Category Archives: Le Monde diplomatique

Le Monde Diplomatique: Opération coup de poing à Durban

http://blog.mondediplo.net/2009-10-01-Operation-coup-de-poing-a-Durban

On n’avait plus vu cela depuis les années 1990. Largement manipulées par le pouvoir blanc de l’apartheid, les violences politiques qui accompagnèrent de 1987 à 1994 le cheminement de l’Afrique du Sud vers la démocratie avaient vite disparu une fois Nelson Mandela installé à la présidence. Depuis, les conflits sociaux se jouaient le plus souvent dans des manifestations pacifiques et devant les tribunaux. Mais, au Kwazulu-Natal, tout cela vient de déraper.

C’est dans le camp de squatteurs de Kennedy Road, à Clare Estate dans la banlieue de Durban (province du Kwazulu-Natal), que se situe le noyau dur d’Abahlali baseMjondolo (ABM), l’un de ces mouvements sociaux mobilisant les résidents des bidonvilles pour des conditions de vie plus dignes [1]. Le 26 septembre, ce camp de sept mille habitants fut attaqué par une milice armée de bâtons, de couteaux et d’armes à feu. Toute la nuit, destructions méthodiques et tabassages en règle se poursuivirent, sans que la police n’intervienne. Au nombre d’une quarantaine, ces nervis revinrent les nuits suivantes continuer leurs opérations. La police, cette fois présente sur les lieux, n’intervint pas. « Les M’pondos ont envahi Kennedy. Kennedy appartient aux Zulus ! », criaient les attaquants, d’après les témoignages des résidents diffusés par ABM. Les logements des membres du mouvement ont été particulièrement visés. L’opération s’est soldée par « quatre morts, de nombreux blessés et des milliers de personnes déplacées [2] ».

Des intellectuels sud-africains, au nombre desquels l’ancien rapporteur des Nations Unies pour la Palestine John Dugard, ont signé une déclaration commune dans laquelle ils indiquent : « Il semble, malheureusement, que les efforts pacifiques d’Abahlali baseMjondolo pour organiser et mobiliser les communautés en faveur du changement et pour résister aux expulsions du camp de Kennedy Road menacent d’importants intérêts fonciers et politiques locaux. C’est vraisemblalement pour cette raison qu’ils se trouvent confrontés à une répression violente qui rappelle la période de l’apartheid. Nous sommes particulièrement choqués par les imputations de complicité de la police dans ces attaques [3]. »

Des cadres locaux du Congrès national africain (ANC, au pouvoir) sont ensuite venus prendre le contrôle du camp, et ont commencé à vérifier les cartes d’appartenance au parti, imputant la responsabilité des attaques aux membres d’ABM. Plusieurs des dirigeants de ce mouvement sont en fuite ; leur président, M. S’bu Zikode, a fait une déclaration vidéo dans laquelle il se déclare « exilé dans son propre pays [4] ».

A la veille de la Coupe du monde de football, la grande affaire de l’année 2010 qui devrait déverser sur l’Afrique du Sud les mannes du tourisme et les projecteurs des médias, il est probable que certains politiciens pressés cherchent à mettre au pas les pauvres des camps de squatteurs, qui entendent pour leur part profiter de l’événement comme d’une tribune pour leurs revendications.

Si l’on ne peut imaginer que cette attaque ait été décidée au plus haut niveau, l’épisode montre de façon alarmante le retour en politique de la « carte raciale », sur laquelle M. Jacob Zuma a appuyé son accession à la direction de l’ANC et à la présidence du pays, en endossant lors de la campagne, qui l’a opposé à M. Thabo Mbeki, les habits traditionnels de chef zulu.

L’instrumentalisation politique de tensions présentées comme « ethniques » (Zulus contre Xhosas, nationaux contre immigrés, etc.) reste le talon d’Achille d’une « nation arc-en-ciel » extrêmement inégalitaire et qui ne réussit pas à intégrer les plus pauvres de ses citoyens.

Violences urbaines en Afrique du Sud

http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/carnet/2008-05-22-Violences-en-Afrique-du-Sud

jeudi 22 mai 2008

Violences urbaines en Afrique du Sud

Depuis dix jours, la population d’Afrique du Sud assiste, effarée et impuissante, à la violence extrême déployée contre les résidents étrangers des bidonvilles. Tout a démarré le 11 mai à Alexandra, l’emblématique bidonville situé en proche périphérie de Johannesburg, à côté du quartier d’affaires ultra-moderne de Sandton. Les agressions ont rapidement été répliquées dans d’autres quartiers, faisant 42 morts et un grand nombre de blessés, semant la panique. Plus de 16 000 personnes ont quitté leur shack, cherchant refuge dans les églises, les postes de police, les écoles… La police a arrêté 400 personnes. Les agresseurs s’en prenaient aux étrangers qui vivent sans papiers dans ces quartiers, ayant fui notamment la répression politique et la crise économique du Zimbabwe, et qu’ils accusent de leur voler emplois et logements.

Dans une attitude désormais classique de déni, le gouvernement de M. Thabo Mbeki s’est empressé de pointer du doigt une sinistre « troisième force (1) » — rappelant qu’en 1994, des éléments pro-apartheid avaient jeté de l’huile sur le feu entre l’African National Congress (ANC) et l’Inkhata Freedom Party, pour provoquer des violences présentées comme inter-ethniques. De son côté, l’ANC, désormais dirigé par M. Jacob Zuma, attribuait la responsabilité du chaos aux « échecs du gouvernement ».

En difficulté sur l’énergie (avec les coupures d’électricité qui ont affecté le pays depuis début 2008), sur l’alimentation (avec les hausses de prix) et sur la délinquance, ce gouvernement en fin de règne apparaît également incapable de maîtriser la crise du logement qu’il a laissé se développer dans le pays. Avec l’extension progressive du « Slums Act », une loi visant à éradiquer les bidonvilles, il semblait en effet penser qu’il suffisait d’en décréter la suppression et de procéder à des expulsions manu militari pour que les pauvres rentrent chez eux.

Leçon de cette dernière semaine, la violence quotidienne de la vie des bidonvilles, où la grande pauvreté le dispute au mépris des autorités, peut conduire à un embrasement incontrôlable. A l’approche de la Coupe du monde de football qui doit se tenir en 2010, la valeur foncière d’un quartier comme Alexandra suscite inévitablement de grands appétits.

Au début de l’année, nous avions rencontré, à Alexandra, dans la zone de Marlboro South, les habitants d’une usine, désaffectée après les émeutes anti-apartheid de 1986, et squattée depuis lors. Ils s’attendaient à se voir signifier à tout moment un avis d’expulsion, car les anciens propriétaires avaient obtenu en justice la restitution de leur bien. A l’intérieur de l’usine vivaient deux cents foyers, installés dans des cabanes de bois et de carton empilées comme un château de cartes sur deux étages (« Nous sommes comme les oiseaux, nous faisons notre nid en hauteur ! »). Un lit pouvait servir à quatre personnes qui y dormaient à tour de rôle. En l’absence d’électricité, on s’y chauffait à la paraffine, au risque de provoquer un incendie. Sud-Africains fraîchement débarqués des homelands, Zimbabwéens ou Mozambicains sans papiers, les résidents s’y côtoyaient en bonne intelligence, s’asseyant ensemble chaque soir sur le muret de la cour d’enceinte pour discuter. Ils travaillaient comme agents de sécurité ou ouvriers du bâtiment, pour des salaires de misère ; avec 35 rands par jour, soit environ deux euros, impossible même de payer le transport : il fallait aller travailler à pied. « Nous venons de différents endroits, et chacun a ses habitudes. Nous ne nous sommes pas mis d’accord pour faire à manger en commun », expliquait à regret M. White, un des habitants (un Sud-Africain). Chacun pour soi, donc, mais plutôt compagnons de galère que partisans de la guerre civile.

De nombreuses organisations ont décidé de se coordonner pour assurer la sécurité de tous les résidents et pour empêcher de nouveaux crimes — montrant ainsi le peu de crédit dont jouit une police plus crainte que respectée. Il faudrait, quand la poussière sera retombée, que la population soit associée à un véritable plan de réhabilitation de ces quartiers.
Philippe Rivière

(1) Peter Fabricius, « “Third force behind attacks” », Cape Times, Le Cap, 21 mai.

Le Monde diplomatique: Whose South Africa?

http://mondediplo.com/2008/05/13southafrica

Le Monde diplomatique, May 2008

‘The world cup will be our chance to make our voices heard’

Whose South Africa?

South Africa will host the World Cup in 2010 so construction – and corruption – is booming. But almost none of the building or the money can be accessed by the poor who live in shantytowns without proper water, sanitation or electricity. These inequalities could be a major issue in the 2009 presidential election.

By Philippe Rivière

“All people shall have the right to live where they choose,
be decently housed, and to bring up their families
in comfort and security.”

(Article 9 of the Freedom Charter adopted
by the Congress of the People at Kliptown
on 26 June 1955.)

There’s a house for sale for $125 just two kilometres from the beach at False Bay, in Khayelitsha, a township east of Cape Town, between Table Mountain and the Cape of Good Hope. The downside is that it is in the QQ section, an informal settlement on marshy land beneath the high-tension cables of Eskom, South Africa’s public electricity utility. Despite a ban, the area is covered with wooden shacks with corrugated iron roofs, the homes of hundreds of thousands of urban poor.

More than 20 years after QQ was squatted, its 600 families still have no sanitation and rely on eight taps for drinking water. An anarchic tangle of electricity cables, hidden beneath tarmac, connects the shantytown to metered supplies in the adjoining legal settlement. Fatal fires are frequent. Anything that can be let out is for hire, even a key to the latrines. Not far from Mzonke Poni’s home, a branch from the main supply cable is concealed in a corner, behind a pile of boxes: he has lived in QQ with his mother for more than six years and hopes to avoid being cut off during the next police raid.

“We’ve got our own Waterfront,” says Poni. QQ has appropriated the name of Cape Town’s smart district because, for four months of the year, winter rains flood all the shacks on low ground. Some residents have raised the soil by a few centimetres to buy themselves enough time to move chairs, television and personal effects to the home of a neighbour or family member.

QQ is in Western Cape province, where half-a-million people are waiting for homes. Wave after wave of young workers flood into the shantytowns, most of them from the rural districts of Eastern Cape. To stay, they need the approval of the local residents’ committee, which gives priority to couples with young children. Although, or maybe because, life is so precarious, there is a strong sense of community in these areas (1). So it came as a shock when the authorities decided to clear them out, district by district, without any preliminary consultation.

After a fire at Joe Slovo, another informal settlement beneath the flightpath of Cape Town airport, the victims were rehoused in new buildings further east, in the Delft area. But people who had not been affected by the fire began to be forcibly relocated. Mzwanele Zulu, a community leader, said: “We wrote to officials from the town council to the president’s office, but nobody would give us any explanation. We refused to be moved by force, we’re close to transport and work here.” The inhabitants decided to block the nearby N2 highway. The reaction was immediate: “The police fired [rubber bullets], then arrested us for incitement to violence.” The residents’ groups went to court over the evictions from Joe Slovo (2), but it was too late to save the school they had set up in a shabby building.

Rumours and dirty tricks

It is late morning in Delft and there is a palpable tension. A woman trying to get to the town hall climbs into our car and asks: “Do you think it’s right, giving new houses to young people, when we’ve been on the waiting list for years?” From a Mercedes, touring streets of newly built houses, a megaphone tells residents to disobey the security guards who are watching the area and who have started an unauthorised census whose final purpose is unknown. The courts upheld the status quo in a dispute between the constructors, Thubelisa Homes, and the squatters who occupied the houses before they were even finished. The housing minister, Lindiwe Sisulu (3), had visited on 16 December 2007 and handed over the keys to families evicted from Joe Slovo, forgetting that a third of the dwellings had been promised to Delft residents.

At Delft town hall, two women claim the same house. “It happens increasingly frequently,” explains Pam Bukes, secretary of the anti-eviction committee. “You can’t blame her [one of the women] for trying it on, but I’m sure she isn’t on any of our lists.”Inter-community tensions are rife. Most of Delft’s population is of mixed race (as defined under apartheid) and votes for the Democratic Alliance (DA). They suspect the African National Congress (ANC) of inciting young blacks from outside to try to force their way in. Martin Legassick, an historian and activist closely involved in the residents’ committees, said: “The place is alive with rumours and dirty tricks, it’s no wonder people are worked up. But bear in mind that the blacks were never able to register for the housing lists.” When something is in short supply, legality goes out the window.

A man of 83 symbolises the seriousness of the problem. He pays out most of his pension to rent a shack in a backyard. As DA councillor Frank Martin, an adviser to Cape Town mayor Helen Zille, points out: “He’s been on the waiting list for more than 20 years. People keep asking me about the risk of violence. The only way to calm things down is to apply the same rules to everybody. Sometimes it’s difficult to deal with the authorities – on Christmas Eve they took advantage of the fact that we’d all gone to demonstrate at the courthouse and sent in the security forces to clear the houses. People want a roof, water, sanitation and local employment. The government is playing with fire by ignoring people’s basic needs. It spends only 1.5% of the budget on housing, compared with 5% to 7% in similar countries.”

Parallel economies

Since South Africa embraced neo-liberalism (open frontiers, economic liberalisation), the huge inequalities that already existed have increased. There are now two parallel economies that never touch; 60% of the population, mostly black and poorly educated, earn less than $450 a month; 2.2% make more than $3,500 a month and enjoy western lifestyles. Unequal land ownership, one of the legacies of apartheid – in 1994, 75% of the population lived on just 13% of the land – contributed to the rural exodus into the townships.

Half live in poverty. According to the United Nations, the current welfare system has only a limited effect on individual poverty and inequality (4). The majority are economically vulnerable and feel the full impact of rising housing costs. “South Africa experienced a significant increase in housing prices from 2000 to 2004-05. It is estimated that house prices increased by 92% in contrast with an average increase of workers’ income estimated at 8.3%.”

The 2.7m homes built with the aid of government subsidies have not been enough to solve the crisis. Demand is rising by more than 200,000 units a year according to the housing ministry: on top of the rural exodus there is a sociological transformation related to political liberalisation, which is reducing the average size of households. There are now some 12.5m households in South Africa, 5m of them in urban areas. According to Legassick, 11% of households live in shacks and 12% in traditional huts; 56% depend entirely upon the government for their housing.

The poorest are being excluded from urban centres. Sometimes they are evicted by subterfuge, lured by the promise of a real house, sometimes under threat of violence. The UN’s special rapporteur blamed the police and a private company, Wozani Security, known as the Red Ants because of their capacity to send 500 men, dressed in red, to empty a building of its inhabitants in a few hours (5).

Moeletsi Mbeki, the brother of President Thabo Mbeki, is a specialist on the area, deputy chairman of the South African Institute of International Affairs and chairman of the South African subsidiary of the Dutch producer of TV reality shows, Endemol.

He said: “South Africa has much in common with post-colonial Algeria. Our economy depends upon mineral extraction. There was a wide sociological gap between grassroots activists and the leaders of the struggle [against apartheid]. The latter did very well out of it, because they took over the state. They and their children now make up the ranks of the emerging middle class. They were lucky enough to get an education; they [ought to have formed] the base of a dynamic private sector in a country where cheap education under apartheid created a huge human resources problem. [Instead] the government spawned an enormous bureaucracy which was spectacularly successful in feeding off these resources, without creating work for the wider population.”

He recalled how in 1991 in Algeria the mismatch between the poverty of the population and the wealth of the privileged members of the political class encouraged the victory of the Islamic Salvation Front. The government’s refusal to accept the result of the ballot plunged the country into civil war.

A living saint

Things aren’t that bad in South Africa. But in a country where 4.2 million struggle to survive on less than a dollar a day, there is resentment of the new rich. The ANC’s image in the shantytowns had been tarnished to the point where even Nelson Mandela is no longer immune from sarcasm: “He’s a living saint… who has privatised water.” The neo-liberal policies that he introduced and his successor Thabo Mbeki continued have not yielded the anticipated levels of foreign investment, but have caused social damage. The Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) programmes, supposed to open up economic opportunity (capital, participation in management) to blacks, have encouraged corruption rather than integrating the long-excluded mass of the population into the economic system.

As early as 2005 the ANC deputy president, Kgalema Motlanthe, stated: “It is the banks that have been the primary beneficiaries of this type of private-sector-led BEE… It should not be (and it is not) the objective of the democratic movement to support or advance such multiple, narrow-based empowerments… Genuine empowerment must focus on the black entrepreneurs who build viable and sustainable businesses [and] will be able to empower others in turn, and will be able to reap full advantage from the new vistas of opportunity that emerge as we integrate the second economy into the first” (6).

“Overall the BEE is crony capitalism,” confirmed Moeletsi Mbeki. “Most of these so-called business leaders are agents of white capital, hand in glove with the state; they aren’t entrepreneurs. Our country is undergoing very rapid de-industrialisation under the joint influence of its lack of entrepreneurial ability and Asian competition. Whole sectors are being undermined: 80% of the footwear bought in South Africa during the 1980s was home-produced. Now 80% is imported, mostly from China. Our mineral resources are enough to allow the government to maintain a welfare state, however limited; but they aren’t enough to support economic development. There is a danger of catastrophe if world prices fall.”

People may question ANC policies, but with 65% of the vote at every election it retains its hegemony. Real opposition to Thabo Mbeki has emerged inside the party, where a leftist coalition from the Communist Party and the Cosatu trade union federation secured the leadership for Jacob Zuma at the ANC national conference in Polokwane in December 2007. If he survives his forthcoming trial on corruption charges, Zuma should become South Africa’s third president in 2009 (7).

But few observers expect a real change of policy. “The ANC has done nothing for us,” an activist said. “Jacob Zuma’s people have been part of the government for 13 years, so they won’t change anything either.” On the ground, on the margins of a system that has let them down, social movements of extraordinary vitality, such as the Anti-Privatisation Forum and Abahlali baseMjondolo (8), are beginning to cohere into national networks and are not afraid to speak out or take to the streets.

In November 2005 police opened fire on 2,000 residents from the Foreman Road settlement, marching on the town hall in Durban. Two demonstrators were wounded and 45 arrested. The same week, in Pretoria, 500 people sacked the home of a member of the municipal council. Confrontations have continued. According to official interior ministry figures, demonstrations about the provision of basic services have increased from an annual average of 6,000 in 2004-05, to around 10,000. In February 2008 police fired on a peaceful meeting in Delft. On 10 March 500 residents of Klaarwater, in Durban, set up barricades and called for the removal of an ANC councillor who had failed to keep his electoral promises over services.

Returning from a recent mission to South Africa, the UN special rapporteur on the right to adequate housing, Miloon Kothari, complained that “there appears to be insufficient meaningful consultation between all levels of government, civil society organisations and affected individuals and communities”. More than $8bn has been budgeted for the building and upgrading of infrastructure for the football World Cup in 2010, including 10 stadiums and a high-speed train. Kothari warned: “Reconverting Johannesburg into a world-class city is already increasing housing prices and increased demand for construction materials has led to a foreseeable shortage of cement” (9). At his house in Orange Farm, a run-down district 40km south of Johannesburg, Richard “Bricks” Mokolo, a former footballer and a spokesman for the Anti-Privatisation Forum, predicted: “The World Cup will be our chance to make our voices heard.”

Translated by Donald Hounam

(1) See Steven Otter, Khayelitsha, uMlungu in a township, Penguin Books SA, Johannesburg, October 2007. He describes the shantytown where he lived as the only white in a black neighbourhood while he studied journalism.

(2) On 10 March 2008 the Cape Town High Court ordered their removal to temporary accommodation in Delft.

(3) His office did not respond to our requests for an interview.

(4) South Africa Human Development Report, United Nations Development Programme, New York, 2003.

(5) See Jean-Christophe Servant, “Johannesburg, un urbanisme sous pression”, video report for Géo.

(6) Kgalema Motlanthe, “Collective effort needed to achieve fundamental change”, ANC Today, vol 5, n° 4, 4-10 March 2005.

(7) See Johann Rossouw, “This is break point for the ANC”, and Aoife Kavanagh, “Jacob Zuma: president or prisoner?”, Le Monde diplomatique, English edition, February 2008.

(8) See the video documentary Dear Mandela.

(9) “Mission to South Africa”, UN Human Rights Council, A/HRC/7/16/Add3, New York, 29 February 2008.

Le Monde diplomatique: Surveilliance, the Law & the Rules

Le Monde diplomatique
March 2008

Surveillance, the Law and the Rules

France established a national security alert system, Plan Vigipirate, in 1978 to mobilise police if a foreign power tried to provoke domestic destabilisation. After 9/11 the legislation was extended to counter terrorism. Private enterprise took advantage of the new climate of fear and now, thanks to the surveillance industry, order reigns without a police presence.

by Martin Mongin

Everywhere we go – supermarkets, car parks, shopping malls,
offices, railway stations, universities, museums, sporting
events, even public libraries – we are under surveillance. We
have got used to showing identity documents and letting
security professionals search our bags. We do what we are
told.

In France over the past decade the security industry grew by
an average 8.5% a year. It employed 150,000 people in 2007
and is expected to employ another 60,000 by 2015 (1). Plan
Vigipirate – and the war on terror – have served as
convenient pretexts for shops and offices to bring in
security personnel. We are constantly told that this is for
our comfort and security. But the real motivation is
economic: to deter thieves, prevent damage and ensure the
appropriate use of public facilities and spaces. The purpose
of security guards and their technology (CCTV, alarm systems)
is to guarantee the security of the establishment – its
goods, fittings, personnel and takings.

The presence of guards across the entire social field is
having invisible effects whose origin can be traced back to a
fundamental confusion about their status, function and
powers: what exactly is this “security” that guards are
supposed to guarantee and which justifies the constant
increase in their numbers? The media rarely examine the issue
from a legal point of view. This ill-defined occupation, with
its enormous potential for abuse, creates ambiguity around
itself. Daily encounters with guards lead people to confuse
distinct conceptual and geographical spheres of social life
and to adopt inappropriate behaviour. Their omnipresence
tends to blur the major distinctions that constitute society:
between public and private spaces and between the law and
mere regulations (rules set by an institution).

The security industry encompasses a wide range of professions
(security guards, fire safety officers, anti-theft agents,
dog-handlers, CCTV operators, patrol officers) and activities
(on-site security, money transportation, personal security,
surveillance, handling technical equipment). On the grounds
that they are all related to security, functions multiply and
often overlap: a fire safety officer may also handle crowd
control in a museum or deal with suspects in a mall.

Imperceptible slippage

According to the industry, a guard’s work “mainly consists of
greeting visitors and controlling access, patrolling
premises, overseeing safety procedures, responding to
emergencies, alerting and guiding emergency teams, and
writing reports on events” (2). But this definition entails
an imperceptible slippage from investigation to prevention
and thence to intervention and even repression. In most cases
the public have little idea of the extent of a guard’s
powers. There are certain uniform constants – epaulettes,
badge, earpiece, walkie-talkie – the main purpose of which is
to establish an asymmetrical relationship, based upon
authority and power, that has no legal standing.

In a white paper published in 2003, Quebec’s ministry of
public security pointed to “one of the main problems that
private security poses today in western countries, the
overlapping of roles between the public services and private
security… The absence of regulations of deontology and
ethics governing the private security industry is likely to
create a vast confusion… as regards practices which are
acceptable and those that are not… Such a situation can
also cause citizens to confuse the mandate of protecting a
client’s profits, by the owner of a private security agency,
and the mandate of public security of the policemen, towards
the community” (3).

In France employers, ill-informed or determined to exploit
the situation, often grant security personnel rights to which
they are not entitled (4). But, as strict regulations
stipulate, security guards are not police officers. “In the
exercise of their functions, [security personnel] must wear a
distinguishing uniform. There must, however, be no risk of
confusion with the uniforms worn by agents of the public
services, specifically the national or local police, or
customs agents” (5).

From a symbolic point of view security guards, however
dressed, present themselves as representing the law, or at
least as representing its representatives. I use the word
“symbolic” because the origin of the complex of invisible
effects produced by the presence of guards can be traced back
to the impressions that they inspire in people. There is
nothing subjective about this: the impressions are
considered, deliberate, and sustained. A calculated attempt
to inspire fear underlies the generation of this power of
deterrence.

If the police stand between the individual and the law,
security guards should stand only between the citizen and the
police. They should be on the side of the forces of law and
order, whom they should warn of any offence committed; but
they should be no more than an extra link in the process of
applying the law. In practice, they have other
responsibilities – observing, monitoring and raising the
alarm; operating in the name of security-related imperatives;
overseeing the observance of a prescriptive code; sometimes
equipped to respond to violence; initiating a relationship of
power or authority – all of which confuse the public mind.
Everywhere they are employed, they threaten us with the law.

Just ordinary citizens

It is extraordinary that the media never make the crucial
point that security guards are just ordinary citizens with no
more powers, privileges or authority than the rest of us.
Most of the time they exceed their authority, but they are as
subject to the law as we are (6). Like anyone, a security
guard can make a citizen’s arrest, as defined by article 73
of the French criminal code, but only if the offender is
caught in the act of committing an offence punishable by
imprisonment. Every citizen has powers that security guards
are reluctant to concede. In reality such offences, along
with the fires and illnesses that guards are supposed to look
out for, remain infrequent. (Perhaps they’re just very
efficient at preventing them.) The problem is that, unlike
the official fire, police and ambulance services, who are
called only after an incident, guards must wait patiently for
a problem to arise. And if it does not they may be tempted to
counter boredom or justify their presence by latching on to
more trivial events.

Their everyday work has far less to do with the law than with
regulation. They spend much less time arresting alleged
delinquents, and detaining them until the arrival of the
police, than ensuring that the public observes the internal
regulations of commercial spaces (7): no food to be consumed
outside designated areas; no flash photography; no
distribution of political leaflets; no sharp objects; no
sitting on the grass. Guards are there to enforce regulations
like these, even if they have no formal authority to do so.

Security personnel operate in privileged spaces that have
been described as “mass private property” (8). Although malls
and multiplexes are private spaces managed by an individual
or company, they are open to the public and much of our
social life occurs within them. These ambivalent spaces are
distinguished from traditional public places by the fact that
they are functional. That is, their raison d’être and
legitimacy of access and use are predetermined, and coded by
a set of internal rules. The area will be sub-divided into
mono-functional units (rest room, eating area, smoking room)
where people know exactly what they are allowed to do, where
every movement has been plotted in advance, every action
anticipated. It is a logical space, based on a finite system
of necessary relations between objects, people and signs,
every part of which is subordinated to the realisation of
this general plan.

Only those individuals willing to conform to that plan are
welcome. Supermarkets, car parks, cinemas and museums are all
functional spaces. Anybody who does not respect their
functions, or who breaks their rules, may not have broken the
law, but is “undesirable”. Management will be tempted to
restrict access, distinguishing between those who are welcome
(clients, subscribers, users, consumers, workers) and those
who are undesirable (loiterers, gangs of teenagers,
demonstrators): every individual who enters the space
simultaneously belongs to both categories.

Pranks and offences

Supermarkets use advertising and free parking to attract
consumers, throw open their (automatic) doors and greet new
arrivals with a smile. In principle, and reluctantly, every
visitor must be welcomed as a potential consumer; but, again
in principle, that visitor is also suspect and therefore
undesirable as a potential delinquent. The guards are there
to prevent or handle any event that goes beyond the
functional framework, because every incident has a cost,
however minimal, for the manager of a commercial
establishment, in turnover, attendance, reputation or image.

The function of guards is purely preventive. They have the
right to be present and to advise the public of the
establishment’s internal regulations. But if those
regulations are infringed, they have no power to deal with
the offence themselves. All they can do is point out the
rules, record the incident and, if appropriate, summon the
police.

In practice the guard’s uniform, behaviour and attitude plays
on the double register of law and regulation, and tends to
inflate a prank into an offence and the most minor event into
an act of delinquency. “Deviant” individuals, confused as to
whether they are really dealing with a representative of the
law, tend to accept the rebuke as a legal call to order. They
assume that their behaviour is illegal, rather than merely
inappropriate.

The confusion is partly due to the formalisation of an
informal power relationship. It is the result, not so much of
the existence of internal rules as such, but of the decision
to have them applied by professionals from outside the
establishment. Until recently it was up to the
establishment’s personnel (librarians, shop managers, counter
clerks) to deal informally, in a humane, spontaneous fashion,
with anyone who breached the rules. Now guards, employed by
subcontractors, are responsible for applying the letter of
the law, following set procedures, informing their superiors,
writing reports and accounting for their actions. Flexible
power relations have given way to mechanical procedures. The
same causes must always have the same effects.

The philosopher Michel Foucault showed how invisible effects
could be produced by this sustained confusion between the
regimes of the law and of regulation, a confusion
characteristic of disciplinary societies. “It succeeds in
making the power to punish natural and legitimate, in
lowering at least the threshold of tolerance to penality. It
tends to efface what may be exorbitant in the exercise of
punishment. It does this by playing… the legal register of
justice and the extra-legal register of discipline against
each other” (9).

The effect of the presence of security guards in public
places, or places to which the public is admitted, is to
overlay the social field with the logic of what Foucault
called the carceral world, giving legal endorsement to
disciplinary mechanisms and the decisions and punishments
that they imply. “Carceral continuity and the diffusion of
the prison-form make it possible to legalise, or in any case
to legitimate disciplinary power, which thus avoids any
element of excess or abuse it may entail… By operating at
every level of the social body and by mingling ceaselessly
the art of rectifying and the right to punish, the
universality of the carceral lowers the level from which it
becomes natural and acceptable to be punished” (10).

The regime of the rule, to whose extension guards contribute,
threatens to undermine individual freedom. It persuades
people to accept relations of authority more easily, to be
more subservient to displays of power, to normalise their
behaviour, and to repress any eccentricity or extravagance.
In the process it pre-empts any political demonstration or
act of civil disobedience that might prevent its own renewal.

In the name of the necessities of an alleged “security” that
requires justification, those in charge of mass private
property call on visitors to respect regulations that are
often a threat to liberty, and employ professionals to
supervise them. There is something fascistic about this;
although it is best described as micro-fascism (11). There is
no over-arching plan determining its application, no
individual instigator, no founding text to enounce its
general doctrine, no conspiracy. There is merely a coming
together of individual wills that reinforce each other to
constitute a diffuse authoritarian regime whose centre is
everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere – a regime that
offers little purchase for anyone seeking to topple it.
________________________________________________________

Martin Mongin is a professor of philosophy and a member of
the Institut de démobilisation in Rennes

(1) See the website of the SNES, France’s national union of
security companies, http://www.e-snes.org

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ministère de la Sécurité publique, “Private Security:
Partner in Internal Security”, Quebec, 2003;
http://www.msp.gouv.qc.ca/police/pu…

(4) The French national rail company, the SNCF, sometimes
expects its security guards to carry out the functions of the
transport police. See Paul Stilatti and Olivier Cyran, “Quand
la SNCF sous-traite le gardiennage”, CQFD, 14, Marseille,
July 2004.

(5) Law 83-629 of 12 July 1983 on private security
operations, article 10.

(6) Ibid, article 13.

(7) In its list of security and surveillance skills, the SNES
website specifically mentions “checking onsite security
procedures”, “overseeing the application of the procedures
laid down” and “enforcing the regulations”.

(8) See Clifford D Shearing and Philip C Stenning, “La
propriété privée de masse”, Problèmes politiques et sociaux,
La Documentation française, Paris, November 2006.

(9) Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the
Prison, Penguin, London, 1991.

(10) Ibid.

(11) See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Two Regimes of
Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975-1995, Semiotext(e), Los
Angeles, 2006.

Translated by Donald Hounam

http://MondeDiplo.com/2008/03/08surveillance (enclosed behind a subscriber firewall)