Category Archives: Jane Duncan

Letters from Jane Duncan on the Unlawful Banning of an AbM Protest by the Sydenham SAPS

To: Captain Govender
Metro Police Special Events
eThekwini Municipality
Fax: 0313044353

6 December 2012

Dear Captain Govender,

Re: Attempt to prohibit Abahlali base Mjondolo march on Councillor Themba Mtshali’s offices

I am writing in connection with an attempt by the South African Police Service (SAPS) from the Sydenham police station to prohibit a march proposed by the Ward 23 community in Clare Estate, which includes the Palmiet branch of Abahali base Mjondolo, on the offices of Ward 23 Councillor Themba Mtshali. The march was meant to take place on Friday 7 December 2012. The convenors provided adequate notice for the march.

The march is meant to begin at Palmiet Park, Palmiet Road in Clare Estate, proceed down O’Flaherty Road, onto Quarry road and then end at the Aquarius building on Mountbatten Drive, where his clr. Mtshali’s offices are. The Premier of the Province, Dr Zweli Mkhize, has apparently agreed to accept the memorandum.

Apparently, the SAPS have insisted that the convenors must first seek permission from the Reservoir Hills shopping mall, as the proposed route will take the march past the mall, as well as the owner of the building where the Council offices are held.

I have been involved in research and advocacy work on the Regulation of Gatherings Act and its application for a number of years, and am currently co-ordinating a project at the University on the Act, its application and its violation: hence my interest in the matter.

The Act does not require the convenors to seek permission from either of the above mentioned parties. The protestors will be using public roads and spaces for their protests, and apparently have no intention of entering either the shopping mall or the councillor’s officers.

This means that the Act, and the Act alone, governs the conduct of the marchers, as the Act applies to gatherings taking place in public spaces.Furthermore, the Act merely requires the convenors to notify the Municipality of their intention to march, which they have done. The march is therefore automatically lawful, unless it can be shown that the conditions for prohibition as set out in the Act apply, and there is no indication in this case that they do. The reasons given for wanting to prohibit the march are not recognised by the Act and are not lawful.

Unfortunately, all too often, reasons like the ones given are used to prohibit marches unlawfully, thereby depriving the affected communities of their constitutional right to assembly, demonstration and picket.

I appeal to you to ensure that the march is allowed to proceed as planned.

Sincerely,
Prof. Jane Duncan
Highway Africa Chair in Media and Information Society
School of Journalism and Media Studies
Rhodes University
0827863600

SABC: Marikana and the problem of pack journalism

Please visit the SABC site to see the pie chart that was published with this important story.

http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/00f7e0804cfe58899b00bf76c8dbd3db/Marikana-and-the-problem-of-pack-journalism-20120710

Marikana and the problem of pack journalism

The televised images of armed miners rushing towards the police in Marikana on the 16th August, and the police opening fire on the miners, will haunt South Africans for many years to come.

Reporting from behind the police line in relative safety, journalists presented to the world images that on the surface of things vindicated the police’s view of events, namely that they shot in self-defence.But subsequent academic, journalistic and eyewitness accounts have called this narrative into question, with evidence having emerged of a second ‘kill site’ where miners were allegedly killed in a far more premeditated fashion by the police.

Journalists were not present at this site. This alternative narrative emerged after miners were interviewed by the University of Johannesburg and subsequently by the Daily Maverick. Up to that point, journalists had completely missed this alternative account.

Hopefully, the truth will emerge from the Farlam Commission of Enquiry. But how did the media fare in reporting on the massacre, and how has it assisted the public to build their own understanding of what happened and its significance?. Why did journalists miss such a crucial dimension of the Marikana story, which called into question very fundamentally the official version of events?

In an initial attempt to answer this question, a representative sample of printed newspaper articles provided by News Monitor via Media Tenor, for the dates 13 – 22 August were analysed for their sources of information: 153 articles in total.

Most miners were interviewed in relation to the stories alleging that the miners had used muti to defend themselves against the police’s bullets, as well as the miners’ working and living conditions.

The source analysis included people and organisations who were quoted directly, or who clearly provided information that formed part of the basis of the article (such as Lonmin annual reports or a report released shortly before the massacre by the Benchmarks Foundation). Many articles had several sources.

Of the 3 percent of miners who were interviewed independently of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU), only one worker was quoted speaking about what actually happened during the massacre, and he said the police shot first. Most miners were interviewed in relation to the stories alleging that the miners had used muti to defend themselves against the police’s bullets, as well as the miners’ working and living conditions.

So in other words, of all 153 articles, only one showed any attempt by a journalist to obtain an account from a worker about their version of events. There is scant evidence of journalists having asked the miners the simplest and most basic of questions, namely ‘what happened’?

A more comprehensive analysis of the media coverage over this period is being planned, but so far, it appears that it was only after the Maverick coverage that many journalists realised that the miners actually had a story to tell, independently of the unions or any other organised formation. Journalists seemed to assume that by having interviewed the unions, they had somehow ‘covered’ the miners’ story; an incorrect assumption, as many miners who initiated and sustained the strike action did not feel represented by either union.

This initial sample of the press coverage during the week of the massacre raises some serious, unavoidable questions, about the state of South Africa journalism, which likes to portray itself as the watchdog of the powerful, and on behalf of the powerless.

However, the bureaucratic and social organisation of news in contemporary media organisations often leads to journalists prioritising the dominant groups in society. It is not coincidental that, apart from being a representation of journalistic sources, the pie chart also mirrors quite accurately where the power lies in society. Those with the most power and money have the biggest voice.

In fast-paced newsrooms, where journalists are required to meet more and more deadlines, it is tempting to rely on sources of information that are more readily obtainable and have been validated by other media, while avoiding sources that are less ‘trusted’ and require more validation. Known as ‘pack journalism’, these tendencies can give journalism a sameness that reduces diversity of voices.

The most easily validated sources are likely to be organisations with the resources to maintain a constant flow of information to the media, such as government agencies, big business and ‘think tanks’. Organisations or individuals representing working class or unemployed interests are likely to be less well resourced and lack the capacity to communicate proactively, which can lead to them dropping under the journalist’s radar.

Many media organisations have dedicated business reporters or even publications. Yet there are hardly any labour reporters anymore; this beat has practically disappeared from newsrooms, which makes it even more likely that workers’ perspectives will be sidelined.

Journalists pride themselves on their independence. Yet if the first week of reporting on the Marikana conflict is anything to go by, many journalists allowed themselves to become mouthpieces of the rich and powerful, reproducing the official versions of events, and silencing the voices of the workers as rational, thinking beings with their own stories to tell.

Such reporting is an indictment on journalism and all that it stands for. It does not help society understand the scale of the social unrest gripping the country, the levels of police violence in response, and overall, the extent of the drift towards outright state repression. A society can ill-afford to sleepwalk through a period in history when it risks collapsing under the weight of its own internal contradictions.

When the Daily Maverick’s Greg Marinovich was interviewed about his stories on the massacre, he was asked what advice he would give to journalists to improve their reporting, and his response was simply to ‘…go take peoples’ stories’. If journalists are to rise to the task of reflecting accurately the most troubled period in South Africa’s post-apartheid history, then journalists should take this advice seriously. If they do not, then they will continue to fail South Africa.

Sunday Independent: Media underplaying police, state brutality

http://www.iol.co.za/sundayindependent/media-underplaying-police-state-brutality-1.1369675#.UDohP8Hibgw

Media underplaying police, state brutality, by Jane Duncan, Sunday Independent

South Africans are still reeling from shock after a clash between the police and striking mineworkers that left dozens of workers dead. The dominant narrative up to this point, supported by camera footage and other media accounts, has been that armed workers attacked the police, who retaliated in self-defence after at least one miner shot at them.

However, in the past week, an alternative narrative has emerged that suggests that, rather than being motivated purely by self-defence, the police killings of miners was more premeditated than initially thought.

Academics based at the University of Johannesburg, have interviewed workers who pointed to a second “kill site” away from the media focus, where miners were allegedly killed as part of a planned attack to crush the strike.

According to Professor Peter Alexander, who led the researchers, “the media haven’t been talking to right people and they don’t ask the right questions. They haven’t interviewed workers. Where were people standing when they were killed? They haven’t asked that. It’s not just the unions that are cut off from people, but the media, too.”

Many have already dismissed Alexander’s claims, preferring to believe that the police could not have been capable of such actions. At worst, the police may have used excessive force, but to argue that they deliberately set out to kill dissenting workers is, conceptually, a bridge too far for them.

What makes the dismissal of these claims easier is that many South Africans are simply not aware of the slow but steady increase in cases of politically biased policing aimed at suppressing dissenting voices, especially (but not exclusively) those outside the tripartite alliance.

The problem predates the remilitarisation of the police, although remilitarisation has undoubtedly intensified it.

Since 2002, local authorities and police officials have increasingly misused the notification procedure in the Regulation of Gatherings Act to deny “permission” to protesters critical of the government (not that permission is even needed in terms of the act). This abuse of process has led many protesters to take to the streets anyway, which on many occasions prompted the police to act violently to break up the “illegal” protests, even if they were peaceful.

Over this period, softer, more facilitative, policing was gradually replaced by harder forms of policing involving the use of rubber bullets and even live ammunition. The police developed other techniques to harass government critics, including making arrests on flimsy grounds, only for the charges to be dropped many months later for lack of evidence, and the imposition of overly restrictive bail conditions.

Social movements such as Abahlali baseMjondolo, the Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF) and the Landless Peoples’ Movement (LPM) are well acquainted with these tactics, but these are largely urban movements.

Small-town and rural activists are particularly susceptible to official harassment as these actions generally fall under the media radar, and many have harrowing stories to tell.

When two LPM activists alleged torture at the hands of the police when they were arrested in 2004, many journalists scoffed at the allegations and were reluctant to report them. As is the case with many torture cases, the charges were withdrawn for lack of evidence.

Since the intelligence services became entangled in the succession battle between Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma, a media spotlight has been thrown on the abuse of intelligence services to advantage sections of the ruling elite.

But activists have been complaining about intelligence harassment for years.

Evidence of inappropriate intelligence surveillance of political critics emerged as far back as the World Conference Against Racism in 2002, and then again during LPM preparations for the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2003, as well as in the wake of service delivery protests in Harrismith.

Long before the Lonmin conflict, the police have been known to act effectively as private security guards for mining companies, repressing dissent against abusive mining practices.

Jubilee SA activists in Limpopo and Mpumalanga have complained for years about police harassment, arbitrary arrests and police violence against protests, as well as death threats.

In 2009, 12 members of Abahlali were accused of the murder of two people in the Kennedy Road settlement, but the State’s case against them collapsed.

The Socio-Economic Rights Institute, which defended the Kennedy 12, argued afterwards that the “charges were based on [State] evidence which now appears almost certainly to have been manufactured”.

With important exceptions, elite and media responses to these events have all too often involved a “yes, but”. The fact that several movements have participated in illegal activities like road blockades and illegal electricity reconnections has been used as a reason to brand them as criminal, and to justify state crackdowns. But this branding has prevented a proper examination of the policing and intelligence practices used to contain their activism, which has been targeted at legitimate expressions and actions, too, and has, beyond question, been repressive.

Under the circumstances it is hardly surprising that activists complain of experiencing persecution twice over: first at the hands of the police, then at the hands of the media, whose failure to recognise the reality of state repression left them vulnerable to further harassment. This frustration at not being heard was also expressed by Lonmin miners at a public meeting at the University of Johannesburg on Wednesday night. At the meeting, workers who spoke were very, very angry at the media.

The media have simply not done their due diligence on state repression of dissenting voices. As a result, South Africans have been deprived of information that allows them to develop a full understanding of the extent to which repression has become an entrenched feature of the political landscape.

Why have these problems arisen? Undoubtedly, there is a class dimension to the problem, as journalists still tend to be drawn from a social base that does not experience the realities of working-class life, which includes a creeping de-democratisation of society that has manifested itself most starkly in poor communities.

The routine processes of news in commercial media organisations also place constraints on journalists. Commercial media organisations tend to legitimise as “common sense” the world views of those who are most attractive to advertisers, leading to reporting and commentary being sucked to the political centre, in the process marginalising more politically radical viewpoints.

Furthermore, given the commercial pressures on media organisations, the sources that are the most widely legitimised by other media tend to be the most used, leading to a form of pack journalism. These sources usually have access to power and money already, which includes the organisational capacity to maintain a constant flow of information to the media.

Organisations representing working-class viewpoints, which are generally less well resourced, can easily be overlooked.

In the case of the Marikana story, this has led to journalists relying overwhelmingly on official sources in the police and government, as well as the unions and their own eyewitness accounts for “balance”. But the voices of workers who have important stories to tell have been largely silent.

These trends are uneven, but to the extent that they do exist, they create an environment where the police can literally get away with murder. South Africans can remain suspended in a state of disbelief, continuing to deny the increasingly obvious fact that society, with its massive inequalities, can no longer be held in equilibrium through consent and that coercion is becoming the terrible – if not entirely unpredictable – state response.

When the allied forces invaded Iraq in 2003, and the embedded media dutifully churned out reports that legitimised their actions, Noam Chomsky urged US citizens to develop what he called a “sceptical reflex”, as part of a course of intellectual self-defence. This course requires doing some hard, intellectual work and developing the ability to think independently and critically.

According to Chomsky, “you’re going to have to compare today’s lies with yesterday’s lies and see if you can construct some rational story out of them. It’s a major effort. You have to decide to become a fanatic. You have to work, because nobody’s going to make it easy for you. [You have to show a] willingness to look at the facts with an open mind, to put simple assertions to the test, and to pursue an argument to its conclusion.”

If SA is to face its problems head on, then citizens are well advised to develop these skills.

SACSIS: The Return of the Police Riot

http://www.sacsis.org.za/site/article/1395

The Return of the Police Riot

by Jane Duncan

Last week, the world was confronted with the horror of South Africa’s first post-apartheid massacre. Over thirty striking Lonmin mineworkers were killed by the police, who turned semi-automatic rifle fire onto the workers after claiming that they were shot at first.

Time will tell whether this was the case, but even if it was, it did not justify the mass killing of so many workers. The available information points to the police having used inappropriate, excessive force to quell the protest.

Why did this happen? Policing commentators have blamed the re-introduction of the military ranking system, which existed under apartheid, which they argue has brought back a more authoritarian policing culture. Other commentators have noted a de-skilling of the public order police, who lack basic crowd management skills, and as a result quickly resort to violence when confronted with protestor violence.

If steps were taken to de-militarise the police again and re-skill them in less confrontational crowd management tactics, how likely is it that the police will return to the rights-based, facilitative policing of protest action that was favoured after the transition to democracy?

The shift towards more repressive policing is not confined to South Africa. Earlier this month, the police used automatic rifles to gun down Sudanese anti-austerity protestors. Chilean students who occupied schools to demand educational reforms were forcefully ejected and arrested by the police. In May, the police used disproportionate force to quell anti-austerity protests by Spain’s ‘Indignados’.

A report released last month by a network of US-based universities, entitled ‘Suppressing Protest’, found that the police had used excessive force against Occupy Wall Street protestors, routinely violating protestors’ rights to free expression and assembly. Globally, hardly a week goes by without significant police violence against protests.

Since anti-globalisations protestors closed down World Trade Organisation negotiations in Seattle, and the events of September 11, 2002, protest policing has undergone a sea change. Increasingly, public order police have relied on confrontation rather than negotiation, and the onset of the world capitalist crisis in 2008 accelerated this change.

Escalating police violence is a symptom of a growing social crisis. In expansionary periods, the police can afford to project an acceptable face and facilitate the rights to assembly and expression.

In the most recent expansionary period of the 1990’s, the dominant mode of democratic protest policing involved a negotiated management of protests, where the police facilitated the protestors’ assembly and expression rights and emphasised communication with protestors. Political elites could rule by consent fairly easily, as they could afford to offer reforms to workers to stabilise the system. The political risks of the use of force, arrests and harassment to maintain power outweighed the political benefits.

South Africa’s transition to democracy took place when this negotiated mode of protest policing was ascendant, leading to it becoming the police’s guiding philosophy. Protests were conducted as a negotiated ritual between the government, the police and protestors, in terms of the Regulation of Gatherings Act.

But in recessionary periods, the ruling elite find it more difficult to afford reforms, and they often implement austerity measures. Protestors find that the negotiated protest rituals of the previous period no longer work to stem the decline in working and living conditions, and seek more effective strategies. As a result, the ruling class find it increasingly difficult to maintain their wealth and power through democratic and peaceful means. They turn increasingly to paramilitary tactics, and actively promote the ‘law and order’ aspects of the state.

In response to the Seattle protest, the police increased their powers over protests. Rapidly, confrontation replaced negotiation as the dominant policing style and police ‘command and control’ of protests came back into vogue.

Increasingly, the police sought to control protests more effectively by setting the ground rules for them and punishing even the most minor infractions of the law. In the earlier phase of this shift, the police devised ingenious micro-techniques to repress dissent without resorting to lethal force, such as the strategic incapacitation technique where the police targeted and harassed protests leaders rather than the whole protest.

Proactive, intelligence driven policing also became more prevalent, where the police infiltrated organisations to identify and isolate ‘troublemakers’. Public spaces were also more tightly policed. Containment strategies such as ‘kettling’, where police herded protestors into an enclosed space and then attacked them, became more commonplace.

Instead of reducing conflict, this over-policing of protests has often escalated conflict. On occasion, the police used this escalation to their advantage to justify the use of excessive, even lethal force, on the grounds of self-defence. Since 2008, the police have on many occasions dispensed with the niceties of incapacitation techniques, and relied more on brute force to quell dissent.

The South African state is being buffeted between these two apparently competing public order policing philosophies, but there is growing evidence that the authoritarian philosophy is gaining ground, although this shift is uneven and contested internally. Largely, the South African media have done a dismal job in tracking this shift and explaining its significance.

Another problem pointed out in the ‘Suppressing Protest’ report is the increasing number of accountability and transparency failures when protestors complain of police violence. South Africa’s experience with formal accountability systems is also not a good one. The Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID) and its predecessor have been largely ineffective in stemming growing police violence.

But if the mooted judicial enquiry into the massacre is to get to the root of the problem, then it will need to recognise that authoritarian policing practices are on the rise globally, which makes the problems South African grassroots movements face more intractable. When viewed in its correct global context, arguably the rise in police violence should not be attributed to a de-skilling of the police in crowd management, but a re-skilling in the new authoritarian policing practices. If this is the case, then police riots are likely to become more commonplace. While this is a gloomy assessment of recent events, it may also be the most realistic one.

On the upside, anti-repression activism is also on the rise globally. Increasingly anti-austerity movements are co-ordinating responses to arrests, including medical and legal support. An array of academic and legal support organisations are monitoring civil liberty violations, demanding information about policing practices and pursuing prosecutions.

In South Africa, where many protests have turned violent, including at Lonmin, the police and even the media have used this violence to delegitimize the protests, which has made it easier for the police to use violence in response. What is often ignored is the fact that overwhelmingly, the instruments of violence remain in the hands of the state, and that the primary violence that gave rise to the protests is the structural violence of the system.

When activists co-ordinate responses to defend democratic spaces against police violence, they are often highly effective because the police are susceptible to political pressure. Such responses have not really coalesced in South Africa yet, but have the potential to. The Lonmin massacre has galvanised important initiatives to organise against police violence.

But unless such initiatives are linked to a political movement against austerity and inequality, their effectiveness is likely be limited. In the wake of the massacre, and police violence elsewhere, the building of such linkages is an urgent political task for social justice movements, globally and locally.

SACSIS: The Struggle for Street Politics

http://www.sacsis.org.za/site/article/1203

The Struggle for Street Politics

Jane Duncan

Public demonstrations have been central to South Africa’s democratic life for decades. Yet recent events suggest a narrowing of the substance of the right to assemble, demonstrate and picket, and a de-legitimisation of street politics.

In this regard, the City of Cape Town’s near hysterical overreaction to attempts to occupy Rondebosch Common is cause for concern. Last week’s Constitutional Court case about whether the South African Transport and Allied Workers’ Union should be held responsible for violence they could not have foreseen in one of their marches, and the chilling effect on freedom of assembly if they are, also raises important questions about whether the state respects the space for street politics as a legitimate form of politics.

Evidence is emerging from many parts of the country that freedom of expression is not the only Constitutional right in trouble at the moment: the right to assembly, demonstration and picket is as well. The Regulation of Gatherings Act gives effect to this right.

When the Commission of Enquiry into the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, chaired by Judge Richard Goldstone, wrote the Act in the early 1990’s, it marked a radical departure from past practices.

The Commission argued that rather than seeing gatherings as threats to national security, the state should recognise them as essential forms of democratic expression. The state should also have a positive obligation to facilitate rather than repress gatherings. Municipalities would play this facilitative role, ensuring that negotiations took place between themselves, the South African Police Services (SAPS) and the convenors of the march.

The Commission also argued for a radically different approach towards policing. Gatherings were to be handled with tolerance and sympathy so as not to provoke a confrontation that may result in violence. Furthermore, gatherings were meant largely to be self-policing, with protestors being responsible for controlling participants through the delegation of marshals.

In terms of the Act, a convener must give notice of an intended gathering to the Municipality at least seven days before the march, although there is also provision for urgent notifications. The responsible officer of the Municipality may then call up a meeting between the three role players to discuss the gathering within 24 hours of having received the notice. In this meeting, the police may request that certain conditions be imposed on the gathering. But the Act requires that the negotiations in meetings take place in good faith. If a meeting is not called up, then the gathering is automatically lawful.

Yet local authorities repeatedly conflate notification with permission seeking, treating the application process as a permission-seeking exercise. This has led to the police breaking up gatherings if the convenor cannot produce a permit proving that the march ‘has permission’ to proceed. Admittedly, the Act lends itself to such confusion.

Furthermore, meetings are often not called within twenty-four hours, and negotiations often do not take place in good faith and in a spirit of negotiation. In fact the meeting may be called on the eve of the march, making it extremely difficult for the convenor to take the Municipality to court on review if the march is banned. Furthermore, Municipalities and the police have been known to impose conditions that may compromise the purpose of the protest and alter its message, thereby reducing the meaningfulness of the protest.

For instance, the Emfuleni Local Municipality charges protestors R165.00 per traffic officer per hour or part thereof as a condition for allowing a gathering. Such practices are discriminatory as they make the exercise of a right subject to financial means.

Municipalities have also been known to invite individuals into the meeting that have a vested interest in the gathering, such as councillors, who in turn have been known to influence decisions about whether to allow gatherings or not, especially if the gatherings are protests against their own performance. In Johannesburg, a Councillor even instructed the responsible officer to prohibit a Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee march before the section four meeting took place, which demonstrated manifest bad faith.

Gatherings have also been prohibited without a meeting, which demonstrates bad faith too as the local authority and police have not even attempted to negotiate conditions short of outright prohibition.

In terms of the Act, the responsible officer may prohibit a gathering on very narrow grounds, especially if violence is likely and no conditions can be imposed that can mitigate this threat. But the responsible officer’s decisions can be challenged in a magistrate’s court within twenty-four hours of the prohibition.

However, Municipalities have been known to ban gatherings on grounds that are not recognised by the Act. For instance, the Mogalakwena Municipality in Limpopo banned a march by the GaPila community on the basis that their grievances were not taken to the ward committee first. The Act does not specific any particular route for grievances to follow before they can form the basis of a gathering.

Other marches have been banned on the basis that there is no one to accept the memorandum. According to the Emfuleni Municipality’s traffic department, the organisation wishing to hold a march must secure a written undertaking from the institution they are marching against confirming that a representative will be available to accept the memorandum. This makes the right to protest subject to the co-operation of the protestors’ adversary, who can easily squash a march simply by not making themselves available to accept the memorandum.

Another popular reason for prohibiting gatherings is that other gatherings are taking place on the same day, and the police do not have the resources to police more than one gathering. This reason has been manipulated in the past to allow gatherings that are more politically palatable to the ruling party, while disallowing gatherings that are more critical.

In order to prohibit a march, the SAPS must provide credible information on oath that the protest is likely to result in violence. The fact that the Act makes no provision for alternative affidavits from the convenor makes this in inherently one-sided process, capable of manipulation by Municipalities and the police. On at least one occasion in Thembelihle, a police affidavit containing highly disputable information was used as a basis to ban a protest.

Gatherings of fifteen people or fewer are known as demonstrations and are unregulated by the Act. Yet the police have been known to break up demonstrations on the grounds that they are illegal.

The Goldstone Commission argued that the police should not be required or authorised to disperse a gathering on the grounds that it has not been approved. In this regard, the police need to exercise high levels of judgement and not act in ways that may inflame a volatile situation.

According to the Act, when a gathering turns violent or where there is serious risk of injury to persons or property, then police may disperse the gathering but first, must use ‘reasonable force’ to disperse the demonstrators.

However, the argument that the gathering was spontaneous, rather than premeditated, can be used as a defence against a charge of an illegal gathering, as the Act contemplates situations where people gather spontaneously in reaction to unforeseen events.

The letter and spirit of the Act have been blithely ignored on many occasions, with peaceful but ‘unlawful’ gatherings being broken up with excessive force. A shift from softer to harder forms of policing has also become apparent in the policing of protests.

The Act does not contemplate a situation where blanket bans of protests can be instituted, except under a state of emergency when the right can be suspended. Yet, evidence has emerged since 2010 of unconstitutional blanket bans of protests.

By acting in these ways, the state has made a mockery of Goldstone’s original intentions. At the time of drafting the Act, Goldstone did not foresee the possibility that local governments would become the focus of such controversy around service delivery, and that in response they would develop myriad ways of misapplying the Act to censor their own critics.

In Makana Municipality, for instance, which has been the target of several service delivery protests, the responsible officer is the Director of Corporate Services, which falls under the office of the Municipal manager. He is part of the Municipal machine, and cannot be expected to take impartial decisions, especially when it comes to protests about the Municipality’s delivery record. Officials in other Municipalities undoubtedly also find themselves conflicted.

The assumption that the ‘golden triangle’ of the convenor, the Municipality and the police would be capable of a co-operative relationship is a fatal flaw in the Act. It is inappropriate to make the ability to exercise a constitutional right contingent on the good conduct of an actor that has a vested interest in not seeing the right being exercised at all.

At the very least, an independent ombudsman should perform the functions assigned to the responsible officer, rather than a Municipal functionary.

But should gatherings be regulated at all? Drexel University’s Tabatha Abu El-Haj has documented how in the United States, since the nineteenth century, the right to assembly has been gradually whittled down and its political effectiveness neutralised.

At that stage, street politics was popular and large spontaneous gatherings were the order of the day. The law interfered with gatherings only when they became disorderly. Since then, pre-emptive regulation was introduced, where permits were required to gather, and where marches could be banned if they disrupted traffic. Minimum time periods for notification made it practically impossible to gather spontaneously to respond quickly to political events. These changes have turned gatherings into a forced ritual that the authorities often simply ignore. But these practices, with certain variations, have become ‘commonsense’ in official circles in many countries.

However, the spate of recent protests in South Africa, many of them ‘illegal’, strongly suggests that South Africans are no longer willing to accept the state’s limitations on their right to practice politics in the most effective way possible. These protestors are communicating the message that the Regulation of Gatherings Act has had its day, and needs to be reviewed. The danger, though, is that in the current political environment, it may be replaced with something far worse.