . . discovered the exalting realm of responsibility.

—Frantz Fanon, *A Dying Colonialism*

The Algerian revolutionary war for independence is oftentimes referred to by historians of Franco-Algerian history as "The War without a Name," one that had no major battles (except the Battle of Algiers), major frontiers, or borders. The war began November 1, 1954, on All Saints' Day, a Catholic holiday ritually

observed by the Algerian European minority or *pied-noirs*. The war ended in June 1962 with the establishment of a newly independent Algerian nation under the presidency of Ahmed Ben Bella, an original member of the *neuf historiqnes*, the visionary architects of the revolution. The eight-year bloody engagement in Algeria exacerbated the already tenuous political stability in France. Still suffering from the humiliating German occupation during World War II and the final loss of Indochina at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954, France returned to its *mission civilisatrice* in its remaining colonies, determined to save face as a European World Power. The Algerian war, however, equally proved financially, politically, morally, and mortally ruinous to France, leading to the dissolution of the Fourth Republic.¹

Prior to All Saints' Day 1954, Algerian Muslim discontent had been brewing and finally culminated in organized riots in Sétif on May 8, 1945, V.E. Day in Europe. The French response was fierce and extreme. The death toll for Europeans was in the hundreds, while the range for Algerians was between 15,000 and 45,000. Besides the economic deprivation associated with colonialism, other specific sociohistorical and political factors led up to the violent confrontation in Sétif. In 1871, the French had enacted the Crémieux Decree, which extended French citizenship to Jewish settlers without their having to renounce their religion.² The Arabs and Berbers were not extended this privilege. In addition, the European *colons* began a process of expropriation of Arab lands under the legal protection of the Warnier Law of 1873; the proposed 1918 Algerian Charter, extending French citizenship to Algerian Muslims who served in the French military during World War I, was rejected by the French National Assembly; and in 1936, the Blum-Violette Bill, whose aim was to grant French citizenship to Muslims, was again rejected by the National Assembly.³

In the aftermath of the riots and repression at Sétif, the French government attempted again, albeit feebly, to reform the Algerian condition and pacify Muslim resistance by revisiting issues such as citizenship, political representation, the separation of church and state, recognition of Arabic as an official language, and enfranchisement of Muslim women. These reforms were unanimously rejected by the *pieds-noirs*, demonstrating to the Muslim Algerians that they were unworthy of French citizenship and by extension not covered by the principles of *liberté, égalité,*

and *fraternité* embodied in the 1789 French *Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen*.⁴

It would take the Algerian liberation movement nine years to reassemble and attempt a bolder confrontation with the *colons* and the French *métropole*. During this phase of regrouping, splinter nationalist groups arose, consisting of the less religiously orthodox Kabyles (Berbers) and Arabs.⁵ By April 1954, the Comité Révolutionnaire d'Unité et d'Action (CRUA—Revolutionary Unity and Action Committee) was formed. The organization appointed nine leaders, three Kabyles and six Arabs, who would also be known as the *neuf historiqnes*. On October 10, 1954, CRUA created the revolutionary Front de Libération Nationale, the FLN.

The FLN's mission was "National independence through restoration of the Algerian state, sovereign, democratic, and social within the framework of the principles of Islam; preservation of all fundamental freedoms, without distinction of race or religion," with the means of struggle "by every means until the realization of our goal."⁶ Yet, the FLN proposed a compromise, "an honorable platform for discussion with the French authorities," as a way to "limit bloodshed."⁷ The revolutionary proclamation offered the following in exchange for restoration of the Algerian state:

French cultural and economic interests will be respected, as well as persons and families; all French citizens desiring to remain in Algeria will be allowed to as foreigners, or for Algerian nationality, in which case they will be considered as Algerians both in rights and duties; the ties between France and Algeria will be defined by agreement between the two powers, on a basis of equality and mutual respect!⁸

The ambitious terms of negotiation were based on mutual recognition, equality, and respect. However, the irrational colonialist mind-set of the French and privileged feelings of entrenchment experienced by the *pieds-noirs* led them to resist all negotiations—in fact, any intimation of the possibility of an autonomous Algerian nation-state. Algeria *belonged* to France; it was unquestionably French. On November 12, 1954, Prime Minister Pierre Mendès-France delivered a speech to the National Assembly, adamantly refusing compromise or secession of Algeria. Algeria, declared Mendès-France, "c'est la France!"⁹ The FLN, in

turn, adopted the principles of "no compromise" and revolutionary violence.

As an integral political strategist and ideologue for the FLN, Frantz Fanon edited *El Moudjahid*, the FLN's journalistic organ, and wrote *A Dying Colonialism*. It is the latter treatise that is of interest here: on the one hand, because of its Algerian specificity, and on the other, because it is in two essays of this political work, "Algeria Unveiled" and "The Algerian Family," that Frantz Fanon can be situated among the twentieth century's most progressive male modernist thinkers on the interlocking nexus of ethnicity, gender, and sexuality. In his analysis of the dialectical relationship between the colonized and the colonizer, the Algerian woman becomes a centrifugal force. She was the axis upon and around which the colonizing mission and anticolonial resistance often spun. "This war," Fanon wrote in July 1959, "has mobilized the whole population, has driven them to draw upon their entire resources and their most hidden resources" (*A Dying Colonialism*, p. 23). The veiled and cloistered Algerian woman could certainly be counted among those resources most hidden.

Before undertaking an examination of the profeminist dimensions in "Algeria Unveiled" and "The Algerian Family," let us first take up some feminist readings of Fanon's positions on women's liberation during the Algerian liberation struggle as well as analyses of the regressive status of women since national independence. Among Fanon's critics on the subject is Marie-Aimée Helie-Lucas, an Algerian feminist and founding member of the Network of Women Living Under Muslim Laws, which assists Muslim women living under oppressive Islamic laws.¹⁰ As feminist philosopher Linda Bell rightly suggests, we cannot simply accept and dismiss Helie-Lucas's challenge to Fanon's sociological and historiographical study as just another point of view.¹¹ Bell continues, "Male assumptions of objectivity have been a camouflage covering male dominance and hiding the way male interests and desires are imposed on females."¹² What are those hidden interests and desires proposed in general by Bell, yet clearly at issue in Helie-Lucas's reading of Fanon?

Featured in the anthology *Opening the Gates: A Century of Arab Feminist Writings*, Helie-Lucas's essay, "Women, Nationalism, and Religion in the Algerian Liberation Struggle,"¹³ argues that Fanon's books have shaped mythologies surrounding Algerian women as freedom fighters equal to their male counterparts:

The image that the outside world has formed of women in the Algerian liberation struggle is shaped by Frantz Fanon's books, a very widely distributed film called *The Battle of Algiers* and the true story of a few national heroines. From these sources, the Algerian woman appears as a freedom fighter who carried arms against French colonialism and its army, a "terrorist" who planted bombs in the city during the Battle of Algiers, who was equal to men in the struggle and who shared decision-making both at the political and at the military levels. (p. 105)

Helie-Lucas's criticism is multilayered. Using freedom fighter Djamilia Amranes's *La Femme Algérienne et la Guerre de Libération Nationale* (1954-62) to support her discussion of inequities and Fanon's "mythmaking," she emphasizes several elements: the ways that gender hierarchies persisted in the percentage of tasks parceled out to women along traditional gender roles during the liberation struggle; the erasure of women's contributions in the archival records, i.e., in the registry of the Veteran's Ministry, the relegation of women and their performed tasks to that of "helpers" of men "fighting for the cause" rather than freedom fighters; and the continued subordination of women in the post-colony.

While the revolutionary phase of the war occasioned transformations in sexual relations and women's status, under the "new" Algerian government that transformative component dissipated. It stopped short in revolutionizing the patriarchal nature of Algerian society, its institutions and customs, and in dismantling the discriminatory practices meted out against women in the public spheres of employment and education and within the family. Shortly after national independence was gained, women were for the most part shuttled back into the kitchen under the secular, nationalist military government of the FLN. In 1984, under President Chadli, the most repressive blow was dealt to women with the passage of the *Code de la Famille*. Working hand in glove with the *Sharia*, the code, with its 224 articles and explicit claim to a return to tradition, sanctions polygamy, mandates women's subservience to their husbands, and allows a husband to repudiate his wife at will. And since 1989, with the decline in popularity of the FLN—due to its failed economic programs, its repressive Western-backed military junta, and the rising appeal of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)—Algerian women have been forcibly enveloped in the *haïk* (veil).

"So much," Helie-Lucas writes, "for Fanon's and others' myth of the Algerian woman liberated along with her country" (p. 107).

Women's liberation and nationalism, whether in the form of the FLN's patriarchal secular nationalism in Algeria, or conservative and fundamentalist nationalism, appear to be irreconcilable. Many Arab feminists point to nationalism as one of the primary oppressive factors impacting women's daily lives and consequently sound the call for a postnationalist feminism. The crux of the nationalism/women's liberation polemic is rooted in the fact that traditional gender relations and the regulation of gender are critical to conservative and fundamentalist nationalist ideology in Algeria and other Islamist countries. Even the secular nationalism of the FLN has, as Mai Chousoub relates, "reclaimed many of the most patriarchal values of Islamic traditionalism as integral to Arab cultural identity."¹⁴ Indeed, the language used to articulate Algerian national identity and culture was and continues to be highly feminized. The land, "nation-state," culture, and the woman are merged, conflated. Culture and identity are imagined as uniquely transmitted through women. The Algerian woman becomes the symbolic repository for group identity.¹⁵ Hence, in order to protect and preserve the nation and the family, which is the foundation of patriarchal culture, the woman must be sheltered from the immorality and corruptions of modernity and, as in the prescriptions of conservatives and fundamentalists, the West. The land, like the female body, must be policed, protected from rape, Western feminisms, and other intrusions. Algerian nationalist discourse and ideology lock women into "tradition" and thereby deprive them of the citizenship rights enjoyed by their male compatriots.¹⁶ The discourse becomes, according to Helie-Lucas, recycled, reinvented, and reinterpreted ad infinitum to suit the needs of the nation-state in its various evolutionary and developmental phases. The more threatened the Algerian nation-state, the more conservative or traditionalist, even rising to the level of fundamentalist, the nationalist discourse and its systemic mechanisms become. Women are at once the custodians of national identity and culture and the wards of the nation-state, central to the preservation of the state and relegated to the margins of the body politic.

Helie-Lucas notes:

Since there was "no humble task in the revolution" we did not dispute the roles we had. . . . The overall task of women during liberation is seen as symbolic. Faced with colonisation the people have to build a national identity based on their own values, traditions, religion, language and culture. Women bear the heavy burden of safeguarding this threatened identity. And this burden exacts its price. . . . Women are supposed to raise sons in the faith and traditional moral standards and to teach the language of the forefathers. Women should be bound by tradition, while men had some access to modernity. (pp. 107-108)

Confronted with the potential destruction of their local culture and customs by the French colonial and imperialist project, Algeria turned virulently inward with particularly regressive gendered ramifications. This turning inward has been reproduced in our postmodern times, a "kind of 'siege mentality' in which stripping Arab women of their rights has become well justified and condoned as a protective act."¹⁷

As educators, nurses, nurturers, mothers, liaison agents, veiled and unveiled freedom fighters, women's roles during the revolution were refashioned and molded in the simultaneous service of the "higher" goals of the struggle—national liberation—and within a narrow, antifeminist political discourse. As Egyptian feminist Nawal el-Saadawi insists, women were "used by the revolution as tools, as cheap labor, cheap fighters—to die first and be liberated last!"¹⁸

The working plans for Algerian liberation did not particularly identify women's emancipation as one of its aims. Many Middle Eastern feminist thinkers, activists, and writers such as Helie-Lucas, Mervat Hatem, Deniz Kandiyoti, Evelyne Accad, Nayereh Tohidi, and Nawal el-Saadawi maintain that women assumed national liberation meant the destruction of oppressive forces from without and within Algerian society: that it was, in effect, inclusive of women's liberation from Algerian patriarchal oppressions. Women's liberationist dimensions were manifested through women's collective participation in national struggle. Their feminism "was not however, autonomous, but bound to the signifying network of the national context which produced it."¹⁹ The feminism of Third World and other women of color was and is importantly tied to anti-imperialist, antiracist, anticolonialist, and anticapitalist struggles.²⁰ However, as Iranian feminist Nayereh Tohidi writes in hindsight, women must demand that their

liberation, their needs, and their specific oppressions be clearly addressed and incorporated into nationalist liberation movements from the outset.²¹ Since those measures were not proactively taken, Algerian women's various innovative strategies of resistance during the national liberation struggle were turned against them, appropriated by the postcolonial nationalist Algerian nation-state and used to police feminine conduct and conformity.

The veil is emblematic of such usurpation of Algerian women's methods of resistance; during the revolution and since the massive 1990 victory of the FIS in the legislative body of Algerian governance,²² it has been used as a means of turning back the clock on the socially transformative potential the revolution offered. Helie-Lucas explores the uses and abuses of Algerian women with respect to the veil:

Although there is no doubt that veiling women is a measure for control and oppression, it became for a time a symbol of national resistance to the French. During the war, French officials had insisted that Algerian women should be freed from the oppression of the veil. French army trucks had transported village women to urban areas. There the women were forced to unveil publicly thereby proving their renunciation of outworn traditions. Both Algerian men and women resented this symbolic rape. In addition to its symbolic role, the veil was supposed to have a practical function. Fanon praised the revolutionary virtue of the veil—it allowed urban women freedom fighters to escape the controls of the French army. . . . How, therefore, could we take up the issue of the veil as oppressive to women without betraying both *nation* and *revolution*? . . . The FLN (the National Liberation Front) encouraged such an attitude that emphasized women's modesty and could also be labelled "fighting for the Cause." (p. 108)

The complexity involved in the Algerian woman's decision to wear the *haïk* is indisputable. Islamist traditions demanded a rigid separation of the sexes, and the veil served this purpose in traditionalist Algeria. Even though the Koran (24:30–31) demanded modesty from both sexes, the veil came to be identified exclusively as a mandate for women and signified modesty and adherence to the traditions of Islam. The veil was rarely worn by practicing Muslim Algerian women in the rural areas where a great deal of the fighting took place. And Kabyle women nev-

er donned the *haïk*. Prior to 1957, the veil had been abandoned by the women in the city. Notwithstanding this virtual abandonment, there were women who continued to wear the veil. The public unveiling of Algerian women to the battle hymn "*Vive l'Algérie française!*" prompted Algerian women again to don the veil. Even women who had long stopped wearing the veil once again enveloped themselves in the *haïk*.²³ Yet one cannot overlook the coercive element manifested in this "voluntary" decision. As Helie-Lucas reasons, "How could women resist wearing the *haïk* without betraying both nation and revolution?"

Further, as Mervat Hatem suggests, "Besides frustrating colonial designs, it was not clear what concrete benefits women derived from being defenders of tradition."²⁴ But as demonstrated by the French campaign of unveiling, not all women were struggling to be rid of the veil at that historic moment. And in parts of the contemporary Muslim world, there are still a great many women who voluntarily don the veil.

The appeal of conservatism and fundamentalism today and their mandates to veil women and return them to their place are as much structured around attempts to regulate women's bodies as they are symptomatic of postcolonial economic, political, and social disarray; structural maladjustments aggravated by Western imperialist powers and the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the modernization of the family; disillusionment and the failure of socialism; and rising youth unemployment. In Algeria specifically, there were riots in October 1988 as a result of this postcolonial disarray. Algeria's economy is literally fueled by a dependence on its petrochemical exports. In the 1980s, the plummeting global price of oil seriously diminished its national revenues.²⁵ The veil, as perceived by fundamentalist and conservative Islamist groups, symbolizes adherence to traditional values; it comforts and appeals to those weary and fearful of the rigors of modernity and female sexuality; and it signals a return to tradition as a cure to postmodern *malaise*.²⁶

In her book *Both Right and Left Handed: Arab Women Talk About Their Lives*, Syrian feminist Bouthaina Shabaan chronicles stories of women whose decision to wear the *hijab* provides them access to certain public spaces and authority denied secular women.²⁷ Turkish feminist Deniz Kandiyoti observes that there is a "patriarchal bargain" between women like Egyptians Zainab al-Ghazali and Safinaz Kazim and the men who endeavor to return women

and men to their "rightful" places. And this bartering has helped to maintain social, economic, and political structures that at the very least strengthen male hegemony.²⁸

And so it would appear inevitable that Frantz Fanon, with his discussion of the revolutionary uses of the veil in *A Dying Colonialism*, would run into conflicts with contemporary Algerian feminists. Helie-Lucas has, however, simplified Fanon's analysis of the veil, Algerian women's liberation, and the family during the Algerian liberation struggle.

As the war for independence progressed, the means of combat strategy mutated. When Algerian women unveiled themselves, acting as *assimilées*, Fanon praised the "revolutionary virtue" of this strategy. Indeed, as the epigraph from Fanon attests, it was the "unveiled Algerian woman" who assumed an increasing importance in revolutionary action. But more than this, Fanon saw that the veil, like the radio described in "This Is the Voice of Algeria," was no longer a static cultural symbol; it too could be transformed, modified under revolutionary circumstances. During the doffing and donning commanded by the revolution, the veil ceased to function as an inert traditional symbol. When the French discovered this ruse and began publicly and forcibly unveiling women in the streets (symbolically raping the women, both Fanon and Helie-Lucas concur), the Algerians' methods of combat again mutated and, in effect, regressed. Fanon writes at length on the subject:

Removed and reassumed again and again, the veil has been manipulated, transformed into a technique of camouflage, into a means of struggle. The virtual taboo character assumed by the veil in the colonial situation disappeared almost entirely during the course of the liberating struggle. Even Algerian women not actively integrated into the struggle formed the habit of abandoning the veil. It is true that under certain conditions, especially from 1957 on, the veil reappeared. . . . The adversary now knew. . . . French colonialism, on the occasion of May 13th, reenacted its old campaign of Westernizing the Algerian woman. . . . Before this new offensive old reactions reappeared. . . .

Algerian women who had long since dropped the veil once again donned the *haik*, thus affirming that it was not true that the woman liberated herself at the invitation of France and General de Gaulle.

Behind these psychological reactions, beneath this immediate and almost unanimous response, we again see the overall atti-

tude of rejection of the values of the occupier, even if these *zulfes* be *objectively* worth choosing [my emphasis]. . . .

In organizing the famous calvacade of May 13th, colonialism obliged Algerian society to go back to methods of struggle already outmoded. In a certain sense, the different ceremonies have caused a turning back, a regression.²⁹

Fanon notes that this particular value of the occupier, the removal of the veil, may be worth choosing, but that the occupier's drive to save, to convert violently, the savages "in spite of themselves" forced the redoming of the veil (p. 63). The fact that the French focused a significant amount of their energies on the veil and the Algerian woman as the last vestige of resistance served merely to "strengthen the traditional patterns of behavior" (p. 49).

Given Fanon's views on human freedom, it is interesting to find analyses of his work on Algerian women and the veil as constituting a denial of female oppression by Algerian men, a pro-male cultural supremacist bias, and a camouflage for male desires and interests. But what is particularly unsettling is Helie-Lucas's assertion that Fanon maintains that the "Algerian woman was liberated along with her country." Fanon identifies women's liberation with national liberation (p. 107). Indeed, he spoke of the transformation of value systems and sexual and familial relations that silenced and rendered woman the complement of man (p. 109). The Algerian woman "developed her personality and discovered the exalting realm of responsibility" (p. 107). This realm did not make her the symbolic repository for group identity, nor did she become the body through which language and customs are passed; she assumed an individual responsibility for herself and her actions denied by traditional Islamist laws, yet challenged, overturned, during the course of revolutionary struggle. At that moment in Algerian history, Fanon saw many Algerian women liberated from time-honored traditions of silence, invisibility, and sequestration.

That the veil is being used in contemporary Algeria and other Muslim countries as a tool of repression and justification for the murder of women³⁰ by the outlawed FIS and other fundamentalist and traditionalist factions—that the "threat" of the Occident and modernity is consistently recalled in order to circumscribe women's behavior and deny their access to the true fruits of citizenship described by el-Saadawi, Helie-Lucas,

Mernissi, et al.—represents one of the many "Pitfalls" or "Misadventures of National Consciousness":

History teaches us clearly that the battle against colonialism does not run straight away along the lines of nationalism. . . . It so happens that the unpreparedness of the educated classes, the lack of practical links between them and the mass of the people, their laziness, and let it be said, their cowardice at the decisive moment of the struggle will give rise to tragic mishaps. National consciousness, instead of being the all-embracing crystallization of the innermost hopes of the whole people, instead of being the immediate and most obvious result of the mobilization of the people, will be in any case only an empty shell. . . . A government that calls itself a national government ought to take responsibility for the totality of the nation . . . it must guard against the danger of perpetuating the feudal tradition which holds sacred the masculine element over the feminine. Women will have exactly the same place as men, not in the clauses of the constitution but in the life of every day: in the factory, at school, and in the parliament. (pp. 148, 201–202)

The innermost hopes of the whole people have not been embraced in Algeria. Women's particular interest, their liberation, was subjugated to the "common good" of the nation, embodied in the particular interest of Algerian patriarchy. Helie-Lucas reveals that nationalism, religion, and socialism helped to elaborate and legislate antiwomen state policies.³¹ Embroiled on the one hand in Algeria's anti-imperialist stances and, on the other, in a patriarchal social structure and fabric, Algerian women continue to bear the brunt of politically conservative social and ideological maneuvers.

Fanon, who died before seeing the evolution of the independent Algeria, witnessed a transformation in the Algerian family and the status of Algerian women during the war. As feminists write in hindsight concerning the shortcomings of the architecture of the Algerian liberation struggle, it is clear that Fanon was at worst optimistic ("Mankind, I believe in you," *Black Skin, White Masks*, p. 7) in assuming that the progressive changes, however minute, in many areas (sexual relations, the transformation of the veil from a static to a nonstatic element, the temporary change in traditional marriage laws for women in the maquis, women's establishing a new dialectic with their body and the world), and, in sum, that the path toward the liberation of

Algerian women opened by the women's organized and collective participation in the revolution would continue to evolve, be embraced by all, and form the basis of the new Algeria.

In contemporary Algeria, the rise of fundamentalism, reactionary antiwoman policies and family codes in keeping with the *Sharia*, which condones stoning (women) for adultery, is undeniably narrowly tied to those transformations. Those transformations, occurring at the moment women entered into the fighting phase of the revolution, spurred the century's long legacy of Algerian women's activism into a collective feminist consciousness and provided the momentum to continue the organized fight for contemporary Algerian women's liberation.³²

In light of Helie-Lucas's important criticisms of Fanon on the question of gender, the veil, and oppression, we now turn our concern to the question of Fanon's commitment to women's liberation as discussed within the very pages that Helie-Lucas challenges. We will ask, in effect: Does Fanon's analysis of Algerian women, the veil, and the family represent a profeminist consciousness, that is, a belief in "woman's right to life as a free woman and as a complete social being"? Or does it merely camouflage male interests and reinscribe conventional gender roles?³³

FANON'S "ALGERIA UNVEILED"

"Algeria Unveiled" goes a long way in explaining the intricacies and developments of the Franco-Algerian war. Not only does Fanon offer insights into the insurrectional role of the women, but he exposes the fundamental flaws of Western liberal strategies from the 1930s onwards to unveil the Algerian woman and thereby colonize and unveil Algeria—the nation—to remove Islamic darkness and savagery and replace it with the light of Western ideas and idealism. From a quasi-sociological point of departure, Fanon attempts to explain the "hows" and "whys," the evolution, of the Algerian woman's integral role in the liberation struggle.

In France's application of liberal democratic ideals, which border on paternalism fueled by cultural imperialism, racism, and economics, the *haïk* would come to be perceived as an interference in the Algerian woman's individuality by the French. And while Fanon recognized and clearly advocated Algerian women's right to exist as free and autonomous beings, he equal-

ly realized that Algerians, men and women alike, had to come to this realization on their own terms; that the occupier, in attempting to violently and clandestinely prevent the Algerian man from interfering with the Algerian woman's cultivation of her subjectivity, equally violated the liberal principles of noninterference; and finally, that those terms would be realized through their collective participation in revolutionary struggle which inevitably transforms the lives and histories of individuals, communities, and countries.

In effect, group culture and tradition are generally signified by dress. And, in the Arab world, the veil worn by women suffices generally to characterize Arab society to the foreigner (p. 35). While a culture or society may be essentially patriarchal and patrilineal in structure and in its doling out and denying of equitable gender roles, the essence of the culture and land (whether it be in the United States and its citizens or France and its colonies) assumes peculiarly feminized dimensions. While feminized language was and is deployed by Algerian nationalist rhetoricians, this same language and thought pattern was assumed by the French in 1954. Algeria was envisioned as having a "feminine" cultural essence. To secularize, to unveil the women, would mean to secularize Algeria proper. Hence, as much as the veil represented cultural symbology, it equally reflected for the French occupier the status of Algerian women—repressed, hidden, and cloistered by an omnipresent and oppressive Arab patriarchy. Following the principles of a skewed Millsian liberalism,³⁴ the French sought simultaneously to liberate the Algerian woman from the veil and destroy the structure of Algerian society. In doing right by Algerian women, the French would be doing right for themselves. The formula of "Let's win over the women and the rest will follow," based on research from Western sociological pundits, became colonial policy (p. 37).

Liberating the women, unveiling the women, would also represent a disrobing of the Algerian man, a usurping of his power over the women and, thus, Algeria. It was hoped that the unveiled women would, like tilled, fertile soil, facilitate the sowing of Western colonial seeds throughout Algeria: "Converting the woman, winning her over to the foreign values, wrenching her free from her status, was at the same time achieving a real power over the man and attaining a practical, effective means of deconstructing Algerian culture" (p. 39).

In French efforts to save the women from the brutish Algerian men, a multitude of strategies were deployed, most notably one involving French women, advocates of women's liberation through colonialization:

Mutual aid societies and societies to promote solidarity with Algerian women sprang up in great number . . . in the course of which droves of social workers and women directing charitable works descended on the Arab quarters. The indigent and famished women were the first to be besieged. Every kilo of semolina distributed was accompanied by a dose of indignation against the veil and cloister. The indignation was followed up by practical advice. Algerian women were invited to play "a functional, capital role" in the transformation of their lot. They were pressed to say no to a centuries-old subjection. (p. 38)

Notwithstanding the fact that Algerian men were equally indigent and famished, Algerian patriarchy and its "arcane" and "archaic" cultural traditions of cloister and the veil were posited as the primary cause of the women's wretched existence. Colonialism, on the other hand, as espoused by the French missionary women, with its explicit political doctrine bent on cultural destruction and exploitation, was transformed into a liberatory women's movement.

Fanon reveals the hypocrisy of these "colonialist" feminists; he points to the reality of the unequal distribution of *intragender* power as well as the complicity and benefits derived from the expropriation of resources, raw materials, and labor to colonialist women at the mere cost of Algerian cultural identity.

The case of Suzanne Massu, a colonialist feminist and wife of General Jacques Massu, an agent of the French military who ordered and defended the torture of thousands of Muslim Algerians and participated in the Battle of Algiers, is worth mentioning here as an illustrative example. In 1958, Suzanne Massu established Le Mouvement de Solidarité Féminine. The movement purported to "be an action of deeply humane and fraternal social order . . . for friendship between the women of the two communities."³⁵ It was not an attempt to "provoke any kind of revolutionary change from tradition."³⁶ Suzanne and Jacques Massu even adopted two Muslim children, a boy and a girl, "as a symbol of the integration [they] were planning."³⁷ The largesse of these two colonialists was duly repaid, for the girl, Malika,

delivered a speech that can only be characterized as colonialist's propaganda to a crowd of 30,000 of her Muslim Algerian brethren, saying explicitly: "I wish with all my heart that Algeria remain French."³⁸

And as much as the donning of the veil and cloister are decried as antiwoman, Fanon relates that the rending of the veil has particularly sexualizing, indeed violently sexual, antiwoman implications for Algerian women in the male colonialist imagination. Replete with metaphors of flesh laid bare and rape, Fanon taps into the European male unconscious with a psychiatric evaluation of stereotypes and dream content. What he unveils is the hypocrisy of the male colonizer's desire to unveil/liberate the woman only to imprison her in stereotypes that render her violable, more ripe for rape:

The rape of the Algerian woman in the dream of a European is always preceded by a rending of the veil. We here witness a double deflowering. . . . The European's aggressiveness will express itself likewise in contemplation of the Algerian woman's morality. Her timidity and her reserve are transformed. . . . The Algerian woman becomes hypocritical, perverse, and even a veritable nymphomaniac. (p. 46)

For as much as the Algerian woman is described as the "de-monetized" object of the Algerian man, she is instantaneously objectified, degraded, in the European male psyche at the moment of her unveiling, her liberation, her entering into "subjectivity."

The occupier wrongheadedly assumed that the Algerian woman exercised absolutely no will; she was envisioned as "inert," "a dehumanized object," a puppet whose strings were pulled by Algerian male puppeteers (p. 36). They equally erroneously estimated that she had no identity, and certainly not one rooted in any aspect of Algerian customs and traditions.

In the course of the intensified struggle over the women and the veil, the colonized reacted violently: "To the colonialist offensive against the veil, the colonized opposes the cult of the veil" (p. 47). As the war progressed to Clausewitzian total war, the Algerians drew upon their entire arsenal, inclusive of the women. And it is at this moment that Algeria entered into veritable revolutionary warfare.

Body Politics: Revolutionary Women, Revolutionary War

Fanon's discussion of the Algerian woman thus far entails his recounting of the factors and events that led to her participation in aspects of the liberation struggle that would require her to step outside the binding ties of traditions and create a woman-outside-of-herself. She was always involved in the war as a nurse, typist, seamstress—in various traditional gender roles—via the occupier's use of her as a symbol of oppression, as well as the Frenchman's real and imaginative raping of the woman. Yet different forms of combat were introduced in 1955 as a result of the occupier's relentlessness in making the women so visible and integral to their colonial enterprise.³⁹ The decision to involve women was wholly, as Fanon acknowledges, entrusted to the males.⁴⁰ The male's *extending* of the privilege to women to join the struggle for Algerian independence does not mitigate the fact that women agitated and volunteered to participate. The first women revolutionaries were married women whose husbands were militants; later, divorced and widowed women and then young unmarried women joined the ranks. With the swelling of the numbers of women volunteers from various age categories and marital statuses, the roles of the women multiplied, ranging from nurses to mountain guides to liaison agents responsible for carrying money, messages, fuel, arms, identity cards, or medicine. Fanon writes that a "moral obligation and a strength of character that were altogether exceptional would therefore be required of the women" (p. 48). Unlike the Algerian male freedom fighter, rape and death were certain for the captured Algerian woman revolutionary. Revolutionary warfare and violence are tragic; lives are lost, but freedom is gained. For Fanon, there is continuity between the woman and the revolutionary. She rises directly to the level of tragedy, as her death is certain (pp. 49–50).

There were no training camps, extensive preparation, or characters from novels or plays to emulate for Algerian women. When either pared down (to appear as an assimilated Algerian) or swelled (carrying various essentials under the *haik*), the Algerian woman had to appear at ease in the European streets. Yet, for the woman who has never wandered the streets alone and without her veil for fear of punishment, ostracism, and public,

familial, and personal humiliation, the experience is at once daunting and liberatory. She had to appear confident with easy strides, overcoming all timidity and awkwardness. She had to relearn her body, invent new dimensions and muscular control (p. 59). Hips freed, legs bared, the body, unleashed from the "disciplining," "tempering," "isolating" *haïk*, was naturally in conflict with itself (p. 59). After years of sequestration and draping in the layers of the veil, she was in the most profound sense bare, naked. In reinventing her corporeal pattern for the revolutionary struggle, she re-familiarizes herself with her own bodily schema, creates a completeness by reestablishing her body in a new and "totally revolutionary fashion" (p. 59). There is, Fanon writes, a "new dialectic of the body of the revolutionary Algerian woman and the world" (p. 59). Abandoned for the revolutionary cause, the veil would again be taken up in the course of struggle. Algeria's willingness to change and accept new ways of fighting colonialism created a space where the Algerian woman could and did change. She was and could no longer be characterized as an "inert object," but as a woman of action. This liberatory path, now opened, could lead to the creation of a new woman.

FANON'S "THE ALGERIAN FAMILY"

Fanon opens his analyses of the Algerian family with references again to the centrality of the Algerian woman. Her transformation "could not have occurred without having profound repercussions" on the Algerian family (p. 59). The war for national liberation has had significantly positive consequences for Algerian women, feeding their collective and organized political consciousness and radicalism; it equally challenged the concept of the nuclear "patriarchal" family with the killing of fathers and brothers and through the participation of women as revolutionary actors and agents of freedom.

However, for Fanon, traditional ideas and modes of behavior are ineffective and counterrevolutionary and must be abandoned during revolutionary warfare. And as contemporary events in the aftermath of national independence continue to unfold, regressive traditions prove equally confining in the face of postmodernity and feminist consciousness.

Fanon divides the essay on the Algerian family into several sections, addressing various familial relations and traditional rules governing those relations. In each section—The Son and Father; The Couple; The Daughter and Father; The Brothers; Feminine Society; Marriage and Divorce—he outlines the transformations in and of relationships occasioned by the revolution and explores the futility of adhering to and enforcing centuries-old traditions during and even after the struggle, specifically in the case of the young Algerian woman.

In the section "The Daughter and Father," the revolutionary theorist provides insight into the structure of the traditional father-daughter relationship and girls'/women's place in prerevolutionary Algerian society. "In the Algerian family," he observes, "the girl is always one notch behind the boy." He continues:

The male . . . enjoys an almost lordly status. The birth of the boy is greeted with greater enthusiasm than that of the girl. . . . The girl has no opportunity, all things considered, to develop her personality or to take any initiative (pp. 105–106).

Clearly aware of the hierarchical nature of gender relations, Fanon reveals how women are marginalized in the household and treated as "minors." The facility with which divorce can be granted to the male "imposes the weight of an almost obsessional fear on the Algerian woman of being sent back to her family" (p. 106). The young girl adopts her mother's attitude of acquiescence and obedience to male authority. At the moment she reaches puberty, she, a "childwoman," is married off (p. 106). While still considered a "minor" in married life, she nonetheless receives a semblance of authority as head of her own domestic space in her husband's household. Unlike the Western modern¹ model for female development, characterized by childhood, puberty, and marriage, Fanon states that the Algerian knows only two: childhood-puberty and marriage (p. 107). In this analysis, Fanon is careful to explain that illiteracy, poverty, and unemployment in Algeria, exacerbated by colonialism, leave the childwoman no other options (p. 107).

The fight for national liberation forced the abandonment of many of these traditional modes of behavior and customs. The revolutionary war paved the way for the woman-as-revolutionary agent to liberate herself from the veil, to relearn her body and develop her personality. Let us again cite Fanon at length:

This woman, who . . . would carry grenades or submachine-gun charges, this woman who tomorrow would be outraged, violated, tortured, could not put herself back into her former state of mind and relive her behavior of the past [my emphasis]; this woman who was writing the heroic pages of Algerian history was, in doing so, bursting the bounds of the narrow world in which she had lived . . . and was at the same time participating in the destruction of colonialism and in the birth of a new woman. . . . The woman-for-marriage progressively disappeared, and gave way to the woman-for-action. . . . The men's words were no longer law. The women were no longer silent. . . . The woman ceased to be a complement for man. *She literally forged a new place for herself by her sheer strength.* (pp. 107-109)

That Fanon recognized the Algerian woman's right to exist as an autonomous and complete social being is clear. That he acknowledged her marginalization is equally clear. She was an actor, an agent, in trying to bring about freedom for Algeria and her own liberation. The father could no longer question the woman-revolutionary's right to speak nor her morality when at the maquis for months, weeks, or days on end. She no longer bowed her head when speaking to the patriarch. Women began to agitate for the right to choose their own partners. More importantly, Algerian women began to forge their place in history, to rewrite the historical record, to refuse to be silent, invisible, and obsequious. They were creating a new woman and a new womanhood to which other Algerian women, the "Feminine Society," could look and emulate. These women could not go back to their silent existences. And it is this literal forging of themselves in the history, into traditionally "forbidden quarters" of work, school, public spaces, that has helped to give rise to contemporary fundamentalist activities.

The Writing of Algerian Feminine History

Throughout his writings on Algerian feminine society and the Algerian liberation struggle, Fanon resists the notion that women should be mere "replacement parts for men," for "revolutionary war is not a war of men" (p. 48). Hence its benefits, namely liberation, should not uniquely extend to men. Generally depicted as *fatimas*, doe-eyed, inactive, and voiceless in historiographic records and texts, Algerian women's contribution to the national liberation struggle is often forgotten, diminished

in contemporary cultural memory, in the French archival records of the war, and in the archives of the Algerian Ministry of Veterans.

Contemporary feminist writers, like Algerian Assia Djebar,⁴² Fadela M'Rabet, and Djamilia Amranes have undertaken the task of rewriting the historical record to give voice and presence to Algerian women. The surface of this feminist project, however, was merely scratched in July 1959 with Fanon's writing of *A Dying Colonialism*. "Algeria," Fanon insists, "is not a womanless society" (p. 67). And women must have a place in the writing of the history of the "new" Algeria. It is not simply the nurses, the women who carry grenades, the submachine gun charger carriers, nor the liaison agents whose voices, stories, and struggles should be heard and written, but

the woman in the city, in the *djebel*, in the enemy administration; the prostitute and the information she obtains; the women in prison, under torture, facing death, before the courts. All these chapter headings, after the material has been sifted, will reveal an incalculable number of facts essential for the history of the national struggle. (p. 60, n.15)

Unlike the Ministry of Veterans in its attempt to deny women's roles in the revolution and thus their access to jobs and retirement benefits in the postcolony, each and every role and every woman who participated in the national independence struggle is acknowledged in *A Dying Colonialism* as revolutionary, as a fighter for an independent Algeria and the feminine collective. As a revolutionary thinker, theorist, and participant in the Algerian revolutionary war, Fanon provides in his writing, if nothing else, a testament to women's resistance to oppression from within and without.

While Fanon's work on Algerian women may provide the stuff of contemporary mythmaking, his writing is not the least bit mythical. To proclaim such is to dismiss the experiential nature of Fanon's writings, what he witnessed and interpreted. It is clear that he did not intend nor did he believe that his work represented the definitive, complete historical picture on the Algerian national struggle when he wrote that "after all the material has been sifted . . . an incalculable number of facts essential for the history of the national struggle" will be revealed. The research of Amranes and Helie-Lucas, Rabet's *La Femme Algéri-*

enne and Djébar's historiographic novels and films disclose a number of important facts and contradictions.

That women fought, died, and helped to bring about a free Algeria should be duly noted. That a male writer chooses to chronicle women's activism demonstrates an awareness of the importance of women and their contributions at historical moments and to historical movements. It represents equally a resistance to what feminist critics have long pointed to as the patriarchal tendency to exclude women from history. Algerian women entered themselves into history. History was made by the women. Fanon has merely related Algerian women's resistance in a way that can be remembered, recalled, and corrected by women in their present quests for self-actualization.

As of late, Fanon has been put into a lurch of sorts, the cliché "damned if you do, damned if you don't." In writing about Algerian women, he has been accused of reinscribing silence, male privilege, and ventriloquism.⁶³ If, in 1959, he had written of the Algerian revolution without a word on the women, he would have been accused of sexism; as he has written of the subject, he now stands accused of mythmaking with a sexist/conservative subtext.

In our rethinking of Fanon in contemporary culture and feminist resistance politics, it certainly does not serve our interests to inscribe "myths" onto Fanon's thought at the very moments when we are claiming to unpack his "myths." An ethics of feminist criticism should allow one to critically engage and expose flaws in Fanon's writings and versions of history without aggressive misreadings and textual revisionism.

It is possible, as Henry Louis Gates, Jr., observed of Homi Bhabha, that one "wants Fanon to be even better than he is."⁶⁴ Yet, in all earnestness, I must say that there are many feminist critics who refuse to acknowledge and put to use the best of Frantz Fanon.

NOTES

1. Sources that will be referred to throughout this part of this chapter and those that inform the history put forth are the following: Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace* (New York: Viking, 1978); Philip Dine, *Images of the Algerian: War, French Fiction and Film, 1954-1992* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994); Rita Maran, *Torture: The Role of Ideology in the*

French-Algerian War (New York: Praeger, 1989); Martha Crenshaw Hutchison, *Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria, 1954-1962* (Stanford: Stanford University Press/Hoover Institute Press, 1978); Alexander Harrison, *Challenging De Gaulle: The O.A.S. and the Counterrevolution in Algeria, 1954-1962* (New York: Praeger, 1989); and PierNico Solinas, ed., *Gillo Pontecorvo's The Battle of Algiers: A Film Written by Franco Solinas* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973).

2. Under the Nazi-collaborating Vichy regime, the Crémieux Decree was repealed by Maréchal Henri Pétain.
3. Harrison provides an excellent snapshot of the sequence of events, xxiii-xxvi.
4. Horne, *A Savage War*, 69. Horne suggests that fifteen of the Muslim deputies abstained from voting. The reforms were defeated 328 to 33.
5. This religious orthodoxy would prove to be a constantly divisive factor in the leadership, as the Kabyle women did not wear the *haïk* and the central committee leaders were predominantly Arab. The current rise in fundamentalism in contemporary Algeria has similarly polarized the Arab and Berber populations. The military government in Algeria has been backed for the most part by Western powers who see the secular FLN as a better alternative than the fundamentalist FIS. Ideologically, the FLN leaders tended to clash as well. While Ramdane Abane stressed the political over the military (the National Liberation Army [ALN]), other leaders stressed the military over the political. Houari Boumédiène would eventually ride into the presidency on the strength of the ALN in 1965. It is suspected that Boumédiène and the other colonels of the ALN had a hand in the attempted bombing of Fanon, for he was highly opposed to the supremacy of the military over the political. This is an important point to elaborate upon, as Mohammed Harbi, a participant in Isaac Julien's film, *Frantz Fanon: Black Skin, White Mask*, insists that Fanon closely aligned himself with Boumédiène. The position of "no compromise" is perhaps the one issue upon which Fanon and Boumédiène agreed, as it was obvious that the French were not going to negotiate and/or recognize an independent Algeria.

6. Horne, *A Savage War*, 95.
7. Horne, *A Savage War*, 95.
8. Horne, *A Savage War*, 95.
9. Horne, *A Savage War*, 98.
10. Barbara Burris, "The Fourth World Manifesto," in *Radical Feminism* (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1973), 352-57, also takes Fanon to task in her discussion of "National" Culture as the Dominant Male Culture. Burris's premise is that Fanon is pro-male cultural supremacy. Her reading is flawed on the most fundamental levels as she begins by insisting that Fanon and not the French identified the veil as an Algerian cultural artifact. Her analyses then spiral out into a cascade of misreadings. She appears at odds with Fanon primarily because of his "hatred" of European colonizers. She goes on to maintain that Fanon does not recognize

female oppression. National culture in Algeria has, unfortunately, turned out to be pro-male supremacy. But Fanon certainly would not condone such a view of national culture or the struggle for independence as will be shown in this chapter and as his son attests in Isaac Julien's *Frantz Fanon: Black Skin, White Mask* and Algerian feminist-writer-activist Assia Djebar remarks in *Le blanc de l'Algérie*. Burris's other charges in this essay are marred by her "common oppression" rhetoric and her attempts to deny white women's privilege in an antiblack culture. It is apparent that her reading of *A Dying Colonialism* stopped at "Algeria Unveiled."

11. Linda Bell, *Rethinking Ethics in the Midst of Violence: A Feminist Approach to Freedom* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1993), 59.
12. Bell, *Rethinking Ethics*, 59.
13. Marie-Aimée Helie-Lucas, "Women, Nationalism, and Religion in the Algerian Liberation Struggle," in *Opening the Gates: A Century of Arab Feminist Writings* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 104-114.
14. Cited in Evelyn Accad, *Sexuality and War* (New York: New York University Press, 1990), 14.
15. Deniz Kandiyoti, "Identity and Its Discontents: Women and the Nation," in *Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 376-91.
16. Here I want to stress that there are feminists who believe that nationalism and feminism can be reconciled if the discussion of sexuality is opened. See Accad's *Sexuality and War*. There are even feminist nationalists who argue that feminism can change the "masculinist face" of nationalism. See Lois West's *Feminist Nationalism* (New York: Routledge, 1996). There are then differences between nationalist discourses. There are modernists, conservatives, and fundamentalists. The secular nationalism of the FLN, however, has failed in Algeria because it consistently reinscribes sexist and misogynist practices with the monetary support of the West.
17. Kandiyoti, "Identity and Its Discontents," 385.
18. Cited in Nayereh Tohidi's "Gender and Islamic Fundamentalism," in *Third World Women and Politics of Feminism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), 260. Also see Nawal el-Saadawi, *The Hidden Face of Eve: Women in the Arab World* (London: Zed Press, 1980).
19. Kandiyoti, "Identity and Its Discontents," 380.
20. See "Women and Liberation: Fatima Babikar Mahmoud talks to Patricia McFadden," *Journal of African Marxists* 8 (January 1986): 3.
21. Tohidi, "Gender and Islamic Fundamentalism," 251-67.
22. Although the FIS won the municipal elections by a landslide (850 municipalities out of 1,500), with 54 percent of the popular vote and only 28 percent for the incumbent FLN, through gerrymandering the Western-backed government expanded the parliament in order to favor the FLN. Violence resulted because of this manipulation of the electoral process, and the FIS declared holy war on the secular government. As a result, the FIS is outlawed in Algeria. For more, see Peter St. John's "Insurgency,

cy, Legitimacy, and Intervention in Algeria," *Commentary* 65 (January 1996): 1-9.

23. Tohidi explains this phenomenon in Iran. Women who deemed the *hajib* as unprogressive voluntarily wore the veil as a form of solidarity against a common enemy, the U.S.-backed Shah of Iran.

24. Hatem, "Toward the Development of Post-Islamist and Post-Nationalist Feminist Discourse in the Middle East," in *Arab Women: Old Boundaries, New Frontiers*, ed. Judith Tucker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 45.

25. St. John, "Insurgency," 3.

26. See Fatima Mernissi's *Beyond the Veil: Male and Female Dynamics in Modern Muslim Society* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987); *Doing Daily Battle: Interfaiths with Moroccan Women* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1989); and *Islam and Democracy: Fear of the Modern World* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1992).

27. Bothaina Shabaan, *Both Right and Left Handed: Arab Women Talk About Their Lives* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991).

28. Deniz Kandiyoti, "Bargaining with Patriarchy," *Gender and Society* 2, no. 3 (1988): 274-90.

29. Frantz Fanon, *A Dying Colonialism* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), 62-63. All subsequent parenthetical page numbers in the text of this chapter refer to this source in this edition.

30. In a paper delivered at the "Spoils of War: Women, Cultures, and Revolutions" Conference at Purdue University in February 1995, Valerie Orlando opened her essay "Women, War, Autobiography in Assia Djebar's *L'Amour, la fantasia*" with a discussion of twelve women who were murdered by the FIS for going "bare-faced" in Algiers. Orlando's essay appears in *Spoils of War: Women of Color, Cultures, and Revolutions*. Also see St. John's "Insurgency." Hundreds of women have been killed since 1995.

31. Helie-Lucas, "Women, Nationalism," 111.

32. See Cynthia Enloe's *Making Feminist Sense of Internationalist Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); for a comparative view of fundamentalism, the family, modernization, and women, see Accad's, Gilliam's, and Tohidi's essays in *Third World Women and Politics of Feminism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991). See also F. Azari's *Women of Iran: The Conflict with Fundamentalist Islam* (London: Ithaca Press, 1983); and E. Sansarian's *The Women's Rights Movement in Iran: Mutiny, Appeasement, and Repression from 1900 to Khomeini* (New York: Praeger, 1982).

33. See Patricia McFadden's "Women and Liberation" cited in Carole Boyce Davies and Elaine Fido's *Out of the Kumbha* (Trenton, N.J.: Africa World Press, 1990), xii-xiii.

34. See Eddy Souffrant's essay, "To Conquer the Veil," in *Fanon: A Critical Reader*, ed. Gordon, Sharpley-Whiting, and White (Oxford and Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1996), 171-79.

35. See Jacques Massu, *Le Torrent et la Digue* (Paris: Plon, 1972), 99-104.

36. Massu, *Le Torrent*, 103-104. Contrary to Suzanne Massu's claims, Le Mouvement clandestinely acted to convert Algerian women, represented by the fact that many members burned their veils during the Battle of Algiers. *Le Torrent*, 96-7, 102.

37. Massu, *Le Torrent*, 114.

38. Massu, *Le Torrent*, 288-89.

39. At the Tenth Berkshires Conference on the History of Women, Indian woman feminist Tanika Sarkar also discussed how the British made Indian women critical to their colonial campaigns and versions of history.

40. Burris takes offense at the fact that men made this final decision to involve the women. The situation was clearly no different in the United States. Women agitated in order to join the fighting ranks of the U.S. military. Fanon applauds the males for such a decision because the fight for decolonization is just as much women's as men's fight. Moreover, through revolutionary struggle, the status of the women would be changed to sister and comrade-in-arms. At least that is what he believed. More importantly, Fanon insisted that the women should not be regarded as replacement products/subordinates to/for the men.

41. It is particularly the modern model. As late as the nineteenth century, French men were allowed to take child-women, that is, pubescent teenagers, as brides.

42. See Djébar's historical/autobiographical novel, *L'amour, la fantasia*. Also see her *Le blanc de l'Algérie* in which she relates her friendships with Josie and Frantz Fanon and mourns their passing. Djébar celebrates Fanon's commitments to Algerian independence; she also recognizes that Fanon would have been distressed over the course of history in Algeria and its contemporary crises.

43. See Rajanna Khanna's unpublished paper, "The Fourth Cinema" on *The Battle of Algiers* which she maintains borrowed heavily from Fanon's *A Dying Colonialism*. Saadi Yacef, however, a member of the FLN/ALN who was critical to the Battle of Algiers, informed much of Pontecorvo's rendition. Yacef stars in the film as himself. See also Diana Fuss's problematic reading of Fanon's discussion of Algerian women, mimicry, and vetrioloquism in "Interior Colonies; Frantz Fanon and the Politics of Identification," *Diacritics* (Summer/Fall 1994): 20-39.

44. Henry Louis Gates, Jr., "Critical Fanonism," in *Critical Inquiry* 17 (Spring 1991): 460.

Chapter Four

Affinities: U.S. Radical Black Feminists and Fanon

We are nothing on earth if we are not, first of all, slaves of a cause, the cause of the people, the cause of justice, the cause of liberty.

—Frantz Fanon, cited in P. Geismar's *Fanon*

As Fanon says, "They were not in history, they were outside of history." What we see today in the development of the women's liberation movement is the beginning of the entrance of woman into history, the woman beginning to speak for the woman. The woman beginning to understand, analyze the history of woman; the woman seeking the roots of the source of her oppression in order to be able to deal with this.

—Kathleen Cleaver, "The Black Scholar Interviews Kathleen Cleaver"

I maintain that the true liberation of black people depends on their rejection of the inferiority of women, the rejection of competition as the only viable relationship between men, and their reaffirmation of respect for general human potential in whatever form—man, child, or woman—it is conceived.

—Linda La Rue, "The Black Movement and Women's Liberation"

As detailed in the survey of feminists' conflicts with Fanon in chapter 1, there is an affinity between Fanonian thought and contemporary U.S. radical black feminists' agendas, although the use of Fanon varies from feminist to feminist. In this chapter, these feminist affinities with Fanon's body of ideas, found ex-