Category Archives: Jane Duncan

SACSIS: How Deep Is the Rot in South Africa’s Intelligence Services?

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http://www.sacsis.org.za/site/article/771.1

How Deep Is the Rot in South Africa’s Intelligence Services?

By Jane Duncan

South Africa has a sorry history of its intelligence services being abused for political ends. In 1994, the country was promised that never again would those in power be in a position to misuse the state apparatus to spy on their political opponents.

This promise was repeated after the bruising succession battle between then president Thabo Mbeki and his successor, Jacob Zuma, after evidence emerged that National Intelligence Agency (NIA) officials took sides in the battle. The NIA has since been incorporated into the State Security Agency (SSA).

Yet there is evidence of the cycle of abuse emerging once again, in spite of the fact that the intelligence services claim to have tightened internal controls. A weekly paper has alleged that illegal monitoring of communications is rife, and various political leaders have alleged that they are being spied on. Mbeki’s supporters also stand accused of attempting to reassert control over crime intelligence ahead of the next African National Congress’s (ANC) national conference to gain political advantage.

Unsurprisingly the media focus on these issues has been on political elites and mainstream parties. Yet many grassroots activists have a wealth of experiential knowledge about the intelligence services and their modus operandi. They have been aware of a buildup of abuse that started in 1999, when the NIA’s mandate was broadened to include the gathering of political intelligence.

The problem has been most noticeable in relation to mega-events hosted by South Africa, such as the World Conference against Racism and the World Summit on Sustainable Development. Fearing a Seattle-style seige of these events – when a World Trade Organisation meeting was shut down by activists in 1999 – the intelligence services monitored activists’ activities, leading to pre-emptive arrests and attempts to ban gatherings.

The Landless People’s Movement and the Anti-Privatisation Forum have also, at various stages, alleged intelligence infiltration and surveillance of their activities. The NIA has also admitted to monitoring the protests in different parts of the country. Yet there has been virtually no public debate about the appropriateness of their actions.

In December, South Africa hosts yet another mega-event, in the form of the COP 17 meeting on climate change. Once again, predictably, there is evidence of activists being placed under surveillance.

S’bu Zikoke is President of Abahlali baseMjondolo, a shackdweller’s movement in Durban. The movement has been a thorn in the side of the local ANC, which has resorted to extreme measures to reduce its influence.

Zikode travels abroad extensively for the movement. On returning from the past few trips, and while still at the airport, Zikode has received calls on his cellphone. The callers claimed to be from the police, asked him about the organisations and individuals he met with and what he said in those meetings.

Then Zikode starting noticing interference on his cellphone. According to Zikode, “Sometimes it sounds like the line is open. It’s also like there’s the sound of the sea or waves. My phone is strange. I would hear people speaking but not to me. Sometimes I would speak and there’s an echo. This went on. I then phoned my network (MTN). They said I should check with the security agencies. It was then that I became very suspicious.”

According to Zikode, the Crime Intelligence division of the South African Police Force (SAPF) has also phoned the Abahlali office repeatedly, asking about the movement’s involvement in the civil society committee for the upcoming COP 17 conference. The Committee aims to facilitate civil society engagement with the event and is also organising a global day of action around climate change.

According to Abahlali’s General Secretary Bandile Mdlalose, who has taken a number of these calls, “They are always asking about things that we have been talking about. They tell us that we know we have a problem with the [eThekwini] Mayor. We were told about the things that we wrote and are planning and we are asked why we are doing this. They make it clear that they are not trying to get information, but that they already know [what we are doing]. They want us to know that they are watching us.”

Zikode has also taken some of these calls. He said, “They have also asked whether we are working with Des D’sa. There are certain individuals who are presented as troublemakers. We are legal. We have strategies, but we are legal. We are part of this country too, and we need to be presented with evidence as to why we should not be trusted.”

Des D’sa is an environmental activist and chairperson of the South Durban Community Environmental Alliance, which is also a member of the civil society caucus. He says that Crime Intelligence has been phoning him too. According to D’sa, “They want meetings and meetings. They have been harassing me. They phone me all the time, wanting to know who our working relationships are with throughout the world [on COP 17].”

According to national police spokesperson Vish Naidoo, Crime Intelligence is part of the co-ordinating committee for COP 17. Naidoo said, “They will be asking lots of questions to identify threats to the event, so that we can prepare ourselves. This is in no way intended to intimidate people. We have a constitution that defends the freedoms of expression and association. We can prepare for planned demonstrations, but we must also anticipate unplanned demonstrations. This is what we have done in relation to all the other major events that South Africa has hosted. So far, no serious threats have been identified.”

On fact value, Naidoo’s explanation may sound perfectly reasonable, but what underpins it is a presumption of the potential for criminality on the part of these movements. Furthermore, the activist accounts imply behaviour that extends beyond gathering information about potential threats and veers dangerously towards intimidation of perceived political opponents. It is not at all clear, for instance, what Abahlali’s fractious relationship with the Mayor has to do with COP 17.

Crime intelligence operatives may well be tempted to cross this line because of their mandate. The National Strategic Intelligence Act requires Crime Intelligence to provide strategic intelligence on national security matters, which lends itself to political intelligence gathering that moves far beyond the SAPS’ crime prevention mandate. But the problem of expansive mandates does not stop with Crime Intelligence.

In response to the 2005/6 crisis in the NIA, former Intelligence Minister Ronnie Kasrils set up a Ministerial Review Commission on Intelligence (excluding Crime and Defence Intelligence). The Commission found many weaknesses on the oversight mechanisms of the intelligence services.

A key finding was that the-then NIA’s mandate was inappropriately broad: a problem it attributed to the overbroad definition of national security in the White Paper on Intelligence. This definition draws on the South African Constitution, which states that “…national security must reflect the resolve of South Africans…to live as equals, to live in peace and harmony, to be free from fear and want and to seek a better life.”

The Constitution’s definition is based on a politically progressive global perspective that rejects a state-centric definition of security, which has led governments to pursue militarised, often repressive, solutions to problems of social instability. In contrast, the progressive perspective enjoined states to address the totality of factors undermining human security, such as poverty, inequality and poor health.

However, this progressive perspective is being used for regressive ends, namely to broaden the scope of the intelligence services to the point where they have been mandated to act as a state watchdog of society.

In 2008, Kasrils warned that a national security policy informed by a human security perspective cannot mean that the intelligence services should be involved in every aspect of public life. He argued that such an approach was bound to lead to intelligence services that are unduly intrusive. The Commission also warned that “…An overly broad domestic intelligence mandate can lead to the NIA focusing in an inappropriate manner on lawful political and social activities.”

The Commission identified other problems too. Counter-intelligence functions are insufficiently regulated, which leaves them open to abuse. Furthermore, there is no legislative regulation or judicial oversight of intrusive intelligence gathering methods such as spying or infiltrating organisations (with the exception of the interception of communications). The oversight body for intelligence services, the Inspector General of Intelligence, is not sufficiently independent from the executive, lacks resources and does not release its reports publicly.

Furthermore, there has been no parliamentary or public debate about the most appropriate mandate for these services. Regrettably, the public is not clamouring for one either.

South Africa is meant to have a state-of-the-art oversight system for the intelligence community. Yet in the grubby real world, there are too few safeguards to prevent factions of the ruling party that seek to gain or retain power from using the intelligence services to further their political objectives.

Unsurprisingly, the Commission’s recommendations to improve accountability have not been implemented. For as long as the threat of leadership change hangs over Zuma’s head, the political will to act on the report will not be forthcoming. It is politically expedient to keep things the way they are.

How deep is the rot in South Africa’s intelligence services? It is difficult to tell, but the accounts of activists suggest a deep set problem.

South Africans seem to have accepted unquestioningly that intelligence matters are inherently secret, and therefore lie outside the public domain. Unless these assumptions are challenged and citizens start to demand accountability from these most secretive areas of government, then activism may well revert back to being a dangerous, even life threatening activity. And the S’bu Zikode’s of the world may continue to bear the brunt of this regression.

SACSIS: If They Come for You, Who Will Speak Out?

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If They Come for You, Who Will Speak Out?

by Jane Duncan

The African National Congress’ (ANC) next elective congress is looming. Already, there are signs that President Jacob Zuma has lost the confidence of key constituencies in the ANC-led alliance, owing to indecisive leadership and his failure to re-orientate the state in a pro-poor direction. This growing disquiet among working class alliance members may well trigger a succession battle.

In response, the new elite clustered around Zuma could be tempted to fight back to retain power, using the same strategies that former president, Thabo Mbeki and his fellow-travellers used.

Fractious leadership conflicts within the ruling party should be of concern not only to ANC members. If left unchecked, they are bound to spill over into broader society. In the case of the Zuma-Mbeki battle, several state institutions were compromised as Mbeki’s supporters manipulated them in an attempt to keep Zuma out of office, especially the security cluster.

When he first came to office, Zuma promised to rise above Mbeki’s dirty politics and unify the party. But there are worrying signs suggesting that his supporters may be employing the very tactics used by Mbeki to ensure Zuma a second term of office.

Dumisani Mahaye is an ANC activist from the township of Wesselton near Ermelo in the Msukaligwa Municipality. The Municipality falls in what is without doubt the most treacherous province in the country for activists with principles, namely Mpumalanga.

Mahaye is a staunch Mbeki supporter. According to Mahaye, “Even a blind [person] can see that Zuma is not fit for office. The comrade is not disciplined. How can you have intercourse without protection? Everything that he has touched has had problems. He does not have what it takes.”

Mahaye maintains that he and other Mbeki supporters in the area are paying the price for having campaigned against Zuma, as they are denied opportunities, while Zuma supporters are rewarded with jobs and tenders. According to Mahaye, “In my ward we supported Mbeki, but when the Zuma camp won, that is when they suppress you. They sabotaged all comrades who supported Mbeki.”

The Msukaligwa Community Committee, which he and his comrades formed, allege that residents need to produce ANC membership cards to qualify for employment. They allege further that tenders are only available to ANC members and a mining trust established in the area is also controlled by the ANC, and those ANC members who are not in favour with the new ruling elite are unable to access opportunities.

More specifically, the Committee alleges that a powerful ANC member linked to the current Premier, David Mabusa, controls deployment decisions in the area, starving Mabusa’s critics of resources. Furthermore, they allege individuals linked to Mabusa’s competitor for the Premier position in 2008, Lassy Chiwayo, as well as ANC Provincial Executive Committee member, Fish Mahlalela, have been marginalised.

These grievances led to violent protests against the ANC-controlled council in February and Mahaye become the de-facto spokesperson of this struggle.

After these protests, according to Mahaye, things took an ugly turn.

One night, he alleged that several armed policemen broke down the door to his house, saying they were looking for guns and petrol bombs. Mahaye said that in spite of the fact that they did not find anything, “They ordered me to lie down and pray, and after praying they said I must crawl to the car. In the car was someone who was involved in the protests who was beaten up to show directions. Both of us had to pray in the big van until we got to the police station.”

“Then they gave us to the Hawks and Intelligence. We went to the control room [in the police station]. The first person introduced himself [as being] from the Middleburg Hawks. Some were from Nelspruit and Polokwane. They wanted to know who was paying me to instigate the protests. I was told I was supplying petrol bombs and that I was buying drugs for people. I was told to make it easy for myself otherwise I will be tortured. I denied all of this. That was when the torturing started.”

Mahaye lay on the floor, demonstrating how they made him lie on his stomach. Some sat on him, he claimed, while others forced his arms back over his head to the point where he could not breathe. He also claimed that they then smothered his face with plastic, and dipped his face into water to stop him from breathing, and repeated these actions over and over again.

According to Mahaye, “You feel that you are gonna die now. They make you say things that are wrong. Until I ended up admitting everything they wanted me to, that I made petrol bombs and was paid for the protests, that I was being paid by Lassie Chilwayo and Fish Mahlalela. I made five different statements about this. They tell you, we know what is going on. We are the Intelligence. You are paid by Bongani Phakati, Lassi and Fish. I was not the only one in the room. Thirty to forty people had been arrested. In each and every room you would hear screams.”

Mahaye was released several days after the alleged torture incident, by which time his injuries had almost healed. According to City Press journalist, Sizwe Sama Yende, who covered the Wesselton protests, other activists that were released at the same time complained of torture at the hands of the police. Sama Yende related, “Some said they were suffocated, others said they were kicked. Some were smothered with the tube [a piece of an inner tyre tube]. They were all asked the same questions. They were asked if they were linked to particular politicians.”

Sama Yende went on to explain, “The torture [of activists] has become quite common these days, especially in Mpumalanga. The police ask people political questions. They ask you, which faction do you affiliate to? [Former Premier] Matthews Phosa is one name that comes up often, as are Mahlalela and Chiwayo.”

Provincial spokesperson for the Mpumalanga SAPS, Captain Leonard Hlati, declined to comment on Mahaye’s claims as the matter was under investigation by the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD). According to the ICD’s spokesperson, Moses Dlamini, they are investigating the case. He said that a complicating factor in Mahaye’s case is that he did not consult with a doctor immediately after the incident.

It is unclear how widespread the phenomenon of political torture is beyond Mpumalanga. Activists from various social movements have alleged torture at the hands of the police in the past.

One of the most publicised cases in this regard took place in 2004, when several members of the Landless Peoples’ Movement (LPM) alleged political torture at the hands of the police and the Crime Intelligence Division. They lost the criminal case at Magistrate’s Court level and did not pursue a civil case. Last year community leaders and their families from the former KwaNdebele homeland alleged that they were interrogated by members of the Middelburg Serious and Violent Crimes Unit who – they claimed – suffocated them with refuse bags and kicked, punched and electrocuted them.

Yet according to Wits University Law clinic attorney, Peter Jordi, who specialises in civil torture claims, criminal suspects are the main victims of torture and not political activists, which implies either that political torture is not a widespread problem yet, or that political torture is a growing problem, but that this has not been recognised as such yet. Activists tend not to document police harassment, making it difficult to pinpoint trends with precision. However, the anecdotal evidence points to a problem.

According to Dlamini, South African law does not recognise torture as a discrete offence, but defined these cases as assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm. This means that statistics about the prevalence of torture are difficult to extrapolate. But according to Jordi, using anecdotal evidence from his own caseload, the use of torture in South African prisons has continued from the apartheid era, with a slight decline in the early 2000’s. But, according to Jordi, “Now it is happening all over the place. They are torturing people for nothing.”

In a workshop on police torture in 2010, the ICD noted as one of its challenges the “code of silence and culture of cover-up prevalent in the police.” Dlamini conceded that it was extremely difficult to investigate torture cases. However, they dealt with this problem by using specialist investigators.

Given what appears to be an upswing in torture of criminals, it should surprise no one if South Africa experiences an upswing in political torture as well. Activists need to be both forewarned and forearmed with information, so that they know what to do if this happens to them.

The problem with torture cases internationally is that they are difficult to prove, especially criminal cases. The burden of proof differs between criminal and civil cases: in the former, the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the torture took place, whereas in the latter, the judge decides on the basis of the less onerous test of the balance of probabilities.

The two most common methods used by the police are electrocution and suffocation where a rubber tube, towel, plastic bag, or condom is placed over the head to stop the victim breathing. The victim’s head may also be placed in a bucket of water, which is consistent with Mahaye’s account.

Electrocution is easier to detect afterwards, as muscle damage can be picked up in blood samples; but the instrument favoured by police to administer the shocks, the dynamo used to power landline phones, is difficult to come by now. As a result, suffocation is becoming more prevalent, which is much more difficult to prove as little physical evidence is left afterwards.

An additional problem identified by Jordi is that the police who use torture have learned how to cover their tracks to prevent successful prosecutions. This is easier in criminal cases as the accused are aware of a pending case from the outset of the investigation and can therefore destroy evidence, whereas in civil cases, evidence can be assembled before the accused become aware that a case is pending. But victims need to act quickly and provide evidence within a week of the incident having taken place, as prospects for success taper off sharply after that. Medical examinations need to take place as soon as possible after the incident.

According to Jordi, the ICD rely on the police to undertake investigations into torture allegations, although they oversee the investigations. “You cannot rely on the police to investigate the police,” he stated. By collecting direct and circumstantial evidence quickly, Jordi has won many civil cases for his clients.

Criminal cases are also traumatic for the victims, who may not want to continue with a civil case if they lose a criminal case. The LPM members who alleged torture never pursued the civil case after they lost the criminal case for lack of evidence, as the criminal trial was simply too discouraging. Furthermore, the prospects of an adverse costs order – always a risk in a civil case – was another chilling factor.

The ANC has a strong social democratic history; but it also has a history of intolerance of those who think differently in the liberation movement. Many ANC members have allowed this culture of intolerance to take root, failing to take individual or collective responsibility for the actions it has led to. Now it would seem that the chickens are coming home to roost.

While all citizens must take a stand against political intolerance, ANC members have a particular duty to do so, if this intolerance begins within the ranks of the organisation. As insiders, they are more likely than non-ANC members to be privy to how intolerance develops and is practiced.

The ANC forms the culture and identity of millions of South Africans. As a result, it will dominate the political landscape for some to come, in spite of signs of fragmentation of its support. Yet in spite of its dominance and the complacency it may breed, ANC members must think beyond their own noses on the need for political diversity.

It is in the long-term interests of each and every member to break the cycle of retribution against critics. Today, an ANC member may support a particular leader’s bid for the highest office in the ANC on the understanding that if that candidate wins, then the member will be rewarded with jobs and tenders. But tomorrow, if the member’s leader is deposed, then he or she may be subjected to the very treatment that those who fell out of favour were subjected to. This is an unsustainable way of running a political organisation; in time, the organisation will tear itself apart.

Then there are the civic duties of all South Africans to mobilise against intolerance. Crime-weary South Africans must not turn a blind eye to ordinary garden-variety torture of criminals, as tomorrow it could happen to them if they fall foul of the law. An ‘eye for an eye’ mentality can allow a culture of torture to take root in the security apparatus, which will affect criminals and non-criminals alike, including political critics.

South Africans should be especially concerned if specialist policing units like the Hawks and the “intelligence cluster” are manipulated to stifle dissent, which is why Mahaye’s allegations should be taken so seriously and investigated to their conclusion.

This week’s revelations by the Sunday Times newspaper that its journalists Stephan Höfstatter and Mzilakazi wa Afrika are being harassed by members of the security and intelligence cluster, is a clarion call to all citizens to demand transparency and accountability from this increasingly powerful part of government, which appears to be turning into the Praetorian Guard of the ruling elite.

To adapt Pastor Martin Niemöller’s famous ‘First they came…’ poem: First they came for the dissidents in exile and put them in the camps, and I did not speak out, because I was not a dissident. Then they came for the ‘Zim-Zims’ with tyres and matches, and I did not speak out, because I was a ‘Warara’. Then they came for the LPM supporters with rubber tubes, and I did not speak out, because I was not an LPM supporter. Then they came for the Mbeki supporters with plastic and buckets of water, and I did not speak, because I was a Zuma supporter. Then they came for me, and there was no one left to speak out for me.

IOL: Media slam DA’s Majavu blacklisting

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For the DA a journalist that takes the lives of poor people seriously is automatically biased. They are now exposed for their authoritarianism and bias to the middle classes.

http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/media-slam-da-s-majavu-blacklisting-1.1024818?

Media slam DA’s Majavu blacklisting

February 11 2011 at 11:13am
By Marianne Merten

The DA’s blacklisting of a Sowetan journalist sets a “problematic precedent”, says Jane Duncan, professor and chairwoman of the Media and Information Society at Rhodes University.

It was of concern if any political party that carried public power took a step to stem the flow of information in this way, she said on Thursday.

“If they have concerns, they are not dealing with the problem by refusing to provide information to that journalist. They should continue to take the concerns to the Press Ombudsman to establish systematic bias,” Duncan said.

“If the journalist is biased, it will come out in the wash.”

DA executive director of communications and research Ross van der Linde is quoted in Thursday’s Sowetan as confirming the party had cut all communication with Anna Majavu, adding it was not obliged to send information to any individual or organisation.

“Majavu is not a journalist. Some journalists and editors disagree with our policies and views, and they are entitled to do so. But Anna Majavu is a former South African Municipal Workers’ Union (Samwu) spin doctor, who has a particular political agenda,” he said.

The DA’s decision followed a complaint to the press ombudsman over a story which linked one of its MPs, and two metro police officers, to the shooting with rubber bullets of two children in Khayelitsha. The story was based on the outcome of an arbitration process.

In September, the press ombudsman directed the Sowetan to publish a correction of a sentence that incorrectly attributed a statement to the arbitrator, as well as a summary of the ruling. The newspaper was also reprimanded for a misleading headline.

The DA’s communication director, Gareth van Onselen, said on Thursday the newspaper had “failed properly to comply”, adding the DA had a long and detailed record of bias on the part of Majavu.

“There is no point in working with a journalist who is not interested in reporting the news,” he said.

Duncan disagreed and pointed out that the DA had been vocal in support of media self-regulation and freedom of expression. Cutting off communication was “completely inappropriate” and sent the message that the DA would only deal with journalists who gave it positive coverage.

The South African National Editors’ Forum (Sanef) said it was “deeply perturbed” by the reported blacklisting of Majavu. It said the move “flies in the face of the DA’s founding liberal values, including commitment to press freedom”.

Calling into question Majavu’s credibility as a journalist simply because she had worked for a trade union was “preposterous”.

Sanef called on the DA to rethink its position and lift the ban.

Meanwhile, the labour sector has come out in support of Majavu. Both the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa and Samwu condemned the DA’s “dastardly censorship” and “immature behaviour”. – Cape Times

SACSIS: Media Freedom Is Your Freedom (Or Is It?)

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http://www.sacsis.org.za/site/article/542.1

Media Freedom Is Your Freedom (Or Is It?)

By Jane Duncan

On Wednesday the 4th of August, Sunday Times reporter Mzilikazi wa Afrika was arrested at the offices of the Sunday Times newspaper, in response to a complaint laid by the Premier of Mpumalanga province, David Mabuza. Many aspects of wa Afrika’s arrest have raised troubling questions about the appropriateness of the state’s actions, and have fuelled speculation that political pressure was brought to bear on the police to act against wa Afrika for his activities as a journalist.

Wa Afrika’s account of his arrest is chilling. What concerned him the most was the fact that he was taken to Mpumalanga to appear in court, which led him to fear that he was going to be killed. His fears were well founded, as wa Afrika and Mail and Guardian journalist Lucky Sindane were on a hit list of people targeted for assassination, and two government officials on the list had already been killed.

These events have reinforced already-deep concerns about the state of freedom of expression in South Africa. But there are those who are unsurprised by these events. Many small town political activists are all too familiar with the treatment wa Afrika was subjected to. These activists are rich repositories of information about small town repression, and the true state of South Africa’s democracy more generally.

Yet their experiences remain largely unexamined and their insights untapped, owing to the news media’s bias towards news in the major urban centres. As a result, abuses of power in outlying areas often fall under the radar, emerging into public view only when they impinge on events in these news centres.

Activist Seun Mogotji’s sympathises with wa Afrika. In responding to the journalist’s account of his arrest, he said, “I am a victim of that. This is becoming a police state. If the government must be criticised, they must be criticised within the framework of the government. Illiterate people are being brainwashed.” He related his own story.

Mogotji is local secretary of the SACP in Moutse and spokesperson for the Moutse Demarcation Forum. Mogotji has become the voice of the struggle to resist the imposed incorporation of the area into Limpopo.

The SACP in Moutse has alleged a spate of assaults, cases of intimidation, harassment and wrongful arrests ‘aimed at members of the community who hold different political views than those of police officials’. Mogotji has been arrested several times for incitement to public violence and public violence, but these cases have been dropped. He claims that he has been declined bail for no good reason. In Mogotji’s words, “the police punish before they prosecute.”

In one incident, a comrade of Mogotji’s was arrested with him, simply for “driving with Seun.” In another incident, he says that a senior police officer told him, “they will make sure I lose my mouth if I don’t shut it.” In yet another incident, he describes how a large contingent of police came to arrest him at his place of work, cordoning off the whole building: as Mogotji commented “they wanted it to be like a movie, like wa Afrika’s arrest.”

Mogotji feels that the police have become even more authoritarian under the Jacob Zuma administration; he said, “Things are worse under Zuma. I am even missing (former President Thabo) Mbeki.” He attributes this growing authoritarianism to the Minister of Police Nathi Mthetwa and Deputy Minister of Police Fikile Mbalula’s ANC Youth League backgrounds. Given the League’s hostility to the SACP – culminating in its leader Julius Malema recently declaring “war” on the SACP and threatening to “beat the dog (SACP) until the owner (Secretary General Blade Nzimande) comes out” – Mogotji is not surprised that communists are bearing the brunt of the police’s wrath.

Mogotji feels that small town repression is largely unreported, and attributes this to the shallow “telephone journalism” practiced by many newsrooms. Furthermore, their lack of interest in small town politics makes them reluctant to invest scarce investigative resources to dig deeper. In spite of these shortcomings, Mogotji feels that the proposed Media Appeals Tribunal will not enhance the quality of journalism as it is designed “to make sure that the people shut their mouths.”

Sam Radebe from the Greater Harrismith Socio-economic Development Forum was also not surprised by wa Afrika’s account of events, given his own long history of conflict with the police, which he related. In 2004, he was part of the service delivery march that led to the fatal shooting of 17-year-old, Tebogo Mkhonza, and that ignited the province in protest action. He and 13 others were charged with public violence and the apartheid-era crime of sedition, simply for having participated in the march, but they were found not guilty.

In October 2009, the community organised a march against poor service delivery, after having notified the municipality of their intention to do so, as required by law. A huge contingent of police was bussed in from neighbouring towns. According to Radebe, “on the day of the march, there was a lot of interference from the ANC and the government asking them not to march.” As the march was about to start, the police officer in charge told the convenor that he had received an instruction from the MEC for Safety and Security in the province that the march should disperse in two minutes. The protestors refused, arguing that their march was legal.

While the German public broadcaster ARD was conducting a live interview with the public relations officer of the Forum, the police arrested him and other protestors and started beating those arrested. The protestors then became angry and started to riot in a fit of collective anger that spread throughout the township. The ANC offices were burnt down and two ANC councillors were attacked.

This account of events reinforces a key finding of rapid response research into recent protests undertaken by the University of Johannesburg’s Centre for Sociological Research, that brutal responses by the police contribute to violence in protests, rather than the protestors being solely responsible.

In April, Mpumalanga Premier David Mabuza told a press conference the following, “On a daily basis, on a weekly basis I receive reports: intelligence reports with classified information. The reports tell me about your activities [and] about ordinary people doing things…In the service delivery protests, they report who is who.”

These words ring in the ears as Radebe recounts how he is followed everywhere by men in plain clothes; a constant feature of his life since the National Intelligence Agency was dispatched to investigate the 2004 protests.

He has also experienced informal repression. In December 2009, he attended a media conference in Upington organised by the Amandla magazine and the National Community Radio Forum. While at the conference, he was phoned constantly and threatened with legal cases “that will see you locked up for fifteen years” by people who identified themselves only as the “law enforcers.”

After returning to Harrismith, Radebe was attacked by four men while walking home, beaten, and threatened with a gun by a man who said, “you are the one who thinks he knows better about the struggle.” He has opened cases, but these cases go nowhere, while the public violence cases against his comrades move with speed through the system.

Radebe is not happy about the news media’s silence on the threats to activists. While Radebe opposes the establishment of the Media Appeals Tribunal, and is mobilising locally in support of media freedom, he argues, “the media must clean its own house, because they do not consider stories from these small towns to be important. There are so many unreported incidents taking place in towns like Harrismith and Warden and the media must dedicate themselves to the lives of the poor. People are being exploited by the police, but the media don’t report on those things. If there is rioting, [only] then they will entertain it.”

Mogotji and Radebe’s stories point to growing state authoritarianism and informal repression. Many, many similar stories remain unreported. They are aware of the possible consequences of telling their stories. But have decided that – in the long run – staying silent is more dangerous than speaking out, as sunlight is the best disinfectant against the rot that is setting in.

The relationship between formal and informal repression is ill understood. But in the absence of hard evidence of a relationship, what can be said is that the failure to deal with formal repression creates the space for informal repression to take root, as a climate of impunity prevails.

Small towns are particularly susceptible to this rot as economic opportunities are few. Local elites can use their control of what few resources exist to dispense political favours and punish political dissidents. Mpumalanga is the most extreme expression of this rot, but there is no reason to believe that the rot will stop there.

To the extent that the news media have failed to report on the de-democratisation of small towns, they are failing the South African public and even themselves. This failure caught up with them on Wednesday the 4th of August.

The media are now appealing to the South African public to support their freedom, re-invoking the South African National Editor’s Forum (SANEF) slogan that “media freedom is your freedom.” According to SANEF, “media freedom guarantees your right to know what’s going on in your country, and participate fully in the decisions affecting you.”

Activists were among the first to respond to this call, when civil society organisations and social movements released a statement condemning the arrest of wa Afrika. Among the spokespeople were Ashraf Cassiem, whose front teeth were kicked in while resisting an eviction, and Maureen Mnisi, veteran of many arrests and assaults for her activism in the shacks of Protea South.

These activists have proved themselves capable of rising above their reservations about the media’s sincerity in professing that media freedom is, in fact, everyone’s freedom. They have defended the broader principle of freedom of expression, and media freedom as an instance of that freedom.

In being called on to defend this broader freedom that has been so badly eroded on their watch, will the media finally do the same?

SACSIS: The Return of State Repression

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The Return of State Repression

By Jane Duncan

Date posted: 31 May 2010
View this article online here: http://www.sacsis.org.za/site/article/489.1

The South African Police Service (SAPS) has issued a directive to a number of municipalities not to allow marches for the duration of the 2010 World Cup. How many have received it is unclear.

This ban came to light when a civil society march for quality public education, scheduled to take place on 10 June to Constitution Hill in Braamfontein, was banned last week. The Anti-privatisation Forum (APF) also planned to march to protest against aspects of the World Cup and general service delivery issues, but their march was banned too.

A snap survey conducted at the end of last week of other municipalities hosting World Cup matches revealed that a blanket ban on gatherings is in operation. According to the Rustenberg municipality, ‘gatherings are closed for the World Cup’. The Mbombela municipality was told by the SAPS that they were not going to allow gatherings during the World Cup. The Cape Town City Council claimed that it continues to accept applications for marches, but indicated that it ‘may be a problem’ during the World Cup period. According to the Nelson Mandela Bay and Ethekwini municipalities, the police will not allow gatherings over the World Cup period.

Why this wholesale suspension of the constitutional right to protest? According to Johannesburg Metro police, the police do not have the capacity to police marches and the World Cup simultaneously. Yet Gauteng SAPS spokesperson Eugene Opperman has denied the existence of a ban, telling the Mail and Guardian newspaper that ‘there’s been a miscommunication. People are saying that there’s a total ban on marches, but this is not the case’.

Given the weight of the evidence, it can be concluded that the ban does, in fact, exist. How high up the source of the banning directive goes is anybody’s guess.

The argument about a lack of police resources is not a credible reason to justify such a ban. Only under a State of Emergency can derogable rights like the right to assembly, demonstration and picket be suspended, which lend credence to the argument made by the education march’s organisers that there is an undeclared State of Emergency in force for the duration of the World Cup.

The talking heads of the security establishment are divided on whether an actual threat to the security of the World Cup exists. But what they agree on is that – to the extent that there is a threat – it will not be homegrown but imported. This makes the SAPS’ determination to usurp municipalities’ decision-making about gatherings difficult to understand. In fact, their actions imply that protest action is being seen as a national security threat rather than a traffic management concern mainly.

It should also be noted that there is no provision in the Regulation of Gatherings Act for gatherings to be prohibited because the police do not have the resources to police marches. This omission is for good reason, as it prevents more manipulative administrations from deciding, for self-serving reasons, to starve the relevant police structures of resources, and then ban protests against its own performance on the ground of lack of capacity.

In any event, if the police are struggling with resource constraints, then the government has only itself to blame. In 2006, an ill-advised restructuring of the SAPS led to a reduction in the number of police involved in crowd management, and led to de-skilling, in spite of the fact that the number protests had nearly doubled from 2005 to 2006.

At the time of the restructuring, the Institute for Security Studies warned that the police should anticipate an escalation of protest action over the World Cup period, and plan accordingly.

If they have done their homework, the police will be aware that mega-events like the World Cup tend to become lightening rods for a range of hopes, fears and discontents, all seeking expression in the international media. They would also be aware that internationally, the police have been forced to acknowledge that contestations around mega-events are a contemporary reality, and that outright repression of dissent is not an option.

The Government Communication and Information System has identified the mega-event as a ‘communications opportunity of a lifetime’, as the eyes of the international community will be firmly fixed on South Africa for the duration of the Cup.

But many who are unhappy with the huge expenditure on the World Cup, and local service delivery issues generally, recognise the same possibilities: as one aspirant protestor put it, “We will have access to an international stage. Don’t think that we won’t use it.” They will want to use the event to focus media attention on the simmering discontent in the country, the extent of which was brought home once again by a quality of life survey released last week by TNS Surveys.

One trade union official, keen to mobilise protests during the World Cup, related some informal discussions with the police. They argued that South Africa’s image had taken a beating recently, with international images of the xenophobic attacks, violent service delivery and the soldier’s invasion of the Union Buildings grounds beamed out across the world. The police reasoned that the ban was justified to prevent negative messages from even finding their way onto the streets in the first place, leading the unionist to ask wryly, “Does this mean that we should ban democracy?”

The SAPS could well be motivated by the need to remake South Africa’s brand in the international media as a land of peace, reconciliation and stability.

As if this censorship of dissent around the World Cup is not a bad enough reason, a consideration of the facts suggests even deeper reasons for the ban.

The argument about a lack of resources does not explain why social movement marches have been banned, using the World Cup as the excuse, since March this year. The Ethekwini Municipality initially banned a march in March, apparently citing the World Cup as a reason. In fact, Durban activists have been reporting on police threats of bannings as early as the end of 2009.

Marches have been banned in the troubled Vaal region since March, not on the pretext of the World Cup, but in an attempt to contain rising struggles against poor service delivery. According to the Chief of Traffic and Security, “The MEC for Gauteng Community Safety, has instructed that no permission for marches in Gauteng should be granted until further notice. This instruction is given by the MEC due to the volatile situation in the townships.”

Then in April, a march planned by the Public and Allied Workers Union of South Africa in Vanderbijl Park for the 5 May was banned. In spite of the fact that the Vaal is off the beaten track in relation to the World Cup, the banning took place in response to a directive sent on April 29 by the Sebokeng Cluster of SAPS to the station commanders of all police stations in the Cluster, which reads as follows: “By the directive of the Sebokeng Cluster, Major General DS de Lange you are hereby informed that no authorization must be given for marches until the end of the World Cup 2010.”

An ill-understood shift in policing culture seems to be taking place. Activists in several cities complain that they are finding it increasingly difficult to march. Police are slow to respond to applications, and are obstructive in meetings to negotiate conditions. When they impose unreasonable conditions or even ban marches, they are generally reluctant to put their reasons in writing.

With the local government elections looming, the World Cup must be a blessing in disguise for beleaguered municipalities facing the wrath of angry residents. They can now ban marches with impunity, using the World Cup as an excuse; hence their eager embrace of a directive that usurps their own powers and functions.

Seen in this light, the ban could be seen as an intensification of a recent trend towards suppressing the waves of protest action that have engulfed Jacob Zuma’s administration.

If this is a correct reading of the ban, then we have a much more serious problem on our hands than a misguided, but ultimately time-bound bout of censorship. It unsettles the well-worn assertion of many political analysts that Jacob Zuma’s administration is more open and tolerant of dissenting views than the Mbeki administration.

Many activists in the cities where the ban is in effect say that they have all but given up on notifying municipalities, and are marching anyway. Add the ‘shoot to kill’ approach, the moves towards militarisation of the police, and the beefing up of security capacity for the World Cup into the mix, and we have a problem waiting to happen.

Do the SAPS understand the implications of their actions? If TNS’ survey is correct, and levels of discontent have reached dangerously high levels, it could take one incident where an over-stressed policeman – ill-trained in crowd management – shoots to kill in an ‘illegal’ protest, to spark a social explosion.

Many South Africans who lived through the horrors of apartheid resist using the word ‘repression’ too lightly, and for understandable reasons. But if one considers the definition of repression by social movement theorist Charles Tilly as “any action by another group that raises the contender’s cost of collective action,” then we are, in fact, seeing the rise of state repression.

Furthermore, social movement research analysing volatile situations over a period of two centuries, has shown that repression is an ineffective way of containing mass dissent. Ironically, it can fuel an intensification of mass protest, as ‘injustice frames’ are created around the state, strengthening the resolve of protestors to remove the state.

Repression can also lead to grievances being driven underground, pursued by leaders who may become as belligerent as their oppressors. In some countries, the end result has been the creation of terrorist groups. So the solution creates the problem.

Which way South Africa goes is, to an extent, in the hands of the SAPS, and if recent indications are anything to go by, our future is not in safe hands.

Feel it. It is here — the return of state repression.